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I. INTRODUCTION 
The armed forces of the United States are organizationally strong. All 
branches and communities have proud histories, cultural traditions, and 
members motivated by patriotism as well as personal career goals. The 
institutional strength of the military, however, also makes it vulnerable to 
political pressures that can undermine its culture. Because everyone must follow 
orders, the armed forces are a prime venue for social engineering. Some civilians 
believe in “social constructionism” the idea that fundamental human 
characteristics, including gender differences other than obvious anatomy, are 
learned behaviors that can be radically changed. Some want to construct a new 
gender-free military, putting to the ultimate test theories about the 
interchangeability of women and men in all roles. 
Independent review of social change in the armed forces is critically 
important. Our gender-integrated volunteer force is at war and undergoing 
radical organizational and cultural change at the same time. Individual men and 
women stand between our nation and enemies who would do us harm, but the 
success of their mission depends on a complex organization that is more 
demanding than anything in civilian life. This institution asks courageous men 
and women to surrender their individuality and independence, many of their 
personal rights, and sometimes their very lives. The rest of us should lend 
support by guarding the strength and integrity of the institution in which they 
serve. 
A. The Importance of Objective Analysis 
On January 27, 1967, a deadly accident occurred that could have stalled 
America’s program of space exploration indefinitely. During a pre-launch test of 
the Apollo One spacecraft,1 an electrical spark ignited the pure-oxygen 
atmosphere inside the cramped capsule, killing astronauts Virgil Grissom, 
Edward White, and Roger Chafee.2 Critics demanded to know why the 
mechanical and electrical engineers of the National Aeronautic and Space 
Administration (NASA) failed to recognize the inherent dangers of operating in 
a pure-oxygen environment. In the aftermath of that tragedy, NASA made 
choices that are instructive to another institution today: the United States 
military. In 1967, a pure-oxygen atmosphere was thought to be the best for 
sustaining human life in orbit; pure-oxygen systems weighed less than mixed-
 
 1. Apollo One is the official name given retroactively to the Apollo/Saturn 204 (AS-204) 
spacecraft. See National Air and Space Museum, Apollo One Summary of Events, Jan. 27, 1967, 
http://www.nasm.si.edu/collections/imagery/apollo/AS01/a01sum.htm (last visited May 1, 
2007). 
 2. Mary C. White, NASA History, Detailed Biographies of Apollo 1 Crew—Epilogue (Aug. 4, 
2006), http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/Apollo204/zorn/epilog.htm. 
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gas systems and had been deployed successfully in the Mercury and Gemini 
missions.3 This basic assumption would prove to be both flawed and fatal. 
Moreover, indicators of trouble immediately preceding the fire—including 
communication problems, a “sour smell” in the spacesuit loop, and a sudden, 
unexplained rise in oxygen flow to the spacesuits—were noted but disregarded. 
Tragically, only eight seconds after Grissom reported fire in the cockpit, the 
astronauts perished in a fireball that melted and fused their spacesuits.4 
NASA temporarily suspended the Apollo program and conducted a full 
investigation. During that critical time, NASA engineers could have defended 
their previous assumptions regarding the benefits of a pure-oxygen atmosphere 
in orbit. They could have defined as their goal the perfection of spacecraft 
machinery—that is, using pure-oxygen atmospheres in all orbiting spacecraft, 
with “zero tolerance” of sparks. Instead, NASA engineers challenged and 
objectively reevaluated the basic assumptions that had guided the space 
program prior to the fire. As a result, the pure-oxygen system aboard the Apollo 
spacecraft was replaced with a less volatile mixed-gas atmosphere. Furthermore, 
redundant backup systems that presumed both imperfection and potential 
failures were built into all spacecraft systems and machinery. Less than two 
years after the Apollo One fire, in December 1968, Apollo Eight became the first 
manned mission to successfully orbit the moon. 
This episode in American history teaches lessons that are applicable not 
only to rocket science but also to social science. The mechanical engineers of 
NASA objectively reevaluated their basic assumptions, analyzed their mistakes, 
and implemented steps to prevent predictable and avoidable disasters. By 
contrast, social engineers out to change the culture of America’s military have 
refused to reevaluate their basic assumptions and have disregarded the negative 
consequences of their own mistakes. Young men and women are being asked to 
risk their lives in the equivalent of a volatile, pure-oxygen atmosphere—an 
environment that social engineers insist will “work” as long as the military 
enforces zero tolerance of “sparks.” This theoretical hubris disregards human 
failings, which are even more common than imperfections in spacecraft 
 
 3. Conversation with Capt. Walter M. Schirra, U.S. Navy (Ret.), one of the original seven 
Mercury astronauts, in San Diego, Cal. (Mar. 1994). See also NASA, REPORT OF APOLLO 204 REVIEW 
BOARD, at pt. IV (Apr. 5, 1967) (“The test was conducted with . . . a 100-percent oxygen 
atmosphere.”), available at http://history.nasa.gov/Apollo204/content.html; id. at app. D-11-9. 
The purge with 100-percent O2 at above sea-level pressure contributed to the propagation 
of fire in the Apollo 204 Spacecraft. . . . This was the planned cabin environment for testing 
and launch, since prelaunch denitrogenation is necessary to forestall the possibility of 
bends at the mission ambient pressure of 5 pounds per square inch absolute. A 
comprehensive review of the operational and physiological trade-offs of the various 
methods of denitrogenation is in progress. 
Id. 
The Apollo One tragedy had been foreshadowed six years earlier, in 1961, when Valentin 
Bondarenko, a Soviet cosmonaut trainee, was horribly burned and killed in an accidental fire inside 
an isolation chamber with a high-oxygen environment. The USSR concealed that calamity from the 
public for many years. James Oberg observed, “The mere knowledge that a Soviet oxygen-rich fire 
had killed a cosmonaut might have been enough to forestall an American repetition of the disaster.” 
See JAMES E. OBERG, UNCOVERING SOVIET DISASTERS: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF GLASNOST 170 (1988). 
 4. National Air and Space Museum, supra note 1. 
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machinery. Like NASA, our military cannot operate on presumptions of 
perfection especially when lives and national security are at risk. 
In recent years of accelerated cultural change in the military, social 
engineers have taken advantage of certain political sensitivities to stifle objective 
analysis. To a certain extent, reticence about social problems in the military is 
understandable—Americans are enormously proud of the men and women who 
serve in the All-Volunteer Force. Nevertheless, straightforward debate about 
military social policies does not constitute criticism of men and women in 
uniform. In many ways, these men and women are like courageous astronauts 
who do not themselves make the decisions and policies under which they will 
live, and sometimes die, in the pursuit of a noble cause. 
Pride in our astronauts does not preclude criticism of NASA. When flawed 
presumptions and engineering mistakes lead to unnecessary disaster and death, 
Americans and their elected representatives have the right—and, indeed, the 
responsibility to demand objective analysis, unflinching candor, accountability 
for violations of law and policy, and constructive steps to remedy problems that 
elevate risks. In the same way, Americans have every right to question the 
flawed assumptions of social engineers who demand radical change in the 
culture of the military. 
There is reason for concern about civilian and military advocates who want 
to order female soldiers into or near direct ground combat, institutionalize 
different standards in training and disciplinary matters, and force the 
acceptance of open homosexuality in military units that offer little or no privacy. 
Members of Congress have the constitutional responsibility to question such 
policies, both before and after they are implemented. There are no compelling 
reasons to elevate risks unnecessarily, or to make military life more difficult and 
dangerous for the men and women who volunteer to serve. 
B. Standard of Review 
There has not been an official, comprehensive analysis of social policies 
involving women in the military since 1992, when Congress established the 
Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces 
(“Presidential Commission”).5 Congress directed the Presidential Commission to 
 
 5. See generally PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE ARMED 
FORCES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: WOMEN IN COMBAT (1992) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL 
COMMISSION REPORT]. The fifteen retired military and civilian members of the Presidential 
Commission, appointed by then-President George H.W. Bush, included both advocates and 
opponents of women in combat. As a result, the Commission’s findings were comprehensive and 
not limited to a predetermined “consensus.” Commissioners requested and received testimony and 
detailed documents from the Department of Defense and all of the service communities throughout 
twenty-seven days of transcribed meetings in Washington, D.C., Chicago, Los Angeles, and Dallas. 
Retired officers, enlisted men and women, family-support professionals, members of Congress, 
combat veterans, religious and cultural leaders, foreign military representatives, training instructors, 
physiologists, military historians, and active duty men and women testified or spoke to 
commissioners during twenty-seven field trips to military locations. Members of the military were 
encouraged to express their opinions freely on either side of a wide variety of issues, provided that 
they had a rationale. A majority of commissioners voted against the deployment of women in air 
combat, most direct ground combat communities, and submarines, but they did not object to the 
presence of women on large surface ships such as aircraft carriers. Commission votes on major 
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report findings and develop recommendations on a wide range of issues 
surrounding the deployment of women in ground, sea, and air combat.6 
Furthermore, the Presidential Commission intensely debated the standard of 
review to be applied in formulating recommendations—that is, whether higher 
priority should be assigned to military readiness or to other concerns such as 
“diversity” and equal employment opportunity. A majority of commissioners 
supported a resolution assigning higher priority to overarching, classic concerns 
such as military necessity and effectiveness in time of war.7 Some 
commissioners, however, were reluctant to endorse even a non-binding 
resolution assigning higher priority to military necessity than to equal 
opportunity and other considerations.8 
Differences of opinion on issues involving gender in the military hinge on 
the standard of review applied. Some activists expect the military to pay any 
 
recommendations occurred on November 3, 1992, the same day that President Bill Clinton was 
elected. Congress did not schedule hearings on the Presidential Commission’s recommendations 
and substantive findings, many of which remain relevant to close combat issues in the news today. 
 6. The issues considered included the history and nature of warfare, physiology, psychology, 
sociology, family and cultural values, the legal consequences of a change in regulations affecting 
military women, and, most importantly, the overarching, classic concerns of the military itself—
namely, combat readiness, unit cohesion, and military effectiveness. 
 7. A consistent case against women in combat was set forth in the “Alternative Views” section 
of the Presidential Commission Report. See id. at 43–79. This section advocated a standard of review 
articulated by then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney on March 26, 1992: 
[I]t’s important for us to remember that what we are asked to do here in the Department 
of Defense is to defend the nation. The only reason we exist is to be prepared to fight and 
win wars. We’re not a social welfare agency. . . . This is a military organization. Decisions 
we make have to be taken based upon those kinds of considerations and only those kinds 
of considerations. 
Id. at 43 (alteration added). See also Center for Military Readiness, The Case Against Women in 
Combat (Dec. 12, 2001), http://www.cmrlink.org/printfriendly.asp?docID=65 (summarizing the 
Alternative Views section of the Presidential Commission Report). The Presidential Commission Report 
also contained statements of individual commissioners who supported women in combat. See 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 80–121. 
 8. See Transcript, Meeting of the Presidential Commission, Wash., D.C., Oct. 22, 1992, 
6:00 p.m. EST to adjournment (on file with author). Commissioner Kate O’Beirne, sponsor of the 
non-binding resolution, said, “It seems to me appropriate to adopt a standard of review that our 
decisions are based on the needs of the military. That’s what [is] paramount in our mind.” Id. 
Commissioner Meredith Neizer disagreed on the need for such a resolution: “It’s military readiness, 
it’s military effectiveness, but that’s not always the only criteria.” Id. Commissioner Darryl 
Henderson said, “I don’t think we have a mutually exclusive situation here.” Id. Commissioner 
Donnelly added, “[C]oncern about military necessity does not preclude concern about equal 
opportunity. It’s a matter of priorities. People who are not convinced that women should be in 
combat are sometimes accused of being opposed to the rights of women, and it’s not so. That’s not 
the intent of the resolution.” Id. Some commissioners voting against the resolution said they would 
have preferred a resolution using the phrase “combat effectiveness,” a phrase used in the 
commission’s authorizing legislation. Id. Others noted that federal courts frequently have used the 
phrase “military necessity” in rulings deferring to the military, and that some policies that are not 
consistent with military necessity, such as gender-based recruiting quotas, have nothing to do with 
combat effectiveness. Id. Subsequent votes and statements by some commissioners favoring the 
integration of women into all combat communities indicated a preference for equal opportunity as 
the priority consideration, even when “performance” was cited as the primary goal. See, e.g., 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 90–92 (presenting a “Dissent on Ground 
Combat” signed by three commissioners). 
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price and bear any burden to promote careers, equal opportunity, or “diversity” 
as a primary goal. For example, Lt. Col. Anthony D. Reyes, appointed Chief of 
an Army Diversity Office established in 2005, advocates a complete repeal of 
women’s exemptions from all forms of direct combat as a way to promote 
“workforce diversity” in the ranks of flag officers.9 Other activists promote the 
cause of homosexuals in the military as a civil rights and equal opportunity 
issue, a stance that assigns higher priority to the desires of individuals than to 
the needs of the military. 
Regardless of the gender-related issue in question, social engineers suggest 
that “leadership” and “sensitivity training” can solve all problems.10 This is 
tantamount to suggesting that perfect machines are sufficient to prevent sparks 
and combustion in a pure-oxygen environment. This paper will analyze policies 
that have needlessly complicated social policies in America’s military and 
weakened the foundations of a structure that must remain strong. Objective 
analysis is the only way to prevent problems that vitiate readiness, discipline, 
and morale in the only military we have. 
II. DOUBLE STANDARDS INVOLVING WOMEN (DSIW) 
UNDERMINE MILITARY STRUCTURE 
Studies of gender in the military usually center on women, but the subject 
cannot be discussed without also analyzing the men who make and implement 
the policies designed by social engineers. When feminists and their allies 
demand policies “for women,” Pentagon policymakers appear to become 
 
 9. LT. COL. ANTHONY D. REYES, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, 
MILITARY FELLOW RESEARCH REPORT, STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR MANAGING DIVERSITY IN THE U.S. 
ARMY ix (June 2006), available at http://www.jointcenter.org/publications1/publication-PDFs/ 
TonyReyes.pdf. Lt. Col. Reyes noted that only seven to eight percent of black officers enter the 
combat branches, which account for fifty-nine percent of the Army’s generals. Id. at 1–2. He argued 
that giving women access to the combat “pipeline” would increase diversity in the senior ranks. Id. 
at 2. See also Kelly Kennedy, Women in Combat Arms?, ARMY TIMES, Nov. 27, 2006, at 16. 
Officers holding any grade of admiral or general are referred to as “flag officers” because they are 
entitled to have a flag designating their rank displayed at their place of duty. 
 10. See, e.g., SEC’Y OF THE ARMY, 1 SENIOR REVIEW PANEL REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 2–3, 
15–25 (July 1997) (examining problems with sexual misconduct at Aberdeen Proving Ground and 
Army training facilities generally; recommending an extra week of “sensitivity” training for all 
recruits, conducted by diversity experts with a mandate to expand and engineer equal-opportunity 
programs). See also Tranette Ledford & G.E. Willis, After Aberdeen, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at 3–4, 
6; Sean D. Naylor, Values Instruction to be Added to Basic Training, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at 4 
(noting that the planned extra week of training would cost the Army the equivalent of “three 
battalions worth of soldiers”); Philip Shenon, Army’s Leadership Blamed in Report on Sexual Abuses, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1997, at A1; Editorial, America’s Lovesick Military, N.Y. POST, Sept. 15, 1997, at 22. 
Several reports on sexual misconduct at the service academies have advocated more hours of 
diversity or sensitivity training to increase acceptance of female cadets and midshipmen. See, e.g., 
REPORT OF THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT & VIOLENCE AT THE MILITARY SERVICE 
ACADEMIES 37–41 (June 2005) [hereinafter DEFENSE TASK FORCE REPORT], available at 
http://www.sapr.mil/contents/references/high_gpo_rrc_tx.pdf. Homosexuals are not eligible to 
serve in the military, but on September 8, 1994, the Department of Defense and the military services 
were official co-sponsors of a “Diversity Day Training Event,” which invited civilian advocates to 
promote “tolerance” of the homosexual lifestyle and cause with lectures, panel discussions, and 
videos. See infra note 411 and accompanying text. 
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defensive and lose perspective. Men, it seems, cannot objectively deal with 
issues involving women. In turn, social engineers take advantage of the 
Pentagon’s defensiveness by trying to suspend, circumvent, or redefine 
standard principles, including the concept of “equality.” The idea of equality has 
been rendered almost meaningless because of inconsistent policies that this 
Article will refer to as “Double Standards Involving Women,” or “DSIW.” The 
acronym applies in many situations created in the pursuit of what feminists 
envision as a “gender free” or “ungendered” military.11 
The military is a prime venue for social engineering because everyone in 
the chain of command must follow orders, and all are ultimately under civilian 
control. Some advocates suggest that the duty to follow orders is so absolute 
that dissent on social policies is unprofessional at best and mutinous at worst.12 
If the same standard were applied to the Pentagon’s decisions about weapon 
systems, officers would have to remain silent about poorly designed equipment 
that creates unnecessary risks or detracts from the effectiveness of military 
missions. Although the U.S. Constitution properly assigns control of the military 
to civilians, political correctness within the Pentagon has become a formidable, 
vitiating force. Despite these political pressures, policy makers should be held 
accountable for policies that they tolerate or impose on the military—
particularly the various, demoralizing forms of DSIW that are harmful to 
women, men, and the military as a whole. 
It must be noted that female soldiers are not the primary cause of DSIW 
and should not be held responsible for its consequences. Most military women 
do not make policy—any more than most military men do. The problems 
evident in gender-integrated units—on land, at sea, and in the air are usually 
caused when policymakers depart from sound principles that are applied in all 
other defense policy matters. 
In previous decades, the military proudly led the way for positive social 
change in matters of civil rights. President Harry Truman signed an Executive 
Order banning racial segregation in the military13—an egalitarian move that 
 
 11. See, e.g., Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 
751 (1996) (“[T]here is much to be gained and little to be lost by changing this aspect of military 
culture from a masculinist vision of unalloyed aggressivity to an ungendered vision combining 
aggressivity with compassion.” (alteration added)). In a February 1993 interview with Vogue 
magazine, Barbara S. Pope, former Assistant Navy Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 
commented on reports that investigations of the 1991 Tailhook scandal had become abusive. “We are 
in the process of weeding out the white male as norm,” she said. “We’re about changing the 
culture.” See Stephanie Guttman, Sex and the Soldier, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 1997, at 20. 
 12. Military personnel evaluation forms have a checkbox indicating support for equal 
opportunity (EO) programs. Personnel expressing dissent on EO matters for any reason have been 
subject to career penalties, including denial of promotions, demotion, or dismissal. See, e.g., Becky 
Garrison, Carkhuff Will Stay, But Will He Fly Again?, NAVY TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at 17 (reporting the 
case of Lt. Cmdr. Ken Carkhuff, a Navy helicopter pilot who was almost dismissed from the Navy 
because he expressed reservations—but did not disobey orders—regarding women in combat 
aviation); Rowan Scarborough, Grounded Navy Pilot Calls Nonflying Jobs Career-Ending, WASH. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 1995, at A2 (same). 
 13. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948) (“There shall be equality of 
treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, 
religion or national origin . . . .”). 
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advanced the needs of the military without simultaneously requiring changes in 
the military standards, principles, or culture.14 To the contrary, the history of 
gender integration in the military has been marred by convoluted double 
standards, which are only worsened by official denials that such double 
standards even exist. Many “experts” fail to acknowledge the double standards 
that are common knowledge among military personnel. Pervasive forms of 
DSIW—which feminists constantly say they oppose but expect to be 
implemented anyway vitiate sound principles necessary to support a strong 
and ready volunteer force.15 The best way to improve the status of women 
would be to end to all forms of DSIW in the military, and to restore high, 
uncompromised standards and sound priorities that benefit women, men, and 
the armed forces as a whole. 
A. Current Department of Defense (DoD) Regulations and Law 
Prior to March 2003, America had little experience with female soldiers in 
or near direct ground combat. The 1991 Persian Gulf War was the largest 
deployment of female soldiers in modern history, and women served effectively 
in support roles.16 Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, however, were 
relatively brief, and the Department of Defense was not able to draw 
conclusions about the abilities of women in combat roles.17 Nevertheless, lessons 
learned in the Persian Gulf War could have been useful in formulating policies 
that would advance both the interests of women and the needs of the military. 
 
 14. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-40 (Findings 1.33, 1.33A). 
 15. See, e.g., BRIAN MITCHELL, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: FLIRTING WITH DISASTER 99–122 (1998). 
In a chapter titled “DACOWITS 1, Army 0,” Mitchell described the earnest attempt by Army Chief 
of Staff Gen. Edward C. “Shy” Meyer to analyze the role of female soldiers and establish objective 
standards for performance commensurate with the demands of given military occupational 
specialties (MOS) in time of war. His “Women in the Army” (WITA) study began in May 1980 and 
was initially presented to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) 
in August 1982. At first DACOWITS welcomed the study, but three months later civilian and former 
military feminists successfully pressured DACOWITS to oppose the WITA recommendations as 
“barriers” to women’s careers. By the fall of 1983, Gen. Meyer had retired and a civilian civil rights 
lawyer with no military experience was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower 
and Reserve Affairs. As a result, most of the WITA recommendations to close certain positions to 
women, and to establish objective standards for physically demanding military occupations 
specialties, were repealed, made optional, or dropped. Following what Mitchell called the 
“emasculation” of WITA, there have been no attempts in the Army to establish objective standards 
for physically challenging occupational specialties; nor are there likely to be any additional attempts 
in the near future. Instead, the armed forces and military service academies have adopted various 
gender-norming techniques that evaluate or grade female trainees differently. Gender-normed 
standards—considered more “fair” for women—give credit for “equal effort” rather than equal 
results. (Brian Mitchell’s book was originally published in 1989 under the title Weak Link: The 
Feminization of the Military.) 
 16. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-47 (Finding 1.55). Approximately 
37,000 Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force women deployed in the war. The Commission also 
received data from the various services indicating that servicewomen experienced a rate of non-
deployability of approximately 3:1 in comparison to men in each of the services, largely due to 
pregnancy. Id. at C-120 (Finding 3.54). 
 17. Id. at C-40, C-49 (Findings 1.35, 1.63, respectively). 
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That opportunity was lost in September 1991, when a sex scandal embarrassed 
the Navy and put Pentagon officials on the defensive. 
1. The Tailhook Turning Point 
a. Defensiveness and DSIW 
At the 1991 Tailhook Association convention in Las Vegas, a group of male 
and female naval aviators celebrated the end of the Persian Gulf War by 
partying wildly. On June 24, 1992, Navy Lt. Paula Coughlin tearfully told ABC 
News that she had been harassed and physically assaulted by male aviators 
lined up in a hotel corridor “gauntlet.”18 
Disciplining the male aviators for “conduct unbecoming” and changing 
Navy culture to prevent a recurrence certainly was justified, but media and 
political pressures on the Navy became excessively intense. Feminists, their 
allies in Congress, and the media essentially demanded that all men present at 
Tailhook ‘91 be punished, whether they were guilty of misconduct or not.19 
When a preliminary report on Tailhook was prematurely leaked to the media, 
then-Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III resigned. Dissatisfied 
congressional feminists, led by Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.), berated the 
Joint Chiefs for “not getting it.”20 Senior House Armed Services Committee 
member Schroeder and other angry members of Congress, such as Rep. John 
Murtha (D-Pa.) and Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), also threatened to withhold 
appropriation funds for personnel and weapons systems, and to block military 
promotions, if Navy officials did not make amends for Tailhook.21 
When the investigation was shifted from the Navy to the Department of 
Defense Inspector General, the situation began to spin so out of control as to 
violate the due process rights of the male aviators. In the rush to obtain 
convictions, overzealous prosecutors gave immunity to junior officers in 
exchange for testimony against senior commanders, and standard legal 
safeguards were suspended during intense, abusive interrogations.22 
 
 18. Transcript, ABC World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast June 24, 1992, 6:30 p.m. EST); 
John Lancaster, A Gantlet of Terror, Frustration: Navy Pilot Recounts Tailhook Incident, WASH. POST, 
June 24, 1992, at A1. 
 19. See Rowan Scarborough, Open Season on Navy, WASH. TIMES, July 20, 1992, at A1 [hereinafter 
Scarborough, Open Season on Navy]. 
 20. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Senate Women Lose Fight to Pull Rank, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1994, at 
A1 (published with an Associated Press photograph of Rep. Schroeder and eight more 
congresswomen walking to the Senate to oppose the retirement in rank of Adm. Frank B. Kelso, who 
was the Chief of Naval Operations during the Tailhook controversy); William Matthews, The Woman 
the Pentagon Loves to Hate, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 7, 1992, at 8; James Webb, Witch Hunt in the Navy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1992, at A23. 
 21. See, e.g., Scarborough, Open Season on Navy, supra note 19 (“Rep. Patricia Schroeder, 
Colorado Democrat, is using Tailhook to promote the women’s movement.”); Matthews, supra note 
20 (“‘[Schroeder] has broken a lot of ground for women in the military and a lot of women really 
respect her. But military men? She threatens them. She is a woman in a position to control the fate of 
boys’ toys.’” (quoting Cathryn Schultz of the Center for Defense Information) (alteration added)). 
 22. Webb, supra note 20; Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Judge Fires Prosecutor for Misconduct, 
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1994, at A3 [hereinafter Scarborough, Tailhook Judge Fires Prosecutor for 
Misconduct]; Editorial, End the Witch Hunt, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 19, 1992, at G2; Peter J. 
Boyer, Admiral Boorda’s War, NEW YORKER, Sept. 16, 2006, at 72–75; Col. W. Hays Parks, Tailhook: 
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Newspapers nationwide began to report on what became known as the Tailhook 
“witch-hook” i.e., unfair punishments of Navy men but not women, even after 
some men had been cleared of misconduct.23 
Although most cases were dismissed immediately for lack of evidence, 
thirty-nine male officers received nonjudicial punishment for various types of 
misconduct, drunkenness, and false statements.24 Cases involving misconduct by 
women, however, were treated with a gender-based double standard that had 
been established by the DoD Inspector General. For example, while men were 
punished for indecent exposure and engaging in suggestive leg shaving, a 
female officer known to have been partying topless and several other women 
who also had participated in heavy drinking, inappropriate touching of men, 
and the leg shaving ritual, were not punished.25 The same double standard was 
applied in cases of adultery at Tailhook.26 A female officer told investigators 
from the Inspector General’s office that three officers attempted to gang rape 
her.27 Subsequently, she admitted that she had lied, stating that she had 
consensual sex with one of the officers in question but did not want her fiancé to 
 
What Happened, Why & What’s to be Learned, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., Sept. 1994, at 89–103 [hereinafter 
Parks, Tailhook: What Happened, Why & What’s to be Learned]. Col. Parks described various threats and 
unnecessarily degrading or intrusive questions used to extract evidence. Id. at 102. Regarding the 
conduct of the Tailhook investigators, Judge Robert E. Wiss of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals 
wrote: 
The assembly-line technique in this case that merged and blurred investigative and justice 
procedures is troublesome. At best, it reflects a most curiously careless and amateurish 
approach to a very high-profile case by experienced military lawyers and investigators. At 
worst, it raises the possibility of a shadiness in respecting the rights of military members 
caught up in a criminal investigation that cannot be condoned. 
Samples v. United States, 38 M.J. 482, 487 (C.M.A. 1994). 
 23. Webb, supra note 20; Boyer, supra note 22, at 74 (“The Department of Defense regularly 
granted immunity to junior officers in the hope of ensnaring their squadron commanders, who thus 
became permanently ‘implicated’ even if they were subsequently cleared of wrongdoing.”). See, e.g., 
Richard Cohen, Keelhauling Commander Stumpf, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at A15. See also Robert J. 
Caldwell, Closing Tailhook’s Bleeding Wound, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 15, 1996, at G-1 (reporting 
that one officer, Lt. John Cooney, U.S. Navy, was “implicated” and punished despite his insistence 
that he was not even at Tailhook and despite later verification of his alibi with dated receipts); 
Editorial, The Navy’s Anita Hill, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 24, 1993, at 2B. 
 24. Parks, Tailhook: What Happened, Why & What’s to be Learned, supra note 22, at 101–03 (noting 
that the DoD Acting Inspector General had forwarded 140 cases for review—not “referred” them for 
prosecution—and that more than half were dismissed immediately for lack of evidence or the lack of 
commission of a criminal offense). See also Gregory Vistica, Tailhook Snagging Men Only, Lets Women 
Off, Say Attorneys, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 27, 1993, at A1; Rowan Scarborough, Navy Morale 
Sunk by Tailhook Probe, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at A1; and Rowan Scarborough, Only 3 Assault 
Cases in Tailhook Scandal, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at A1. 
 25. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE TAILHOOK REPORT, at VIII-1–2 (1993) [hereinafter 
TAILHOOK REPORT]; Parks, Tailhook: What Happened, Why & What’s to be Learned, supra note 22, at 101 
(“DoD IG [Inspector General] policy established for the Tailhook investigation was that it would not 
include misconduct by female officers.”). 
 26. Parks, Tailhook: What Happened, Why & What’s to be Learned, supra note 22, at 101. 
 27. Id. at 101; Vistica, supra note 24; Elaine Donnelly, The Tailhook Scandals, NAT’L REV., Mar. 7, 
1994, at 61 [hereinafter Donnelly, The Tailhook Scandals]. 
04__DONNELLY.DOC 6/18/2007  3:01 PM 
 CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY 825 
know of her activities.28 The men were punished, but the female officer was not 
held accountable for her dishonest accusation.29 
In February 1994, Capt. William T. Vest, a Navy judge, blasted DoD 
officials for bungled, amateurish witness interview reports that could not stand 
up in court.30 Judge Vest justifiably threw out the last of three pending courts-
martial due to violations of due process. The Association of Naval Aviation 
(ANA) reported that at least 152 Navy officers were directly affected by 
Tailhook-related letters of censure, non-judicial punishments, career-ending 
 
 28. See Editorial, Tailhook Fever, WALL STREET J., Mar. 12, 1996, at A18; Rowan Scarborough, 
Tailhook Witness Told Lies, WASH. TIMES, July 23, 1993, at A1. This statement also is based on 
numerous interviews with key Navy officials who were involved in or implicated by the Tailhook 
investigation, including former Navy Judge Advocate General Rear Adm. John “Ted” Gordon, U.S. 
Navy (Ret.), former Commander of the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) Rear Adm. Duval M. 
Williams, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Rear Adm. Riley Mixson, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Cmdr. Robert E. Stumpf, 
USN, and several others who were unjustly punished in various ways. 
 29. Parks, Tailhook: What Happened, Why & What’s to be Learned, supra note 22, at 101; Donnelly, 
The Tailhook Scandals, supra note 27. Several flag officers also were unfairly scapegoated in media 
reports. See Parks, Tailhook: What Happened, Why & What’s to be Learned, supra note 22, at 96–98; 
Donnelly, The Tailhook Scandals, supra note 27, at 59–60 (based on personal interviews and 
correspondence in 1993 with Rear Adms. Mixson, Williams, and Gordon). Acting Navy Secretary 
Sean O’Keefe falsely claimed at a September 1992 news conference that Rear Adms. John Gordon 
and Duval Williams were retiring as a matter of “conscience.” In truth, Adm. Gordon was scheduled 
to retire at that time; he did not resign due to Tailhook. Four weeks later, Acting Secretary O’Keefe 
issued a memorandum clearing Rear Adms. Williams, Gordon, and George W. Davis, the Navy 
Inspector General, of wrongdoing. On Feb. 14, 1995, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) inserted a statement in 
the Congressional Record correcting misinformation about the retirement of Rear Adm. Gordon, the 
former Navy Judge Advocate General, making it clear that Gordon had not done anything to 
warrant adverse actions. 141 Cong Rec S2667 (1995) (statement of Sen. Nunn). 
In one of the more egregious cases of Tailhook injustice, a career-ending letter of censure was 
issued to Rear Adm. Riley Mixson in 1993, punishing him for Tailhook convention arrangements 
made by others in 1991. Rear Adm. Mixson was busy elsewhere at that time, serving as Commander 
Battle Force Red Sea, leading a three carrier battle force and numerous allied ships in the air/surface 
campaign in Operation Desert Storm. In 2003, Navy Secretary Gordon England convened a board of 
review, which cleared Mixson’s name and removed the unwarranted letter of censure from his file. 
In June 2002, another prominent Tailhook target, former Blue Angel Cmdr. Robert E. Stumpf, 
finally received his deserved promotion to the rank of captain, which had been bureaucratically 
ensnared in the Senate’s “Tailhook Certification”process. Capt. Stumpf, an exemplary officer who 
probably would have achieved flag rank, celebrated his retroactive promotion on the same day that 
he retired from the Navy. 
 30. Scarborough, Tailhook Judge Fires Prosecutor for Misconduct, supra note 22; Donnelly, The 
Tailhook Scandals, supra note 27, at 59–60. Rear Adm. John Gordon, the Navy Judge Advocate 
General, predicted that numerous violations of due process rights by the Acting DoD Inspector Gen. 
Derek J. Vander Schaaf, including bungled interviews, would result in the dismissal of all court 
martial cases. In an interview with The San Diego Union-Tribune, Gordon commented, “[T]he 
politicians took charge, taint[ing] evidence and the process. Improper command influence ruined the 
investigations and ruined the prosecutions.” See Robert J. Caldwell, Hollywood’s Half-True Tailhook, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 28, 1995, at G1. The dismissal of the last three pending courts martial 
on February 8, 1992, proved Gordon to be correct. 
During subsequent litigation brought by Lt. Paula Coughlin against the Tailhook Association and 
Hilton Hotels, Judge Philip M. Pro, a United States district court judge in Las Vegas, criticized the 
DoD Inspector General’s investigatory techniques and ruled that the report was “largely conclusory 
and based upon hearsay indicating its lack of trustworthiness.” Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass’n, No. 93-
044 (D. Nev. Sept. 2, 1994). See also John F. Harris, U.S. Judge Says Tailhook Report Won’t Fly, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 8, 1994, at A8. 
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correspondence, fines, adverse evaluations, forced resignations, and other 
adverse actions.31 Since there were only three courts-martial, however, 
dissatisfied feminists created the false impression that the men had gotten off 
easy.32 
b. Feminists Take Advantage of Navy Scandal 
Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) wasted no time seizing upon the Tailhook 
scandal to force the embarrassed Navy to accept female pilots into tactical 
aviation. The liberal congresswoman sponsored and passed an amendment in 
the House version of the 1992 Defense Authorization bill, which repealed the 
law that exempted women from combat aviation.33 She saw the acceptance of 
female pilots as the first step in transforming the unruly “culture” of the male-
dominated aviation community.34 Rep. Schroeder’s harsh criticism of the Navy 
pressured the organization to rush the training of women in combat aviation, 
with tragic consequences.35 Yet, Rep. Schroeder’s demands presented a cultural 
contradiction. In essence, she and the advocates of women in combat were 
arguing that violence against women in a Las Vegas hotel corridor was wrong, 
but combat violence against women, at the hands of the enemy, was perfectly all 
right. 
The illogic of Rep. Schroeder’s position escaped the attention of House 
Armed Services Committee members who, without prior hearings, hastily 
approved her amendment to open combat aviation to women. On June 18, 1991, 
the Senate Armed Services Committee did conduct a comprehensive and 
balanced hearing on the Schroeder amendment. Several advocates testified in 
favor of the change, but members of the Joint Chiefs testified in opposition to the 
legislation. 
The Senate legislation that was proposed as a substitute for the Schroeder 
bill called for the establishment of a presidential commission to study all aspects 
of the issue. Just prior to the floor vote, then-Secretary of Defense Richard 
Cheney expressed support for the presidential commission legislation, but 
equivocated on Rep. Schroeder’s amendment to put women in combat aviation. 
Taking a “ready, fire, aim” approach, the Senate passed legislation repealing the 
law regarding women in combat aviation,36 while simultaneously establishing a 
presidential commission to analyze and report on what that would mean.37 
 
 31. Jerry Unruh, The Flight Plan: Impact of Tailhook, WINGS OF GOLD (Ass’n of Naval Aviation), 
Summer 1996, at 12–13. 
 32. Ellen Goodman, The Navy Got Away With It, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 1994. 
 33. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, 
§ 531, 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991) (opening naval aviation to women and repealing 10 U.S.C. § 8549 
(1956), which barred Air Force women from assignment to “duty in aircraft engaged in combat 
missions”). 
 34. Women in the Military: The Tailhook Affair and the Problem of Sexual Harassment: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Mil. Personnel & Compensation of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs. & Def. Pol’y Panel, 102d 
Cong. 25 (Sept. 14, 1992) (statement of Rep. Schroeder). 
 35. See infra Part II.D. 
 36. Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 531, 105 Stat. at 1365. 
 37. Id. § 541, 105 Stat. at 1450. 
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c. The 1992 Presidential Commission Study and Report 
Throughout 1992, while the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of 
Women in the Armed Forces conducted its study, the administration of 
President George H.W. Bush refrained from assigning women to combat 
aviation. On November 3, 1992, the day that the Presidential Commission voted 
to oppose the use of women in most types of combat, including aviation, 
President Bush lost his bid for re-election. Thereafter, in 1993, Congress was 
preoccupied with then-President Bill Clinton’s demand that homosexuals be 
allowed to serve openly in the military. Although there were no full-scale 
hearings on the extensive findings and recommendations of the Presidential 
Commission, Congress repealed the law that exempted women from service on 
combatant ships.38 Navy officials embarrassed by the Tailhook scandal were 
reluctant to oppose the legislation. With most combatant ships and aircraft 
opened to women, nothing remained except Department of Defense regulations 
exempting women from involuntary assignments in or near direct ground 
combat units, such as the infantry. 
However, Congress was clear in that it did not want the Pentagon to order 
women into direct ground combat.39 The National Defense Authorization Acts 
for Fiscal Year 1994 and subsequent years have included language safeguarding 
congressional oversight on matters of women in combat.40 If the Pentagon wants 
to change these regulations regarding women in ground combat, the Secretary 
of Defense must approve and formally notify Congress thirty consecutive 
legislative days (approximately three months) in advance.41 Such notice must 
include an analysis of the effect of the proposed changes on the exemption of 
 
 38. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 541, 107 Stat. 
1547, 1659 (1993) (repealing 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1991), which barred women from assignment to “duty 
on vessels that are engaged in combat missions (other than as aviation officers as part of an air wing 
or other air element assigned to such a vessel)” and from assignment to “other than temporary duty 
on other vessels of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels of a similar classification 
not expected to be assigned combat missions”). 
 39. JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 118–19 (1983). 
Contrary to popular belief, Congress never enacted a statute that specifically exempted women from 
ground combat. Unlike specific ships and aircraft on combatant missions, ground combat units were 
more difficult for Congress to define. Members also trusted that the Pentagon would never assign 
women to ground combat units such as the infantry. 
 40. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 541, 107 Stat. at 1659. 
 41. Id. § 542, 107 Stat. at 1659–60. The FY 1994 congressional notification law regarding direct 
ground combat was reinforced and expanded in the FY 2001 and 2002 NDAAs. See National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 573, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-136 (2000) 
(enacting 10 U.S.C. § 6035 (2000) (requiring the Secretary of Defense to give Congress a thirty-day 
notice before either assigning women to serve aboard submarines or configuring submarines to 
allow for women’s service)); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-107, § 591, 115 Stat. 1012, 1125 (2002) (amending the law from FY 1994). The notification law 
regarding direct ground combat was restated in the FY 2006 NDAA. See National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 541(a)(1), 119 Stat. 3136, 3251 (2006) 
(enacting 10 U.S.C. § 652 (West Supp. 2007)). 
Legislation sponsored by Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.), and enacted as part of the FY 2001 and 
2002 NDAAs, mandated official notice to Congress at least thirty legislative days (when both Houses 
are in session) before women are assigned to submarines as well as direct ground combat. 
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young women from Selective Service obligations,42 which the Supreme Court 
previously has tied to their exemption from ground combat.43 
d. The Aspin Regulations 
On April 28, 1993, then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin issued a 
memorandum announcing that he was going to begin the training of female 
pilots for tactical aviation, promote repeal of the remaining law regarding 
combatant ships, and make significant changes in DoD regulations regarding 
the assignment of servicewomen in or near close combat.44 On January 13, 1994, 
Secretary Aspin followed up on his plan by issuing a two-page memorandum 
setting forth regulations that would govern the assignment of women in or near 
direct ground combat. In addition, the memorandum provided a definition of 
what constitutes direct ground combat.45 The 1994 regulations, known as the 
Aspin rules, apply to all the military services and remain in effect today. 
With identical letters dated January 21, 1994, Secretary Aspin officially 
reported the rule changes to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House 
and Senate Armed Services Committees.46 The new rule and definition of direct 
ground combat provided: 
A. Rule. Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which 
they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to 
units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct 
combat on the ground, as defined below: 
B. Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with 
individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a 
high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. 
Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating 
and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.47 
The new combat definition permitted four additional restrictions on the 
assignment of women: 
• Where the Service Secretary attests that the costs of appropriate berthing and 
privacy arrangements are prohibitive; 
• Where units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate 
and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women; 
 
 42. 10 U.S.C. § 652. 
 43. See generally Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
 44. See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force et al., Policy on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces (April 28, 1993) 
[hereinafter Policy on the Assignment of Women]. 
 45. See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force et al., Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (Jan. 13, 1994) 
[hereinafter Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule], available at http://cmr 
link.org/cmrnotes/lesaspin%20dgc%20defassign%20rule%20011394.pdf. 
 46. See Letters from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to House Armed Services Committee 
Chairman Ronald V. Dellums and Ranking Member Floyd Spence, and to Senate Armed Services 
Committee Chairman Sam Nunn and Ranking Member Strom Thurmond (Jan. 21, 1994). 
 47. Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, supra note 45. 
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• Where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and 
Special Operations Forces missions; and 
• Where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast 
majority of women service members.48 
On July 28, 1994, Aspin’s successor, William J. Perry, approved lists of units 
that would be opened or closed to women, in compliance with the Aspin 
regulations announced on January 13.49 
The most significant changes set forth in the Aspin regulations were: (1) the 
elimination of the so-called “DoD Risk Rule,”50 which exempted women from 
assignments in close proximity to close combat units, and (2) the removal of the 
phrase “substantial risk of capture” from the definition of direct ground combat. 
In general, the DoD Risk Rule had made it possible for women to volunteer for 
military service without being forced to serve in units operating in or near the 
front lines of direct ground combat. Although not a perfect standard, the Risk 
Rule reflected the then-prevailing view that female soldiers in support units 
should not be needlessly exposed to risk of injury, death, or capture while 
serving in close proximity with close combat units such as the infantry, armor, 
field artillery, Marine infantry, and Special Operations Forces. 
Eliminating the DoD Risk Rule and changing the definition of direct 
ground combat made available to women hundreds of military occupational 
specialties and approximately 80,699 positions on land, as well as a total of 
259,199 positions in all the military services, since 1993.51 These newly opened 
positions included some brigade-level headquarters of direct ground combat 
units, and support units that do not routinely “collocate” with direct ground 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense William Perry to the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force et al., Application of the Definition of Direct Ground Combat and Assignment 
Rule (July 28, 1994) [hereinafter Application of Direct Ground Combat Definition and Rule], available 
at http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/wjperry%20letter%20072894. 
 50. The Department of Defense established the Risk Rule in 1988 to help standardize the 
services’ assignment of women to hostile areas. In evaluating whether a non-combat position should 
be closed to women, each service interpreted the DoD Risk Rule according to its own mission 
requirements. The Risk Rule read as follows: 
[R]isks of direct combat, exposure to hostile fire, or capture are proper criteria for closing 
non-combat positions or units to women, when the type, degree, and duration of such risk 
are equal to or greater than the combat units with which they are normally associated 
within a given theater of operations. 
See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-36 (Findings 1.16, 1.17); see also Center for 
Military Readiness, Policy Analysis: Why American Servicewomen are Serving at Greater Risk (Apr. 2003) 
http://cmrlink.org/CMRNotes/M38V8CCMRRPT16.pdf. 
 51. See Dep’t of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs News Release No. 
449-94, Positions and Occupations Open to Active Duty Women by Service, As of October 1, 1994 
(July 29, 1994); Lists of open and closed positions submitted by the services and approved by 
Defense Secretary William J. Perry on July 28, 1994 (on file with author); Table provided by Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness titled “Positons Opened Since April 1993” on July 28, 
1994 (on file with author) See also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: INFORMATION ON 
DOD’S ASSIGNMENT POLICY AND DIRECT GROUND COMBAT DEFINITION (1998), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99007.pdf. 
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combat units at the battalion level.52 The Aspin regulations continued to exempt 
female soldiers from assignments in smaller direct ground combat battalions, 
such as the infantry, armor, field artillery, Marine infantry, Special Operations 
Forces such as the Rangers and Navy SEALS, and Special Operations Forces 
helicopters. Lastly, the Aspin regulations exempted women from assignment in 
support units that constantly “collocate” or embed with direct ground combat 
units such as the infantry.53 
e. Female Soldiers Serving at Greater Risk 
The full effect of the rule changes that constituted the Aspin regulations did 
not become apparent until nine years later. On March 23, 2003, four days into 
the ground war in Iraq, the 507th Maintenance Unit, operating with a Patriot 
Missile Battery of the 3rd Infantry Division, took a wrong turn on the road near 
the city of Nasiriyah and was ambushed.54 Absent the DoD Risk Rule, which was 
abolished in 1994, the gender-integrated support unit was part of a column of 
support troops accompanying the aggressive 3rd Infantry Division on its way to 
liberate Baghdad.55 
Within hours the nation witnessed on television the frightened face of 
captured Army Spec. Shoshana Johnson on Al Jazeera TV, together with four 
fellow soldiers. The Iraqi video also showed the bodies of several dead 
American soldiers, some of whom appeared to have been shot at point blank 
range.56 Among the missing were Pfc. Lori Piestewa, a young single mother of 
 
 52. Larger brigades, which are composed of several battalions, are composed of approximately 
3600 to 3900 soldiers. Smaller battalions usually include 700 to 800 soldiers. 
 53. See infra Part II.A.2.b. 
 54. See Richard S. Lowry, The Story of Jessica Lynch: What Really Happened in Nasiriyah, DAILY 
STANDARD (online), Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/ 
000/000/013/568yzaz.asp. Lowry described the actions of Marines who fought at Nasirayah and 
Army Sergeant Donald Walters, whose vehicle got stuck in the sand. See id. Walters was caught 
fifteen miles behind enemy lines and “resisted for as long as he could. He probably ‘fought to his last 
bullet.’ He was captured alive and taken to an Iraqi stronghold and later murdered.” Id. Lowry 
added, 
The story of the Marines’ battle to secure Nasiriyah is an amazing saga that everyone 
should read. The battle was filled with individual acts of heroism. A Distinguished Flying 
Cross, two Navy Crosses, a handful of Silver Stars, and a larger handful of Bronze Stars 
were awarded for valor in the battle. Sergeant Donald Walters was awarded a Silver Star, 
as well. Donald was a sandy-haired young man. Some believe that it was an intercepted 
Iraqi radio report of his ordeal that was somehow attributed to Jessica Lynch, the only 
blond female in the unit. 
Id. See also Jane McHugh, Navigation Error Led to Attack on Convoy, ARMY TIMES, July 21, 2003, available 
at http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/0-ARMYPAPER-2009767.php; Howard L. Rosenberg, 
Nightline: The Real Story of Pfc. Jessica Lynch’s Convoy (ABC television broadcast June 17, 2003) 
(transcript available at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=128387 (Part 1); http://abc 
news.go.com/Nightline/story?id=128389 (Part 2)). See also Laura Cruz, 507th “Fought Hard,” EL 
PASO TIMES, July 9, 2003, at 1A. 
 55. If the DoD Risk Rule had still been in effect, it is possible that this and similar support units 
would have been all-male or, if gender-integrated, assigned elsewhere until the completion of direct 
ground combat operations, i.e., the direct ground combat attack on Baghdad. 
 56. Paul Martin, U.S. Calls Footage of POWs “Disgusting,” WASH. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2003, at A01. 
There were conflicting accounts of how many bodies were visible on the video [broadcast 
on Al Jazeera], but all agreed that at least four persons could be seen in U.S. Army 
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two toddlers, and nineteen-year-old Pfc. Jessica Lynch.57 This was a surprise to 
many Americans, including the parents of female soldiers, who thought there 
were rules against women in close combat.58 
Nine days later, Marines and Special Operations Forces found the body of 
Pfc. Piestewa in a shallow grave near the civilian hospital where they had 
rescued Pfc. Jessica Lynch.59 In a front page Washington Post story that captivated 
the world, Pfc. Lynch was initially and erroneously described as a teenage “Girl 
Rambo” warrior who had fired all her ammunition killing Iraqis before she was 
captured.60 Some feminists hailed the capture of Shoshana Johnson and the “GI 
Jane” image of Pfc. Lynch as examples of women’s ability to fight in combat, 
which they considered justification for advancement of other feminist goals.61 
Although doctors who had examined Pfc. Lynch in Germany knew otherwise, 
they and Pentagon officials did not correct the hyped-up legend that had grown 
up around her. It was not the fault of Pfc. Lynch that her story became 
distorted—in fact, she courageously told the painful truth in a network 
television interview and in her book, I Am a Soldier Too.62 
Pfc. Lynch and her friend Pfc. Piestewa were injured during the ambush 
and horribly abused in the hours immediately following their capture. 
According to medical reports, Pfc. Lynch was anally raped, many of her bones 
 
uniforms, some of them lying in pools of blood. At least two of them appeared to have 
died from wounds to the head. The video also showed individual interviews with five 
prisoners, several of whom appeared to be extremely frightened. The one woman among 
the prisoners [Spc. Shoshawna Johnson] had a large bandage around her ankle, and one of 
the men was lying on a blanket and had to be assisted to sit up. 
Id. (alterations added). See also Lowry, supra note 54. 
 57. Chris Roberts, Associated Press, Texas Army Post, Kin Horrified About POWs, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 25, 2003. 
 58. See Lowry, supra note 54; Kari Huus, POW Video Reopens Gender Debate, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 
25, 2003, http://www.msnbc.com/news/890275.asp; Cathy Booth Thomas, Taken by Surprise: This 
Single Mom Joined the Army to be a Cook. How Did She Become a POW?, TIME, Apr. 7, 2003, at 64–65. 
 59. See Lowry, supra note 54 (describing this as the first successful rescue of an American POW 
since WWII; what made it even more remarkable is that it occurred in the center of a war-torn city 
and was precisely executed without a single casualty). See also Bill Gertz, Military Begins Effort to 
Identify 11 Bodies: Remains Found in Rescue of Lynch, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at A1; Joyce Howard 
Price, Military Identifies Recovered Bodies, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at A1 (in which Air Force Maj. 
Gen. Gene Renuart of U.S. Central Command in Qatar said, “They did not have shovels in order to 
dig those graves up, so they dug them up with their hands.”). 
 60. Susan Schmidt & Vernon Loeb, She Was Fighting to the Death, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2003, at 
A1. A flag-bedecked photo of a smiling Jessica Lynch in her uniform highlighted the article, which 
was republished worldwide. On April 20, 2003, The Washington Post ombudsman Michael Getler 
wrote in an article that the story was thinly sourced and probably not true. Michael Getler, 
Ombudsman, Reporting Private Lynch, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2003, at B06. See also Lowry, supra note 
54 (writing that Lynch and Piestewa were initially taken to the Tykar Military Hospital, which was 
near the ambush site and later identified as the headquarters of Saddam Hussein’s henchman 
“Chemical Ali,” where hundreds of gas masks, protective chemical suits, and a torture chamber 
were found). 
 61. See, e.g., Editorial, The Pinking of the Armed Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2003, at A14; Anne 
Applebaum, When Women Go to War, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2003, at A17; Richard Sandomir, Citing 
Role of Women in War, Burk Raises Pressure on Augusta, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at S1 (describing 
Martha Burk’s campaign to convince the Augusta National Golf Club to admit women because 
female soldiers were serving in the war). 
 62. RICK BRAGG, I AM A SOLDIER TOO: THE JESSICA LYNCH STORY (2003). 
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were broken, and she barely survived.63 Lynch was unconscious for 
approximately four hours following the ambush attack on her Humvee. Sexual 
assault probably occurred during that time, and most likely in the first building 
where she and other captives were taken, described in some news reports as a 
Fedayeen headquarters building that included a medical aid station.64 At some 
point the severely injured Pfc. Lynch was taken to the civilian Hussein hospital 
in Nasiriyah, where she awakened. Iraqi doctors and nurses said they comforted 
and cared for Lynch until April 1, 2003, when she was rescued by a combined 
Special Operations Forces Team.65 
On December 30, 2003, NBC News briefly aired a video obtained from an 
Iraqi source, which was probably taken at the first facility where the captives 
had been taken.66 The video, which received little public notice when it aired, 
 
 63. Prime Time Live (ABC television broadcast Nov. 11, 2003) (transcript on file with author). 
Medical records from the American hospital in Germany indicated that “[Lynch] was a victim of 
anal sexual assault . . . [her] body armor and bloody uniform were found in a house near the ambush 
site.” Id. (alterations added). The records also noted “the traumatic nature of her peri-anal lesions.” 
Id. 
 64. Bill Gertz, Coalition Forces Uncover Iraqi Torture Chambers, Graves, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2003, 
at A11 (reporting that U.S. Marines had uncovered a torture chamber near Nasiriyah on April 8; in a 
“hospital room,” the Marines found a car battery next to a metal bed frame that apparently was used 
as an electric-shock device; and photos of burned and tortured bodies were found nearby). See also 
Intelligence Tip, Local Iraqis Help Cited in POW Rescue, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2003, at A10. Most reports 
failed to acknowledge that there were two locations involved, though some reports said the captives 
were initially taken to a Fedayeen headquarters with a small medical facility placed inside to deter 
air attacks. The Washington Times quoted MSNBC correspondent Kerry Sanders, who accompanied 
U.S. troops investigating what happened after the ambush, as stating: 
“The forces found a bloodied U.S. uniform, of a kind used by female soldiers, when they 
seized another hospital, used by Iraqi forces, in Nasiriyah last week, Mr. Sanders said. 
MSNBC reported that Pfc. Lynch originally was held at the nearby hospital where Marines 
found the bloody uniform. They also found a room with a bed and large battery next to it, 
indicating that it had been used as a torture chamber.” 
Id. Pfc. Lynch, who was reportedly unconscious for approximately four hours at the first building, 
has no memory of that time. Id. It is possible that video of the captured soldiers, including some who 
had been shot at point-blank range, was taken at this building, which was subsequently destroyed. 
 65. See Lowry, supra note 54; Alan Feuer, Aftereffects: A Hospital Ward; Rescued Soldier’s Iraqi 
Doctors Doubled as Her Guardians, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, at A12; Dana Priest, William Booth & 
Susan Schmidt, A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together, WASH. POST, June 17, 2003, at A1; 
Michael Getler, Ombudsman, A Long, and Incomplete, Correction, WASH. POST, June 29, 2003, at B06; 
Sources Say Jessica Lynch Has Amnesia, FOXNEWS.COM, May 4, 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/ 
story/0,2933,85936,00.html; John Kampfner, Saving Private Lynch Story “Flawed” (BBC News 
broadcast May 15, 2003) (transcript available at http://newsw.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/ 
correspondent/3028585.stm). At some point Pfc. Lynch was taken to the Saddam Hussein General 
Hospital in Nasiriyah, where she received adequate care prior to her rescue. News accounts about 
Pfc. Lynch were generally confused for several reasons: The initial hype about Lynch’s heroism, the 
failure of hospital officials in Germany to correct those erroneous news reports, Lynch’s own 
amnesia, gag orders imposed on the Special Operations Forces troops who rescued Lynch, and 
European suspicions that the rescue had been staged. 
 66. Richard Engel, Tape Confirms Iraqis Tried to Save U.S. POWs (NBC television broadcast Dec. 
30, 2003). The headline on this news report is misleading and inconsistent with the troubling Iraqi 
video, which showed light bandages on the battered faces of the two women. Pfc. Lynch appeared 
pale and unconscious, while Pfc. Piestewa appeared to be in pain and near death. At the time of the 
NBC News report, legitimate Iraqi doctors who treated Pfc. Lynch at the Hussein hospital in 
Nasiriyah were insisting in news interviews that they had given Pfc. Lynch the best care possible. 
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showed the bloody and bruised faces of Pfc. Lynch and Pfc. Piestewa, the single 
mother of two toddlers, while in captivity.67 Pfc. Lynch appears deathly pale and 
unconscious, her eyes nearly closed and rolled back, lying on a bed next to her 
friend, Pfc. Piestewa, who would soon become the first female soldier killed in 
Iraq. Pfc. Piestewa’s battered and loosely bandaged face is shown grimacing in 
pain when a gloved hand jerks her body around to make her face more visible to 
the camera.68 
In her ABC Prime Time Live interview with Jessica Lynch, Diane Sawyer 
asked the wounded soldier whether it was difficult to include the truth in her 
book. Out of the mouth of a former Army private came words that star-studded 
generals have not had the courage to say. “Yes, it was,” Pfc. Lynch responded, 
“But, you know, if it did happen, then people need to know that that’s what 
kind of people that they are, and that’s how they treat the female soldiers that 
are over there.”69 Feminists suddenly dropped Lynch as their hero and remained 
largely silent as the death toll of military servicewomen continued to mount. 
Americans have been enormously impressed by the courage, loyalty to 
duty, and patriotism of women who have volunteered to serve in the current 
war. Support for women in the military is not an issue. Nevertheless, there are 
questions of policy that remain largely unexamined and unresolved. The Bush 
Administration has failed to direct Pentagon officials to find a way that female 
soldiers can proudly serve our country without exposing them to greater, 
unequal risk. 
2. Ground Combat: Violations of Policy and Law 
a. The Definition of “Combat” 
Definitions are important, and the word “combat” is frequently misused. 
Although Department of Defense (DoD) regulations regarding combat are not 
solely tied to “front lines,” they do draw important distinctions based on the 
mission of each different unit. For instance, in the current war, all deployed 
soldiers are “in harm’s way,” but direct ground combat (DGC) troops are 
specifically trained to engage and attack the enemy, while under fire, with 
deliberate offensive action. 
DoD regulations exempt female soldiers from direct ground combat units. 
Under the associated “collocation rule,” also set forth in the 1994 Aspin 
regulations, female soldiers are exempt from assignment in support units that 
are “collocated,” or “embedded,” with direct ground combat battalions below 
the brigade level. The “collocation rule,” therefore, serves to exempt female 
soldiers from combined infantry/armor maneuver battalions in the Army’s 
 
The previously undisclosed Iraqi video apparently was taken of the female captives elsewhere, 
probably at the first building where Pfc. Lynch and Pfc. Piestewa were taken immediately after the 
ambush. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Prime Time Live (ABC television broadcast Nov. 11, 2003). See also Elaine Donnelly, Jessica 
Lynch Reality Shatters Amazon Myths, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 30, 2003, at G1. 
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newly “transformed” modular brigade combat teams (BCTs),70 which used to be 
called “units of action (UAs).” Even in modular units, and battlefields that do 
not have “front lines,” the collocation rule is applicable and should be enforced. 
All soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan are “in harm’s way,” but the missions 
of infantry, armor, Marine infantry, Special Operations Forces, multiple launch 
rocket systems, and other specialized units, such as Military Transition Teams 
that train Iraqi men in combat skills, have not changed. Nor did DoD 
regulations regarding women in combat change during the Army’s 
transformation to modular brigade combat teams. Brigade-level troops provide 
support to combat battalions intermittently, coming and going from larger 
forward operating bases (FOBs). In contrast, collocated support troops and 
forward support companies are embedded and remain at the smaller battalion 
level one-hundred percent of the time. Brigade-level units are open to women, 
but combat-collocated support troops, at the “tip of the spear” battalion level, 
are required by regulation to be all-male.71 
The offensive missions of infantry and Special Operations Forces have not 
changed, but there are some borderline military occupational specialties that 
should be reevaluated. For example, military police units in Iraq have taken on 
new duties that involve more than traditional military law enforcement. That 
occupation should be reevaluated and possibly divided with occupational titles 
that reflect actual mission requirements. Gender assignment codes also should 
be reviewed and revised to comply with existing DoD regulations. If the Army 
wants to change those rules, Congress must receive notice of proposed changes 
well in advance, in compliance with laws mandating congressional oversight.72 
Some female soldiers and Marines have been assigned to assist infantry 
units by searching Iraqi civilians in “female search teams” (FSTs). Women 
performing this duty are in harm’s way and courageous, but since they are not 
trained to attack the enemy, their mission is not designated “direct ground 
combat” under the DoD definition. The use of female soldiers and Marines to 
assist in searches of female Iraqi civilians, or to participate in humanitarian 
missions, does not justify incremental repeal of women’s land combat 
exemptions.73 Nor is it prudent to keep assigning American women to perform 
 
 70. In the early 1990s, following the Persian Gulf War, the Army began to “draw down” and 
“transform” itself. Army divisions were reorganized as smaller, modular organizations, which were 
designed to be more flexible and agile than traditional divisions. These modular organizations, 
initially called “units of action” (UAs), later were named brigade combat teams (BCTs). Units 
operating with wheeled vehicles were called Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), and later 
Stryker Brigade Combat teams (SBCTs). A typical maneuver battalion in a brigade combat team 
combines infantry and heavy armor troops (tanks) with a collocated forward support company 
(FSC), which provides immediate support to the maneuver battalion. Brigade-level support troops 
come and go intermittently, but collocated FSCs constantly remain with the ground combat 
maneuver battalions. 
 71. Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, supra note 45. 
 72. See supra note notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 73. Sandra Jontz, Marine Raid Breaks Gender Barrier, STARS & STRIPES (Mideast ed.), May 4, 2005, 
available at http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=28044&archive=true. This article 
shows female Marines handing out stuffed animals to children and conducting female civilian 
searches, among other things. 
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this role, without training Iraqi women to do female security searches at a future 
time. 
b. Why the Collocation Rule Matters 
The collocation rule improves chances for survival and mission 
accomplishment in direct ground combat missions, such as the battles to liberate 
Baghdad in 2003 and Fallujah in November 2004. Soldiers and Marines in those 
fierce battles benefited from advanced technology, but their tasks still required 
them to have the ability to carry physical burdens that lie beyond the 
capabilities of most women.74 A collocated maintenance soldier is not trained to 
attack the enemy in deliberate offensive action, but he may be needed to 
physically lift and evacuate a wounded infantryman or Marine who has been 
injured and might die without immediate medical help. Ground combat soldiers 
today carry between eighty and one hundred pounds on their backs—about the 
same weight that Roman legionnaires carried in the days of Julius Caesar.75 
 
 74. See William Gregor, Not Equipped for Rigors of War, KANSAS CITY STAR, July 16, 2005, at B7. 
Dr. Gregor, a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel and military training expert who testified before the 
Presidential Commission on September 12, 1992, wrote: 
The public may not understand the debate over the assignment of women to direct combat 
roles. After all, Army women have been killed and wounded in the fight in Iraq. However, 
being subject to hostile fire is not the same as being assigned a direct combat role. The 
commuters on London’s Tube were subject to hostile fire and so are children on the streets 
of Baghdad . . . . The 1982 Women in the Army Policy Review observed that only eight 
percent of women were capable of performing jobs in the heavy work category and 
proposed a test for recruits to measure physical potential to be used in assigning 
occupational specialties. Because the test would have limited career field choices, feminists 
strongly objected, and it was dropped. 
Id. See also MITCHELL, supra note 15, at 104–22; infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 75. See Elizabeth Weise, Soldiers in Iraq Carry Extra Load: Back Pain, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 2005, at 
6D (reporting on a study that found “[m]ore than half of U.S. soldiers who have been medically 
evacuated from Iraq and treated at two of the military’s large pain treatment centers suffer not from 
battle wounds but from bad backs”). “Inherent in being a soldier is carrying large weights. 
Historically, the ideal ‘carry weight’ is a third of your body weight,” said Lt. Col. (Dr.) Frank 
Christopher, chief of deployment health at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Id. However, many troops in 
the field carry much more than that—up to 180 pounds, in some cases. See also Matthew Cox & Rick 
Maze, Troops Get Extra Armor, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at 14 (reporting that side plates in the new 
“Interceptor” body armor system have nearly doubled the weight of protective vests from sixteen to 
thirty-one pounds since March 2003). Both Army and Marine officials have warned members of 
Congress that “Every pound of protective gear hinders combat troops’ ability to hop over walls, 
search house after house and—when necessary—dive for cover.” Id. 
As new technologies emerge, the weight burden is likely to increase. See Matthew Cox, Fielding the 
Future NOW, From GPS to Helmet-Mounted Displays, Land Warrior Brings Cyberspace to Soldiers, ARMY 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2006, at 14 (showing photos of soldiers in full “Land Warrior” battle gear 
undergoing testing at Fort Lewis, Wash.). It is likely that soldiers will someday carry: (1) a helmet-
mounted computer display; (2) an audio headset with microphone; (3) a soldier-control unit for the 
Global Positioning System (GPS); (4) a multi-function laser equipped with an infrared illuminator 
and pointer; (5) a large rechargeable battery (to supply ten hours of power); (6) a navigation module 
with a GPS map to track the wearer’s position and positions of fellow soldiers; (7) a voice/data radio 
system for communications from platoon level up to unit headquarters; and (8) a micro-computer 
processor to manage information flow. Id. All of this equipment is estimated to weigh seventeen 
pounds and will replace items currently in use, which weigh about eight pounds. Id. In addition to 
these burdens, soldiers must also carry weapons, ammunition, food, and water. Indeed, the only 
item that has gotten lighter in modern military history is freeze-dried coffee. 
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There is no question that female soldiers are brave—this has been proven 
many times in the current war. But body size, strength, and physical closeness to 
direct ground combat troops during offensive operations, such as the attacks on 
Baghdad in March 2003 and Fallujah in November 2004, are factors that are 
important for survival and mission accomplishment.76 In direct ground combat, 
women do not have an equal opportunity to survive or to help fellow soldiers 
survive.77 Substituting women for men in combat-collocated support units 
increases danger for everyone, while introducing a host of disciplinary and 
deployability problems that would detract from unit cohesion, readiness, and 
morale. 
Both women and men in the military have a right to expect official 
compliance with policy and law. If Pentagon officials want to eliminate the 
collocation rule or any other regulation affecting women, they should make the 
case for those changes publicly—and in advance—as required by law. 
c. The 3rd Infantry (Unit of Action) Brigade Combat Team 
In March 2004, the U.S. Army began to depart from both DoD policy and 
the notification law regarding women in or near ground combat. Local 
commanders of a newly organized combined infantry/armor battalion, which 
was based at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and part of the 3rd Infantry Division, 
improperly assigned a female captain to command a forward support company 
(FSC), which was collocated with a direct ground combat battalion required by 
regulation to be all-male. The combined infantry/armor maneuver battalion, 
part of the “3rd ID,” was one of the first of the Army’s reorganized modular 
“units of action” to deploy to Iraq.78 The battalion-level forward support 
company in question was designed to collocate or to embed, one hundred 
 
 76. Id.; Gregor, supra note 74 (“Any male who meets Army entrance standards has the physical 
stature necessary to achieve the physical requirements for direct combat roles . . . . The general 
population of women is not so physically equipped.”). Dr. William Gregor, a retired Army Colonel 
and military training expert who testified before the Presidential Commission on September 12, 
1992, presented data showing a wide gap in physical capabilities in Army ROTC cadets. See 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-41 (Finding 1.39). Similar findings by Dr. 
Gregor, presented to the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related 
Issues, see infra note 290, on Dec. 2, 1998, are available at http://www.cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/ 
gibtapdx.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2007), at Appendix C. The Presidential Commission found that, 
“[i]n general, women are shorter, weigh less and have less muscle mass and have a greater relative 
fat content than men. . . . Female dynamic upper torso muscular strength is approximately fifty-sixty 
percent that of males . . . [and] female aerobic capacity [important for endurance] is approximately 
seventy to seventy-five percent that of males.” See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, 
at C-70 (Findings 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3) (alteration added). 
 77. George Neumayr, Your Mother’s Army, AM. SPECTATOR, May 2005, at 27. A Marine writing 
to Neumayr described an incident that occurred during his training of a gender-integrated Marine 
Reserve unit: 
During one training cycle . . . some of the women participated in an urban warfare course. 
One of them promptly broke her leg doing a spider drop out a window. Her smaller frame 
could not take the shock of landing after dropping approximately 6 feet while weighed 
down with all the equipment a Marine is expected to wear in battle. 
Id. 
 78. Correspondence between a known but confidential source at Fort Stewart, Ga., and the 
author (on file with author). 
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percent of the time, with the soldiers of the 4th Battalion, 64th Armored 
Regiment, known as the 4-64th. As such, the FSC fell under the extant DoD 
collocation rule, which required its personnel to be all male.79 
When the situation first became known in March 2004, the Office of the 
Army General Counsel informed 3rd ID commanders that any attempt to 
gender-integrate battalion level FSCs embedded with combined infantry/armor 
direct ground combat battalions, including the 4-64th’s forward support 
company, would constitute a violation of current policy and the congressional 
notification law.80 Within weeks, the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter 
Schoomaker, intervened. The 3rd ID Commander, Maj. Gen. William Webster, 
was told to bring the 4-64th infantry/armor battalion’s FSC back into 
compliance with Army policy and law. Appropriate reassignments were made, 
and the situation was resolved satisfactorily for everyone concerned. 
However, despite the compliance efforts and reassignments, a second 
attempt to unilaterally gender-integrate the 4-64th infantry/armor maneuver 
battalion’s collocated FSC apparently was initiated by the DoD Office of 
Personnel & Readiness, Army Human Resources Command officials, and 
commanders of the 3rd Infantry Division. Shortly thereafter, soldiers of the 4-
64th were ordered to administratively change their unit’s modified table of 
organization and equipment (MTOE)81 in order to accomplish two things: (1) 
administratively “assign” the FSC troops to the legally gender-integrated 
brigade support battalions, on paper only; and then (2) physically “attach” the 
FSC troops back to the maneuver battalion. 
In the 3rd ID and other divisions, brigade level positions that are “in 
harm’s way”—but not collocated with direct ground combat units such as the 
infantry are legally open to female soldiers. However, the smaller battalion-
level direct ground combat (DGC) units, and the support units (FSCs) that 
collocate with them, are required to be all-male. Soldiers in the formerly all-male 
forward support company, and the infantry/armor maneuver battalion with 
 
 79. Chain of Command Chart, 4th Battalion, 64th Armored Regiment (Apr. 15, 2004) (on file 
with author). 
 80. Telephone conversation between a female judge advocate general (JAG) and the author in 
Spring 2004. See also National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 591, 115 
Stat. 1012, 1125 (2001) (amending the FY 1994 off-code provision that was ultimately codified at 10 
U.S.C. § 652 (West Supp. 2007)). 
 81. An Army brigade is composed of approximately 3600 (infantry) to 3900 (heavy armor) 
soldiers, and battalions include 700 to 800 soldiers. Each Army unit has a table of organization and 
equipment (TOE) or modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), which lists every billet 
and piece of equipment that is assigned to that unit. The MTOE computer chart for personnel 
includes a column for gender codes, as designated by the Army’s “direct combat probability code” 
(DCPC) system. Units coded “P-1” are open to males only. Units coded “P-2” are open to both 
genders. In the 3rd ID, soldiers were ordered to remove combat-collocated FSC soldiers from the 
MTOEs of the combined infantry/armor maneuver battalions. Instead, these personnel were 
included on the MTOE lists of legally gender-mixed brigade-level support units. This was done even 
though FSC soldiers, some of them female, were physically “attached” to all-male maneuver 
battalions. An Army briefing titled “Combat Exclusion Quick Look Options,” dated May 10, 2004, 
admitted that this administrative strategy could be seen as “subterfuge” to circumvent current 
policy and law. See Dep’t of the Army, Combat Exclusion Quick Look Options 14 (May 10, 2004) 
[hereinafter Combat Exclusion Quick Look Options], available at http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/ce-
qlo%20051004.pdf. 
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which it was collocated, were well aware that the unusual administrative 
paperwork was contrived as a way to circumvent DoD policy and the 
congressional notification law. 
In the 3rd ID and other reorganized “brigade combat teams,” known as 
BCTs, modular direct ground combat maneuver battalions were ordered to do 
the same thing. Contrary to the DoD collocation rule, an undisclosed number of 
female soldiers have been “employed” in FSCs that are physically collocated 
with direct ground combat battalions.82 
d. Army Admits Strategy of “Subterfuge” 
The rationale and blueprint for gender integration in the 3rd ID were set 
forth in a twenty-two-page Army PowerPoint presentation, titled “Combat 
Exclusion Quick Look Options.”83 Among other things, the May 10, 2004, 
presentation attempted to justify circumvention of the collocation rule by 
drawing a distinction between the 1994 DoD regulations, promulgated by 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and “additional restrictions” that the Army had 
in place two years earlier.84 
This was an odd argument, for three reasons: (1) the 1992 Army regulations 
in question, AR 600-13,85 were superseded by the DoD regulations set forth by 
Secretary Les Aspin in January 1994;86 (2) the Army’s plans to implement the 
Aspin regulations were approved by Secretary Aspin’s successor, William J. 
Perry. Secretary Perry’s July 28, 1994, memorandum, approving the Army’s list 
of open and closed units, has not been overruled or changed by a successor;87 
and (3) the Army’s 1992 rules included a definition of “Direct Combat” that 
 
 82. E-mail correspondence from sources at Ft. Stewart, Ga., to author (beginning in Mar. 2004) 
(on file with the author); telephone conversations and meetings Army and DoD officials at the 
Pentagon and the author (Spring, Summer 2004); copies of modified table of organization and 
equipment (MTOE) lists obtained from a confidential source (on file with author). Throughout 2004, 
Army officials denied there were any female soldiers in the ground combat-collocated FSCs. 
However, in an interview with a Boston Globe reporter in January 2005, an Army spokesman finally 
admitted that “scores” of female soldiers were being assigned to FSCs at Fort Stewart, Ga. See Bryan 
Bender, U.S. Women Get Closer to Combat, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2005, at A1. 
 83. Combat Exclusion Quick Look Options, supra note 81, at 3–15. 
 84. Id. at 3, 13–15. This was a questionable attempt to justify or excuse the Secretary of the Army 
acting on his own, in circumvention of DoD regulations, to place female soldiers in ground combat-
collocated support units. The “additional restrictions” in the Army’s 1992 rules were minor. See infra 
note 85. But even if variations in the language of 1992 Army rules had been substantive, the 1994 
Aspin regulations superseded them. 
 85. Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers, AR 600-13 (effective April 27, 1992) 
[hereinafter Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers], available at http://www.armyg1. 
army.mil/eo/documents/ar600_13.pdf. In its 1992 rules, the Army defined Direct Ground Combat 
as: 
Engaging an enemy with individual or crew served weapons while being exposed to 
direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy’s personnel, 
and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy 
by fire, maneuver, and shock effect in order to destroy or capture the enemy, or while 
repelling the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack. 
Id. 
 86. Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, supra note 45. 
 87. Application of Direct Ground Combat Definition and Rule, supra note 49. 
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included a Risk Rule, similar to that of the DoD, which exempted female 
soldiers from direct ground combat and support units involving a “substantial 
risk of capture.”88 Secretary Aspin abolished the Risk Rule with his January 1994 
memorandum.89 Officials trying to claim that the Army’s 1992 rules are still in 
effect have to explain why the former Risk Rule is not in effect as well. 
Despite this and other points of misinformation, the May 10, 2004, “Combat 
Exclusion Quick Look Options” presentation was surprisingly candid about the 
Army’s intentions. At Fort Stewart, commanders of the 4-64th battalion 
conceded, in response to questions from soldiers, that the sole purpose of the 
contrived administrative change was to assign female soldiers to the ground 
combat-collocated FSC, without making formal changes to the DoD rules and 
without giving prior notice to Congress as required by law. The commanders’ 
actions were consistent with the May 10 “Quick Look Options” presentation, 
which included the “caveat” that this course of action “could be perceived as 
subterfuge to avoid [the] congressional reporting requirement.”90 Armor and 
infantry soldiers at Fort Stewart were aware of the pretense, but it was their 
duty to follow orders without comment or dissent. 
In addition, the “Quick Look Options” presentation conceded that the 
practice of administratively assigning the forward support company personnel 
to the legally open brigade level “does not solve collocation restrictions for 
female Soldier assignments.”91 Indeed, both this plan and a later version of it 
presented in a November 2004 Pentagon briefing depended on a subterfuge 
strategy.92 The entire plan constituted DSIW on an unprecedented scale. 
The May 10 “Quick Look Options” presentation suggested that there might 
not be enough male soldiers to fill the land “combat-collocated forward support 
companies, but Army officials did not provide any documentation to support 
those concerns.93 If a shortage of men is the problem, breaking the rules to place 
young women in units required to be all male is not the solution. 
As of July 2005, there were more than fifteen million men of military age—
eighteen to twenty-four—in the United States.94 Given the size of this 
demographic, a straightforward request from the President, asking young men 
to consider volunteering for the combat arms, would likely inspire sufficient 
numbers to respond positively. There is no compelling need to retain gender 
“goals” (i.e., quotas), which keep the numbers of women and mothers in the 
military artificially high.95 An end to gender quotas in the Army (which already 
 
 88. Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers, supra note 85. 
 89. Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, supra note 45. 
 90. Combat Exclusion Quick Look Options, supra note 83, at 14 (emphases and alteration 
added). 
 91. Id. at 11. 
 92. See infra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. 
 93. Id. at 5. 
 94. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIVISION, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION BY 
SELECTED AGE GROUPS AND SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2005, at T.2, available 
at http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2005/NC-EST2005-02.xls. 
 95. The effect of pressures to maintain gender quotas is illustrated in charts published by the 
Chicago Tribune on March 20, 2005, which cite the DoD as the source. The graph accompanied an 
article by Kirsten Scharnberg. See Kirsten Scharnberg, Stresses of Battle Hit Female GIs Hard, CHI. TRIB., 
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have been dropped by the Navy) would allow and encourage military recruiters 
to concentrate on young men who are needed for the combat arms.96 
e. Circumvention of the Congressional Notification Law 
In June 2004, the Center for Military Readiness filed a formal request for 
intervention with the DoD and Army Inspectors General. No apparent action 
was taken to bring the Army back into compliance with DoD regulations and 
the congressional notification law. Instead, female soldiers reportedly have been 
placed in even more land combat-collocated support units—not just in the 3rd 
ID, but also in the 101st Airborne, the 1st Cavalry, and several more.97 Unaware 
female soldiers have been given assurances that nothing significant has been 
changed, but men with combat experience are aware that regulations are being 
violated.98 In the same way, reports of disruptive behavior and evacuations due 
to pregnancies are accumulating, but sources have said that reporters rarely ask 
about such problems, and men are reluctant to discuss them anyway, lest their 
careers be ruined.99 As a result, rule violations and disruptive situations continue 
with little notice. 
 
Mar. 20, 2005, at C1. A copy of the graph is available at http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/ 
actdtymilperwom032005a.pdf. 
Despite personnel drawdowns in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, the percentage of female 
active duty personnel has stayed at approximately fifteen percent, with seven to ten percent of the 
troops deployed to the Middle East being women. All Things Considered: Wounded in War: The Women 
Serving in Iraq (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 19, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=4534450); Lizette Alvarez, Jane, We Hardly Knew Ye Died, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, § 4, at 1; Women in Military Service for America Memorial Foundation, Inc., 
www.womensmemorial.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
 96. Rick Maze, More Young Men Say They Are Likely to Join the Military, AIR FORCE TIMES, Mar. 
25, 2002, at 24. The DoD “Youth Attitude Tracking Survey”(YATS) of 10,000 young people found 
that the percentage of young men who said they were inclined to join the military jumped sharply 
after September 11, 2001, to the highest level in a decade, but the propensity to serve among women 
declined. Id. 
 97. Confidential conversations and e-mails between author and known male and female 
soldiers in the 3rd ID at Ft. Stewart, Ga. (2004–2006), the 101st Airborne at Ft. Campbell, Ky. 
(December 2004–April 2005), the 4th ID at Fort Hood, Tex. (2004–2007), the 89th Truck Co., Ft. Eustis, 
Va. (2004–2005), a multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) unit formerly based in Germany (2004–
2005), and Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadrons at Ft. Riley, Kan., 
and Ft. Benning, Ga. (2005–2006) (on file with author). 
 98. See id. Spc. Stephanie Filus, a mechanic in the 101st Airborne at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 
learned in November 2004 that she was going to be assigned to an FSC and deployed to Iraq in 2005. 
Spc. Filus was assured by local commanders that nothing significant would change, but she 
understood and resisted the risks of collocation with a direct ground combat maneuver battalion. 
That assignment was very different from the non-combat position that Spc. Filus had been promised 
by her recruiter. Spc. Filus’ request for discharge was denied, and she was sent to Fort Polk, 
Louisiana, for training, which she completed successfully. After her second request for discharge 
was denied, Spc. Filus attempted suicide with pills in the presence of her commanding officer, and 
was consequently hospitalized. Shortly thereafter, in May 2005, Filus received an honorable 
discharge. 
 99. See id. According to confidential e-mail correspondence between the author and known 
officers currently serving in Germany and Iraq (starting in Dec. 2006, on file with author), 
evacuations due to pregnancy have already occurred in a formerly all-male FSC, where one combat-
experienced armor officer used to be assigned. A second known source, a combat-experienced 
infantry officer, reported that a civil affairs unit had to be completely replaced because a female 
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In addition, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), and Reconnaissance, 
Surveillance, Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadrons operating with Stryker 
Brigade Combat Teams, have been quietly dropped from an Army list of units 
coded to be all male.100 This was done without the written approval of the 
Secretary of Defense and without the legally required notice to Congress.101 Such 
actions by Army officials constitute DSIW, which are likely to elevate risks and 
undermine trust. The most important decisions regarding women in the military 
are being made bureaucratically by unaccountable officials who use semantics 
and sophistry to circumvent the plain meaning of law. If it is such a good idea to 
order women and mothers into or near direct ground combat, Pentagon officials 
should follow proper procedures, in accordance with the law. 
3. The Congressional Debate: 2005 
a. Army Changes Rules Without Authorization or Notice 
On November 4, 2004, Pentagon officials assured staff members of the 
House Armed Services Committee that the Army had no intention of repealing 
the collocation rule.102 A subsequent closed-door briefing within the Pentagon 
indicated that the Army was planning to do just that.103 When that briefing was 
reported in The Washington Times,104 Lt. Gen. James Campbell, Staff Director of 
 
captain became intimately involved with male Iraqi community leaders, creating a security risk. This 
officer also noted that reporters and officials never ask about such incidents, and that male officers 
would not risk comment even if they did. 
 100. Memorandum from the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (G-1) to Commander, U.S. 
Army Training & Doctrine Command, Direct Ground Combat Position Coding (DGCP) of the 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron of the Interim (now Stryker) 
Brigade Combat Team (Apr. 26, 2002), available at http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/lemoyne%20memo 
%20042602.pdf. This memorandum, signed by Lt. Gen. John M. LeMoyne, confirmed that RSTA 
squadrons, which came into existence several years after the 1994 Aspin regulations were set forth, 
were to be coded “P-1” or “male-only” in compliance with the Aspin regulations. However, the 
Women in the Army Point Paper prepared for the Secretary of the Army on January 24, 2005, did not 
mention RSTA squadrons as units required to be all male. The paper omitted MLRS and also 
changed the wording of the DoD collocation rule, without authorization by the Secretary of Defense. 
See infra note 106. 
 101. Under the Army’s Direct Combat Probability Code (DCPC) system, also known as the 
Direct Ground Combat Position (DGCP) system, units required to be all male are designated “P-1” 
on Tables of Organization & Equipment. Positions that are open to either men or women are coded 
“P-2.” 
 102. Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Army Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action and 
Gender Coding,” presented to senior House Armed Services Committee staff members on 
November 3, 2004. This presentation was obtained by the author by e-mail from a member of the 
HASC staff on November 17, 2004. 
 103. Col. (P) Robert H. Woods, Jr., Director, HRPD, “Patriotic Women of Excellence Contributing 
to Our Force,” Nov. 29, 2004. According to a Pentagon source, this eleven-page (unnumbered) slide 
briefing was presented to Lt. Gen. James Campbell, Director of the Army Staff (DAS), at the 
Pentagon. 
 104. Rowan Scarborough, Report Leans Toward Women in Combat, WASH. TIMES Dec.13, 2004, at 
A1. An unclassified e-mail memorandum was sent from Lt. Gen. James Campbell, DAS, to more 
than forty Army Pentagon officials, on the same day, December 13, 2004, at 10:21 a.m. EST. The 
message asked for help in dealing with the problem of “Information Security” on pre-decisional 
internal materials. That is a legitimate concern under normal circumstances, but the intent of this 
memo was suspicious. Lt. Gen. Campbell’s memo appeared to be generated in response to the 
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the Army, issued a memo imposing restrictions on internal documents and 
warning of “press leaks.”105 In January 2005, HASC Chairman Duncan Hunter 
(R-Cal.) began conducting his own investigation to determine what the Army 
was doing with its female soldiers. Hunter’s investigation confirmed that the 
Army was placing female soldiers in combat-collocated FSCs, while 
simultaneously claiming that there was no need to inform Congress of such 
changes. This claim was based on the administrative changes described above, 
signaled by a subtle revision in DoD regulations. Army officials did not have 
authority to make such revisions unilaterally, without authorization by the 
Secretary of Defense. 
The unannounced policy changes in question were reflected in a “Women 
in the Army Point Paper,” prepared for the Secretary of the Army on January 24, 
2005, which misstated the DoD regulations as follows: 
Department of Defense policy (1994) prohibits the assignment of women to units 
below the brigade level whose primary mission is direct ground combat. Army 
policy (1992) further prohibits the assignment of women to positions or units 
which routinely collocate with those units conducting an assigned direct ground 
combat mission.106 
This statement failed to note that Army rules (1992) were superseded by 
DoD regulations (1994). The “Women in the Army Point Paper” also used the 
word “conducting,” which does not appear in the 1994 DoD regulations.107 That 
word, and variations of it that were used by Army officials elsewhere, implied 
that female soldiers could be placed in or near direct ground combat units, with 
the understanding that they would be evacuated before the troops began 
“conducting,” “undertaking,” or “performing” direct ground combat. 
This semantically nuanced difference appears to explain several 
astonishing statements made by Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey in a 
meeting with this Article’s author on February 16, 2005. Secretary Harvey 
showed the author a document listing twenty-four positions in a typical FSC 
that would be open to women. When asked how this could be justified, 
Secretary Harvey claimed that a problem did not exist, because the female 
soldiers would not be present when a battle began.108 In other words, female 
soldiers would be evacuated from a combat-collocated FSC just prior to a battle. 
This author expressed concern about commanding officers who would be 
 
Washington Times report that Army officials had said one thing about the collocation rule to 
congressional staff members, but something different in a closed-door meeting at the Pentagon. A 
few days later, the Army “gag order” became a news story in itself. See infra note 105. 
 105. Rowan Scarborough, Policy Leak Brings Army Order on Keeping Mum, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2004, at A3. 
 106. The four-page “Women in the Army Point Paper,” which was described as a “draft” but 
was being implemented anyway, was obtained by the author from the Office of the Secretary of the 
Army a few days after a meeting with Army Secretary Francis Harvey on February 16, 2005 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Women in the Army Point Paper], available at http://www.cmr 
link.org/cmrnotes/women%20in%20the%20army%20point%20paper%20021805.pdf. 
 107. For purposes of comparison, see Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule 
supra note 45. 
 108. Personal meeting notes (on file with author); see Women in the Army Point Paper, supra note 
106, at 1. 
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required to send female soldiers elsewhere at a time when they would be 
needed most and further noted that most officers would balk at doing so. 
Secretary Harvey insisted that soldiers would be required to follow orders. The 
means by which the female soldiers would be evacuated on the eve of battle was 
not made clear. In several speeches and articles, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter 
Schoomaker and Secretary Harvey both claimed that women would not be 
present when troops started “conducting,” “undertaking,” or “performing” 
direct ground combat.109 Equivocal words such as this worked to mislead many 
members of Congress, but not the Chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee, Rep. Duncan Hunter. 
b. The Hunter/McHugh Amendments 
In May 2005, HASC Chairman Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Cal.), together with 
the HASC’s Military Personnel Subcommittee Chairman John McHugh (R-N.Y.), 
co-sponsored amendments to the 2006 Defense Authorization Bill that would 
have codified current DoD regulations and required the Army to comply with 
them.110 The first Hunter/McHugh amendment, approved by Chairman 
McHugh’s subcommittee on May 11, 2005, would have specifically applied 
current DoD regulations regarding women to the Army’s new, modular brigade 
combat teams (BCTs), and exempted female soldiers from placement in smaller 
forward support companies (FSCs) that collocate or embed with direct ground 
combat maneuver battalions one hundred percent of the time.111 These collocated 
FSCs differ from larger gender-integrated support units at the brigade level, 
where support personnel are “in harm’s way,” but come and go intermittently.112 
 
 109. Gen. Peter Schoomaker, The Future of the U.S. Army, Address at the American Enterprise 
Institute (Apr. 11, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1011/ 
transcript.asp). See also Army Secretary Francis Harvey, A Message from Army Leadership, SOLDIERS 
MAG. (U.S. Army), Mar. 2005, at 3. See also Testimony on the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal 
Year 2007 and the Future Years Defense Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Armed Services, 109th 
Cong. (2006) (statements of Sec’y Harvey & Gen. Schoomaker). At that hearing, in answer to a 
question from SASC Chairman Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), Secretary Harvey mentioned the 
collocation rule, and said that “we code positions in forward support companies and other 
companies so that no women will co-locate with a unit performing direct ground combat.” The 
wiggle word is “performing,” implying that female soldiers may be assigned as long as the unit is 
not “performing’” direct ground combat. Contrary to his insistence that this policy is “totally 
consistent and compliant with DoD policy,” the DoD collocation rule does not include “ing” words 
such as “conducting” or “undertaking,” which could be cited to authorize “employment” of women 
in land combat-collocated support units, provided that they are evacuated prior to actual direct 
ground combat. Chairman Warner apparently missed this point, asking only about women’s career 
“opportunities.” 
 110. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 111. The first Hunter/McHugh amendment, approved by the Personnel Subcommittee on May 
11, 2005, provided in pertinent part: 
(a) PROHIBITION—Female members of the Army may not be assigned to duty in 
positions in forward support companies. 
See Dana Wilkie & Otto Kreisher, Hunter Plan Bars Women from Army “Forward Support,” COPLEY 
NEWS SERV., May 18, 2005; Andy Pasztor, House Panel Bars Women from Direct Ground Combat, WALL 
STREET J. (online ed.), May 19, 2005; Stephen Dinan, Panel Acts on Women in Combat, WASH. TIMES, 
May 19, 2005, at A1. 
 112. Army acronyms have changed several times during “transformation” of forces to modular 
brigade combat teams, but the missions of reorganized direct ground combat (DGC) troops, such as 
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When the Hunter/McHugh amendment passed the Personnel 
Subcommittee in a nine-to-seven partisan vote on May 11, 2005, congressional 
feminists and their media allies were nearly apoplectic.113 In response to the 
uproar, Hunter and McHugh substituted a new amendment. The second version 
of the Hunter/McHugh amendment was less specific, but broader than the 
original, because it would have codified DoD regulations affecting women in all 
the services, and not just the Army.114 Properly enforced, the Hunter/McHugh 
amendment still would have required the Army to stop violating the 1994 DoD 
regulations with regard to forward support companies and other direct ground 
combat-collocated support units, and to refrain from redefining the Aspin 
regulations without the approval of the Secretary of Defense and the legally 
required notice to Congress in advance. 
During an intense, late-night debate on May 18, 2005, Democrat Committee 
members Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), Rep. Vic Snyder (D-Ark.), Rep. Ellen 
Tauscher (D-N.Y.), and Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-Cal.) offered amendments that 
would have stricken or modified the legislation. In a remarkable moment of 
clarity, Chairman McHugh threw down the gauntlet by challenging his 
opponents to go ahead and make the case for allowing the Army to assign 
women to ground combat units without Congress having a say.115 The issue, as 
Chairmen Hunter and McHugh saw it, was the critical need for civilian control 
and oversight of the military in this important matter of public policy. That was 
and remains a perfectly legitimate issue to debate in a major congressional 
committee—especially since Army officials have provided legislators with 
constantly changing, dissembling information about the physical placement of 
female soldiers in or near direct ground combat. 
Hunter and McHugh led the Republicans in defeating every crippling 
amendment on narrow roll call or voice votes. Given the late hour, Republicans 
stayed largely silent, but Chairmen Hunter and McHugh secured approval of 
their amendment by the full House Armed Services Committee at 
11:08 p.m. EST.116 This surprised reporters, some of whom had already filed 
stories that did not accurately report the debate. Ultimately, the original 
 
the infantry, armor, and Special Operations Forces, remain substantially the same. The brigade-level 
units that are open to women under the current regulations are sometimes referred to as brigade 
support battalions (BSBs), forward support battalions (FSBs), main support battalions (MSBs), or 
Sustain Brigade Units of Action, equivalent to Division Support Commands stationed on forward 
operating bases (FOBs). Female soldiers currently are authorized to serve above the brigade level, 
including the headquarters of direct ground combat units such as the infantry, but not in or 
collocated with smaller battalions that engage the enemy with deliberate offensive action under fire. 
 113. See, e.g., Ann Scott Tyson, More Objections to Women-in-Combat Ban, WASH. POST, May 18, 
2005, at A5; Editorial, Chauvinism at the Battlefront, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at A24. 
 114. The second Hunter/McHugh amendment, approved by the full House Armed Services 
Committee on May 18, 2005, simply would have codified the language of DoD regulations regarding 
women, including the collocation rule, as established on January 13, 1994, by Secretary of Defense 
Les Aspin. See “Women in Combat” Provision, Mark-Up of H.R. 1815, National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (May 18, 2005) (provided by HASC; on file with author); supra 
note 45. 
 115. Personal notes taken during HASC mark-up session, May 18, 2005 (on file with author). 
 116. See Roll Call of House Armed Services Committee vote on Amendments 91, 92 (May 18, 
2005) (provided by HASC; on file with author). 
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Hunter/McHugh legislation was not enacted because then-Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld pressured Chairman Hunter to withdraw the legislation 
before it was voted on by the full House. 
The third version of the Hunter/McHugh legislation, which was adopted 
by the House on May 25, 2005, did not include language to codify current DoD 
regulations.117 Instead, the House bill mandated a report from the Secretary of 
Defense on the subject by March 1, 2006, which was later changed in Conference 
to March 31, 2006. The approved Hunter/McHugh legislation also reaffirmed 
the law mandating formal notice to Congress of any changes in regulations 
affecting women in or near ground combat: 
If the Secretary of Defense proposes to make any change . . . to the ground 
combat exclusion policy . . . , the Secretary shall, before any such change is 
implemented, submit to Congress a report providing notice of the proposed 
change. Such a change may be implemented only after the end of a period of 60 
days of continuous session of Congress . . . following the date on which the 
report is received. 
A change referred to in paragraph (1) is a change that . . . opens to service by 
female members of the armed forces any category of unit or position that at that 
time is closed to service by such members . . . .118 
c. Pentagon Resists Oversight by Congress 
Contrary to some news reports, final passage of the Hunter/McHugh 
amendment would not have removed female soldiers from any positions in 
which they were legally authorized to serve.119 The amendment would have only 
codified current DoD regulations adopted in 1994.120 Nevertheless, big guns from 
liberal media, some members of Congress with feminist views, and officials of 
the Department of the Army denounced the Hunter/McHugh amendment as if 
 
 117. See Rowan Scarborough, GOP Retreats on Women-in-Combat Bill, WASH. TIMES, May 26, 2005, 
at A1. 
 118. H. amend. 210 to H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. (2006) available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ 
109/specialrules/hr1815/109hr1815_hunter.pdf. 
 119. Several news articles inaccurately reported that the second version of the Hunter/McHugh 
amendment would have allowed female soldiers to serve in FSCs. See, e.g., Thom Shanker, House Bill 
Would Preserve, and Limit, the Role of Women in Combat Zones, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at A20. A 
codified collocation rule, however, would have had the same effect as current DoD regulations. See 
also HASC Mark-up of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, H.R. 1815, May 18, 
2005 (provided by Chairman Hunter; on file with author). 
 120. See supra note 45. A disingenuous Army Public Affairs news release issued on May 19, 2005, 
titled “Army Statement on Proposed Legislation,” ironically, concurred with this view. See Dep’t of 
the Army, Public Affairs News Release, Army Statement on Proposed Legislation (May 19, 2005), 
available at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=7353. Stating that the Army had 
reviewed existing law and DoD policies and found itself in compliance, the news release added: 
Furthermore, existing DoD and Army policies are in compliance with the legislation being 
proposed under House Resolution 1815 [the Hunter/McHugh amendment]. Thus, the 
proposed legislation contained in HR 1815 is unnecessary, does not provide further 
clarification, and may in fact lead to confusion on the part of commanders and Soldiers. 
Id. (alteration added). This admission was inconsistent with a two-sentence letter sent to Chairman 
Hunter by Lt. Gen. James L. Campbell, DAS, which made the unsupported claim that 21,950 
positions would be closed to women if the legislation passed. See infra note 133. 
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it would have ended the history of women in the military.121 The campaign to 
criticize and derail the Hunter/McHugh legislation benefited from months of 
neglect of the story by major newspapers such as the Washington Post, the New 
York Times, and even the Military Times. With few exceptions, these publications 
failed to report on the significant events that had caused Hunter to investigate 
and act in the first place—events that had been reported in some newspapers 
since the fall of 2004. For many months, the Army had been bending, breaking, 
redefining, or circumventing the rules on women in or near direct ground 
combat, but most news organizations ignored the story until Chairman Hunter 
took the initiative to sponsor legislation.122 
In response to Chairman Hunter’s amendment, Army officials initially 
denied that they were permitting the illicit assignments, but later they used 
misleading terms and unlikely scenarios to justify the placement of female 
soldiers in battalion-level units that were required to be all male.123 Four 
equivocations have been used to circumvent policy and law, which could be 
summarized as follows: 
• The Selective “Memory” Option. In the May 10, 2004, the “Quick Look 
Options” briefing; the November 3, 2004, presentation to HASC staff 
members; and the November 29, 2004, briefing conducted at the 
 
 121. On May 11, 2005, separate but identical letters were sent to Chairman Hunter by Army 
Secretary Harvey and Army Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Richard A. Cody. See Leo Shane, III, Army 
Opposes House Panel’s Bid to Bar Women from Combat Support Units, STARS & STRIPES (European ed.), 
May 12, 2005, available at http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=28244&archive=true. A 
news release titled “Women Removed From Combat Support Roles” was issued by Democratic 
members of the HASC on May 11, 2005. Chairman Hunter also issued a statement on May 11, and on 
May 24, 2005, Hunter and committee member Rep. Thelma Drake (R-Va.) called a news conference 
to clarify that the legislation would not affect any female soldiers serving in positions authorized 
under current DoD regulations. See Rep. Thelma Drake, Let Lawmakers Decide, USA TODAY, May 25, 
2005, at 13A. 
 122. See, e.g., Lisa Burgess, Army Is Considering Adding Women to Its New “Units of Action” 
Structure, STARS & STRIPES (European ed.), Oct. 23, 2004, available at http://stripes.com/article.asp? 
section=104&article=24225&archive=true; Lisa Burgess, Army Secretary Harvey: No Combat for Female 
GIs in “Transformed” Army, STARS & STRIPES (European ed.), Jan. 15, 2005, available at 
http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=25642&archive=true; Rowan Scarborough, 
Female Soldiers Eyed for Combat, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at A1; Rowan Scarborough, Army Charged 
With Ban Violation, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A6; Rowan Scarborough, Combat Role for Women 
Confused, WASH. TIMES (online ed.), April 18, 2005, http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/ 
20050418-125223-4270r.htm; Rowan Scarborough, Report Leans Toward Women in Combat, WASH. 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, at A1; Rowan Scarborough, Policy Leak Brings Army Order on Keeping Mum, 
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at A3; Rowan Scarborough, Women in Combat Ban Again at Issue, WASH. 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, at A1; Vince Crawley, Army Plans to Officially Put Women on Front Lines, ARMY 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004; Bryan Bender, U.S. Women Get Closer to Combat: Some Say Move Imperils Units, 
Violates Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Bender, U.S. Women Get Closer to 
Combat]; Bryan Bender, Army Secretary Rejects Change in Policy on Women in Combat, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 29, 2005, at A11; Robert Burns, In Unconventional War, Army’s Gender Rules Don’t Keep Women 
Out of Combat, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 26, 2005; Ann Scott Tyson, For Female GIs, Combat Is a Fact, 
WASH. POST, May 13, 2005, at A1; Ann Scott Tyson, More Objections to Women-in-Combat Ban, WASH. 
POST, May 18, 2005, at A5; Ann Scott Tyson, Amendment Targets Role of Female Troops, WASH. POST, 
May 19, 2005, at A4. 
 123. See Bender, U.S. Women Get Closer to Combat, supra note 122 (reporting that officials of the 
Third Infantry Division publicly acknowledged they had “added scores of female soldiers to newly 
created ‘forward support companies’. . . .”). 
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Pentagon,124 the Army claimed that it could operate under “additional 
restrictions” in Army rules, effective in 1992.125 The 1992 regulation, 
however, was superseded by the DoD (Aspin) regulations of 1994.126 
The 1992 Army regulation also included a “Risk Rule,” which is no 
longer in effect.127 Divergence from extant DoD regulations cannot be 
justified by selectively observing part of an obsolete rule—but not all of 
it. 
• The “Doublethink” Option. Field commanders were ordered to skirt the 
rules by “assigning” women to gender-mixed support units at the 
brigade level while physically placing them in units “attached” to 
maneuver battalions required to be all-male.128 
• The “Little Bit Pregnant” Option. Secretary Harvey’s “Women in the 
Army Point Paper,” dated January 24, 2005, showed arbitrary changes 
in the gender codes of twenty-four of 225 positions in a typical FSC.129 
Initial breaches in the rules guaranteed more of the same.130 
• The “Beam Me Up, Scotty” Option. Secretary Harvey’s “Women in the 
Army Point Paper” revised the collocation rule so that it would only 
apply when a given unit is “conducting” direct ground combat.131 
However, without extra vehicles and helicopters to evacuate female 
support soldiers on the eve of battle, field commanders would have 
more luck acquiring Star Trek “transporter” machines for that purpose. 
During the HASC debate, the first in more than a decade, officials 
continued to change estimates of the number of positions that might have been 
closed to women if the Hunter/McHugh legislation passed, ranging from a few 
dozen to a few hundred.132 However, on the day before the vote was scheduled, 
Lt. Gen. James L. Campbell, Director of the Army Staff, sent a vague, two-
 
 124. See supra notes 81, 102, 103. 
 125. See supra note 85. 
 126. See supra notes 45, 50. 
 127. See supra note 85. 
 128. See supra notes 81, 82. The Army Public Affairs News Release stated that “[f]irst, the 
Forward Support Companies are not part of, nor do they work for, units below the brigade level 
whose primary mission is direct ground combat, such as infantry and armor battalions.” Army 
Statement on Proposed Legislation, supra note 120 (alteration added). This disingenuous statement 
reflects the fiction that forward support company personnel would not be physically collocated with 
infantry/armor ground combat battalions, due to administrative assignment to a legally gender 
integrated brigade level unit. 
 129. Women in the Army Point Paper, supra note 106, at 2–4. This document, obtained from the 
Office of the Secretary of the Army, provided a specific gender code change list of twenty-four of 225 
positions in a typical 3rd ID Heavy Unit of Action Forward Support Company (FSC). The number 
was small but the breach of regulations was significant. Either the Army is in compliance with DoD 
policy or it is not. “Employing” female soldiers in a support unit embedded with direct ground 
combat troops effectively repealed the collocation rule without authorization and without the legally 
required notice to Congress. Having broken that regulatory barrier, Army officials seem unwilling to 
enforce any regulations regarding women in or near direct ground combat. See discussion infra Parts 
II.B.1.c.–d. 
 130. See Women in the Army Point Paper, supra note 106, at 2–4; discussion infra Parts II.B.1.c.–d. 
 131. See supra notes 106–109. 
 132. Statements by Chairman Duncan Hunter and Subcommittee Chairman John McHugh 
during House Armed Services Committee debate, May 18, 2005 (personal notes on file with author). 
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sentence letter to Chairman Hunter, which was released to the media.133 The 
letter claimed, without any supporting documentation, that “21,925 spaces 
currently open to female Soldiers would be closed”134 if the Hunter/McHugh 
amendment passed. The statement was not credible because the legislation 
would have simply codified the extant Aspin regulations, not altered them. The 
unsupported figure nevertheless was used to stir up negative press and 
opposition to the legislation.135 Despite repeated inquiries, details to back up the 
Army’s claim have not been produced. 
Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey and Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Richard A. 
Cody sent letters and dispatched several advocates to block the legislation 
before it arrived on the House floor.136 Then-Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld met privately with Chairman Hunter and reportedly pressured him to 
withdraw the HASC-approved legislation and replace it with language 
mandating a formal report to Congress on the status of women in or near land 
combat.137 That report was mandated by the FY 2006 Defense Authorization 
Act138 and was due on March 31, 2006. However, Secretary Rumsfeld and his 
Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David S.C. Chu, disregarded 
the deadline.139 The task was diverted to the Rand Corporation, which failed to 
produce a report in 2006.140 As this article goes to press—more than a full year 
past the deadline for the statute-mandated report to Congress—the Rand report 
has not yet been released. This irresponsible delay has given Congress an excuse 
to avoid convening oversight hearings for another full year, and possibly two. 
Consequential decisions affecting women are being made without 
congressional oversight or accountability for the consequences.141 Some 
 
 133. Letter from Lt. Gen. James L. Campbell, Director of the Army Staff, to Chairman Duncan 
Hunter (May 17, 2005) (on file with author). This letter, which was inconsistent with the “Army 
Statement on Proposed Legislation” issued by Army Public Affairs on May 19, claimed that “a total 
of 21,925 spaces currently open for assignment to female Soldiers would be closed.” The Army has 
yet to provide figures to justify this figure, which was widely reported in The Washington Post and 
other media just before the House Committee’s May 18, 2005, vote. In the following week, Army 
officials continued to complain about “confusion”—confusion that they themselves had created. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.; Ann Scott Tyson, Amendment Targets Role of Female Troops, WASH. POST, May 19, 2005, at 
A4. The Campbell letter from Lt. Gen. Campbell was either a complete fabrication or an admission 
that the Army had been violating current regulations to a greater extent than was previously known. 
 136. See Army Statement on Proposed Legislation, supra note 120. 
 137. The result of this pressure was the third version of the Hunter/McHugh amendment, as 
enacted in the NDAA for FY 2006. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-163, § 541(a)(1), 119 Stat. 3136, 3251 (2006) (codifying the Hunter/McHugh amendment at 
10 U.S.C. § 652 (West Supp. 2007)). 
 138. Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 218(c)(3), 119 Stat. at 3172. 
 139. Letter from Dr. David Chu to Sen. Carl Levin (Apr. 27, 2006) (on file with author). 
 140. Meeting of an official in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & 
Readiness and the author (Mar. 2, 2007). 
 141. See Drake, supra note 121. 
I unequivocally support the women in our military and their desires to serve our nation 
honorably in the armed forces alongside our men. Military policy has been to keep women 
off the front lines, and it is a policy that the Defense Department should not unilaterally 
change. I believe any change in this policy must be the responsibility of Congress, so that 
America’s elected officials can be held accountable. 
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legislators on both sides of the aisle have taken this issue seriously, but most 
seem unconcerned. Members of Congress frequently assert their right to oversee 
and approve other national defense matters, but issues involving military 
women are often treated as less important—except when sex scandals occur. 
This type of double standard is disrespectful to military women, who certainly 
deserve better. 
B. Incrementalism + Consistency = Radical Change 
1. Costs of Confusion 
In response to a question from a group of journalists in January 2005, 
President George W. Bush said that his policy was “No women in [ground] 
combat.”142 Nevertheless, the President has not intervened to restore the Army to 
compliance with DoD policy and the congressional notification law. The risks of 
allowing this situation to continue are high, especially since social engineers 
cannot be relied upon to objectively evaluate the results of their own 
recommendations and decisions. 
a. Presidential Intent and Inattention 
Even proponents of women in combat should feel uneasy about 
controversial policies being implemented outside of current policy and law. In 
May 2005, Stars and Stripes ran a story quoting female enlisted women and 
junior officers saying that they should be allowed to make all decisions about 
where they should serve.143 Another story in the Washington Post quoted a female 
officer defending her decision to send a female medic to serve with an airborne 
infantry company without asking permission: “Think of the fallout if she had 
gotten wounded or killed,” the officer said. “I probably would have been 
brought up on charges for defying Army policy.”144 Such insubordination is a 
recipe for chaos in a profession that requires discipline and obedience to 
legitimate authority. It is not acceptable to allow junior officers—or even four-
star generals—to make up the rules on their own. 
b. Precedents, Compromises and Consequences 
There are seven major categories of consequences, resulting from 
continuation of the status quo, which should be of concern to the Commander in 
Chief: 
Morale. Soldiers are beginning to doubt the judgment of their leaders,145 
although they are rarely asked or permitted to express their concerns publicly. 
Ordering women into land combat also creates a moral and cultural 
 
Id. 
 142. Rowan Scarborough & Joseph Curl, Despite Pressure, Bush Vows “No Women in Combat,” 
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at A1 (alteration added). 
 143. Sandra Jontz & Kevin Dougherty, Trust Us to Decide Our Role in the Army, Female 
Servicemembers in Iraq Say, STARS & STRIPES (Mideast ed.), May 25, 2005, available at 
http://www.stripesonline.com/article.asp?section=104&article=28530&archive=true. 
 144. Tyson, For Female GIs, Combat Is a Fact, supra note 122. 
 145. See supra note 99. 
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contradiction: violence against women is all right, as long as it happens at the 
hands of the enemy. 
Legal. Federal courts have repeatedly upheld young women’s exemption 
from Selective Service obligations because women are not deployed in ground 
combat. If the ground-combat policy is changed—deliberately or by default—a 
future legal challenge, brought on behalf of men, would likely succeed. As a 
result, women would be subject to Selective Service and military obligations on 
the same basis as men, without a vote of Congress.146 
Political. Families, upon finding that their daughters must register with 
Selective Service and be subject to combat deployment on the same basis as men 
if they join the military, are likely to hold accountable all elected officials who 
allowed these things to happen. Recruiting for the volunteer force also could 
suffer. 
Military Effectiveness. Military effectiveness will be directly affected if—or, 
based on past experience, when—the training requirements are changed to 
guarantee “success” for average female trainees in or near direct ground 
combat. Proponents deny this would happen, while simultaneously demanding 
gender-normed standards that measure “equal effort” instead of equal results.147 
Training in direct ground combat units will have to be made less demanding for 
men, since female trainees suffer stress fractures and other injuries at far greater 
rates. Ultimately, lives will be needlessly lost when soldiers who are unable to 
cope with the physical demands of direct ground combat are ordered (not merely 
allowed) into those units anyway.148 
Social/Cultural. Professional behavior between men and women is always 
desired, but inappropriate relationships frequently occur on either end of a 
spectrum between hostility and romantic involvements. Problems on the 
hostility side lead to charges of harassment or worse. Entanglements on the 
other side encourage breakdowns in discipline and unit cohesion, and sex 
scandals cause personnel to be removed and units to be demoralized.149 
 
 146. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-127–C-128 (Findings 4.3–4.12). The 
1981 Rostker v. Goldberg decision regarding Selective Service was reaffirmed by the federal courts 
most recently in 2003. See Schwartz v. Brodsky, 265 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2003). 
If a deeply-rooted military tradition of male-only draft registration is to be ended, it 
should be accomplished by that branch of government which has the constitutional power 
to do so and which best represents the “consent of the governed”—the Congress of the 
United States, the elected representatives of the people. 
Id. at 135. 
 147. See MITCHELL, supra note 15, at 99–122 (discussing Gen. Myer’s attempt to implement 
identical standards for men and women, which was derailed by both DACOWITS and feminist 
critics). 
 148. The issue of women in combat is frequently discussed in permissive terms—i.e., should 
women be “allowed” to serve in combat? In reality, everyone in the military must follow orders and 
go where they are ordered to go. The Presidential Commission determined that, with the exception 
of special operations forces and specialized units, “voluntary” combat for women only would not be 
a workable option, due to the demoralizing effect of such a policy on unit cohesion. See 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-127 (Finding 4.13). 
 149. In March 2007, NASA experienced turbulence such as this in an apparent love triangle. 
Navy Capt. Lisa Marie Nowak, an astronaut, drove cross-country to confront Air Force Capt. 
Colleen Shipman, a rival for the affections of Navy Cmdr. William Oefelein, a space shuttle pilot. See 
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Readiness/Deployability. Romantic relationships of the type mentioned 
above, frequently lead to pregnancies, escalating childcare costs, single 
parenthood, family disruption and poverty, and personnel losses before and 
during deployments.150 
Precedent. Once an unchallenged decision is made to place women in some 
units coded to be all male, there is nothing to prevent extension of the same 
practice to other direct ground combat units, including the Marine infantry, 
artillery, armor, Special Operations Forces, Special Operations Forces 
helicopters, and Military Transition Teams (MTTs). Indications are that 
incremental changes in extreme directions are already happening. 
c. Military Transition (Training) Teams (MTTs) 
No one has provided data proving shortages of men for the combat arms. 
Serious deficiencies could occur, however, if the institutional Army continues to 
supply Central Command with an unsuitable “inventory” of soldiers who are 
not eligible for direct ground combat. 
Given the status of the Iraqi war at the beginning of 2007, the Army has a 
great need for experienced combat soldiers who can train Iraqis to defend and 
secure their own country. This training is being done by small Military 
Transition Teams—sometimes called Military Training Teams, or most often 
MTTs—composed of eleven to fifteen soldiers, officers, or Marines with ground 
combat leadership experience.151 MTT soldiers are embedded with Iraqi units for 
one year in order to teach them military skills and combat tactics. Given the 
closeness of the Transition Training Team relationship, and the fact that Iraqi 
units are usually poorly equipped and under constant attack, MTT personnel are 
required to be all male.152 Specialized Army MTT training—which is considered 
 
NASA Fires Astronaut Nowak, CNN.COM, Mar. 7, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/space/ 
03/07/nasa.nowak/index.html. 
 150. In February 2005, the Pentagon reported that between 1994 and 2003, a total of 26,446 
women were discharged from the services due to pregnancy. It is not clear whether these 
“unplanned loss” figures include military women who did not deploy or were evacuated from the 
war zone due to pregnancy. See Memorandum from Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel & Readiness, to Derek Stewart, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management at the 
GAO (Feb. 7, 2005), reprinted in GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: FINANCIAL 
COSTS AND LOSS OF CRITICAL SKILLS DUE TO DOD’S HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY CANNOT BE 
COMPLETELY ESTIMATED 42 (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL COSTS CANNOT BE ESTIMATED], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05299.pdf. According to a confidential message from 
a soldier serving Iraq in 2006, one of the 3rd ID’s collocated FSCs—which used to be all male under 
DoD regulations—already has experienced personnel losses and disruptions due to pregnancies in 
the ranks. 
 151. Gina Cavallaro, Small Teams, Big Job, ARMY TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at 8. There are several 
different types of MTTs, including Special Police Transition Teams, Border Transition Teams, and, in 
Afghanistan, Embedded Training Teams. Some female soldiers have been involved in such training, 
located at the Forward Operating Base (FOB) level, but in support roles only. It would make sense 
for American women to train Iraqi women to perform security searches of female civilians, but it is 
difficult to determine if this is being done. 
 152. According to the Army Times, “Cultural sensitivities and the same gender rules that apply to 
the ban on women in direct combat in the U.S. military mean female soldiers can’t join a MITT. But 
women are involved in similar small-team training activities above the brigade level.” Gina 
Cavallaro, MITT Duty a Career-Booster for Soldiers Who Make Team, ARMY TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at 10. 
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career-enhancing for volunteers—takes place at Fort Riley, Kansas. However, 
some soldiers are assigned involuntarily to MTTs from battalions operating in 
Iraq or Afghanistan, without receiving special training.153 There has been some 
controversy about soldiers who do not have the experience or training to 
accomplish the critical mission of the MTTs. In an interview with Army Times, 
Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard spoke very frankly about the failure of the Army to 
provide the right type of soldiers for this important job. “Only combat vets who 
inspire confidence,” he said, “need apply.”154 
There are indications that, even though the small eleven- to fifteen-man 
MTTs are required to be all-male, some deployed women may have been 
ordered to serve in a battalion-level MTT—a clear violation of current DoD 
Regulations.155 Given the Army’s practice of redefining rules without prior 
notice, it is difficult to determine what is happening in the field, but there is 
reason for concern. The MTT mission, which is extremely important, should not 
be undermined by cultural conflicts caused by unauthorized, incremental 
gender integration in units required to be all male. It is very challenging and 
difficult enough to train new Iraqi combat troops without forcing men of that 
culture to accept and embed with female soldiers. Iraqi trainees respect all 
Americans, including our female soldiers, but MTTs are combat schools, not 
charm schools. Terrorists who are determined to create anarchy in Iraq by 
various means, including disruption of the Iraqi/American Training Teams, 
could easily use cultural prejudice against women and western culture to 
alienate male trainees who abjure obedience to women.156 
Unneeded social tensions that encourage indiscipline or international 
incidents could destroy trust, demoralize American/Iraqi training teams, and 
seriously undermine efforts to “stand up” more Iraqi combat battalions.157 MTT 
field commanders want to accomplish their missions well, but they will be 
blamed for the consequences of socially volatile conditions ignited by 
predictable “sparks.” International scandals involving sexual harassment, 
misconduct, or allegations of sexual assault between male Iraqi trainees and 
 
 153. Gina Cavallaro, Additional Soldiers to Join Training Teams, ARMY TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at 10. 
 154. Gina Cavallaro, “We Could Be Better”: CO Wants Trainers to be Better Caliber, Get Higher 
Priority, ARMY TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at 30. 
 155. Confidential correspondence between a family member/soldier and author (Oct. 2006) (on 
file with author). This reference is to soldiers reassigned from already-deployed units in Iraq, not 
those receiving specialized training at Fort Riley, Kansas. 
 156. The size of this cultural divide is no more visible than in ceremonies to hand over security 
responsibilities to Iraqi police and soldiers in Najaf province. An event in December 2006 included 
warriors on horseback, martial arts demonstrations, and, at one point, the tearing apart and eating of 
a live rabbit by Iraqi soldiers. “The leader bit out the heart with a yell, and passed the blood-soaked 
remains to comrades, each of whom took a bite.” Fast Track, AIR FORCE TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at 6 
(illustrated with AP photo taken by Alaa Al-Marjani on Dec. 20, 2006). 
 157. According to a known and reliable male source in Iraq, a female civil-affairs soldier became 
romantically involved with male Iraqi community leaders, which required that the entire unit be 
replaced. This demoralizing incident raised security concerns, since the sharing of operational plans 
with an Iraqi of questionable loyalty could increase security problems and overall risks. Two female 
soldiers who have served under fire in Iraq, one opposed to women in direct ground combat units 
and one in favor, wrote in e-mail correspondence with this author that it would be a mistake to 
gender-integrate the MTT Iraqi combat-training units. Confidential correspondence from sources in 
Iraq to author (Oct.–Nov. 2006; Apr. 2007) (on file with author). 
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American women could be set off by provocative photos or interviews broadcast 
worldwide. 
The Iraqi training mission must be accomplished successfully, so that 
American troops can eventually withdraw. Combat is not a place for military 
social experimentation with male troops of another culture who are interested in 
survival, not sensitivity training. 
d. Marine Infantry, Special Operations Forces, SEALS, etc. 
Having allowed the Army to circumvent and ignore the DoD collocation 
rule, what will Pentagon officials say when feminists inevitably demand “career 
opportunities” in infantry battalions? The devil is not in the details but in the 
standard of review used to determine policy. If the primary standard and goal is 
the advancement of women’s careers (instead of military necessity), demands 
for consistency in all other ground combat units will be implemented 
incrementally. If Congress abdicates its right and responsibility to provide 
oversight, further gender integration will have to include Army and Marine 
infantry, armor, Special Operations Forces, Special Operations Forces 
helicopters, and Navy SEALS. And if “equal opportunity” is the primary 
consideration, regulations regarding submarines will be next on the list. 
Regardless of the consequences of the current unauthorized changes, 
Marine infantry and other specialized combat communities will be unable to 
make the case that they are different from units already integrated with women. 
At that point, all of the seven consequences listed above will occur at an 
accelerated pace. Incremental integration will impose all the complications of 
gender relationships on close combat units, making military life in the combat 
forces even more difficult and more dangerous than it is now. 
2. What Do Women Want? 
a. DACOWITS Downplays Enlisted Women’s Views 
The vocabulary of this Article acknowledges throughout that one woman’s 
“exclusion” from close combat is another woman’s “exemption.” On this issue, 
as on all issues, not all women think alike. Contrary to opinions commonly 
expressed by the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services 
(DACOWITS) and civilian feminists, Army surveys have indicated that the 
majority of military women are strongly opposed to combat assignments.158 
Women are especially opposed if they would be forced into combat on an equal 
basis with men. Furthermore, in recent decades, particularly during the 1990s, 
the former DACOWITS committee constantly promoted the repeal of women’s 
combat exemptions and other agenda items favored by feminists.159 The 
 
 158. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (ARI), ARMY PERSONNEL SURVEY OFFICE, DIRECT COMBAT 
ASSIGNMENT POLICY: FINDINGS FROM THE FALL 2001 SAMPLE SURVEY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, at 1–2 
(Fall 2001) [hereinafter ARI, SAMPLE SURVEY], available at http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/ 
arissmp3q01.pdf. See also Center for Military Readiness, Enlisted Women Opposed to Military 
Assignments, CMR NOTES, July 2003, at 1, available at http://www.cmrlink.org/viewarticle.asp?f= 
mcr677issue74.pdf. 
 159. See generally DACOWITS, Recommendations, http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/table 
recommendation_subpage.html (last visited May 7, 2007). At one time, DACOWITS served a useful 
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influential advisory committee operated as a tax-funded feminist lobby 
primarily composed of civilian women and a few ambitious female officers. 
Based on the author’s personal observations as a member, the committee rarely 
heard from enlisted women, even though they outnumber female officers by a 
ratio of five to one.160 
b. ARI Survey Shows Women Opposed 
The unrepresentative nature of DACOWITS may explain why the 
committee missed the message conveyed by a series of surveys conducted by 
the Army Research Institute (ARI), which found that most military women do 
not wish to participate in combat assignments.161 In 2001, for example, question 
number sixty in the ARI “Sample Survey of Military Personnel” asked military 
people whether women should be assigned to direct ground combat, which was 
defined as “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew-served 
weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct 
 
purpose, making recommendations on a variety of subjects to benefit women in the military. In the 
1990s, however, this tax-funded DoD advisory committee became a feminist lobby, promoting 
women in combat and related causes that assigned priority to women’s career opportunities over the 
needs of the military. The mostly civilian and female members of DACOWITS routinely disregarded 
the advice of male military officers (but not female officers assigned as advisors to the committee) 
and rarely reviewed the consequences of their previous recommendations. In 1998, DACOWITS 
issued a report advocating gender-mixed Army basic training. Committee members had visited 
several co-ed training bases, but not the Marines’ separate-gender training base at Parris Island, 
South Carolina. See Rowan Scarborough, Panel of Women Hits Training Sexes Apart, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 
20, 1998, at A1. 
In the spring of 1998, the committee also endorsed “career opportunities” for women in multiple 
launch rocket systems (MLRS) and Special Operations Forces helicopters like the ones shot down in 
the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu, Somalia. See DACOWITS, Spring Conference 
1998, Recommendations, http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/history_of_recommedations/hist-rec-spr-
98.html (summarizing recommendations). In the spring of 1999, DACOWITS demanded to know 
why the Navy does not assign female sailors to submarines. Even though the comprehensive Report 
of the Science Applications International Corporation had been prepared for DACOWITS in 1995, see 
SAIC REPORT, infra note 178, and Navy officials reviewed that information for the committee, 
DACOWITS recommended at its Fall 1999 and Spring 2000 meetings that (1) future submarines be 
redesigned to accommodate mixed-gender crews; and (2) that female officers be assigned to larger 
Trident ballistic missile (SSBN) submarines. See DACOWITS, Fall Conference 1999, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/history_of_recommedations/hist-rec-fall-99.html (summarizing 
recommendatations); Spring Conference 2000, http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/history_of_ 
recommedations/hist-rec-spr-2000.html (same). See also Center for Military Readiness, Issues: 
DACOWITS, http://www.cmrlink.org/dacowits.asp (last visited May 7, 2007); Center for Military 
Readiness, End Preferential Treatment for Pentagon Feminists, CMR NOTES, Apr. 2001, at 1, available at 
http://www.cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/m7c81missue64a01.pdf. 
At its 50th Anniversary meeting in the spring of 2001, the committee received statements it had 
requested from the services in the fall of 2000 regarding the next item on their agenda: deploying 
women in direct ground combat units. That meeting was the last to occur under the committee’s 
original Charter; the Fall 2001 meeting did not take place due to the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon. A 
few months after the Charter was allowed to expire in February 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Paul Wolfowitz announced a new Charter for a smaller advisory committee of the same name, 
which was directed to study family readiness and related issues. See DACOWITS Charter, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/ tablecharter_subpage.html (last visited May 7, 2007). 
 160. Personal observation as a former member of the DACOWITS and participant or observer of 
many committee meetings. 
 161. See ARI, SAMPLE SURVEY, supra note 158. 
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physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel.”162 A bar graph slide 
prepared by ARI further indicated that the low number of enlisted personnel 
who were in favor of placing women in combat on the same basis as men “had 
remained stable since the fall of 1993.”163 Among female and male officers, levels 
of support—nineteen percent and twenty percent, respectively—were higher, 
but still far less than a majority.164 
ARI also asked whether current policy “should be changed so that females 
can also be ‘involuntarily assigned’ [to combat units].”165 The results, which 
should have given the Army pause, indicated that only ten percent of enlisted 
women wanted the Army to order female soldiers into combat units on an 
involuntary basis.166 Furthermore, when ARI’s questionnaire inquired about 
combat assignments on a voluntary basis—a hypothetical idea that is not a 
workable option167—responses in favor were not much higher.168 Only twenty-six 
percent of enlisted women were in favor of voluntary combat for women, as 
opposed to sixteen percent of the men.169 Only twenty-nine percent and twelve 
percent of female and male officers, respectively, were in favor of voluntary 
combat assignments for women.170 When the question was asked in terms of 
“voluntary [combat] assignments for both males and females,” the percentages 
in favor ranged from a high of thirty-one percent (enlisted women) to a low of 
seven percent (male officers).171 
Such dismal survey results on the women in combat issue presented a 
problem for Pentagon feminists. Obvious differences between the views of 
enlisted women and outspoken female officers would undermine the perception 
that military women uniformly desire “career opportunities” in or near close 
combat. The answer to the problem was simple: If you do not wish to hear the 
answer, then stop asking the question. In 2002, the ARI survey dropped the 
question about women in combat and substituted less consequential inquiries.172 
 
 162. Center for Military Readiness, Enlisted Women Opposed to Combat Assignments, Sept. 3, 2003, 
http://www.cmrlink.org/WomenInCombat.asp?docID=204. 
 163. See Army Personnel Survey Office, U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI), Slide Presentation: 
Sample Survey of Military Personnel, at 2, 6 (June 10, 2003) (“Policy Should Have Involuntary 
Assignment for Females Also: Officers,” “Policy Should Have Involuntary Assignment for Females 
Also: Enlisted Personnel”) (on file with author). 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. (alteration added). 
 166. See id. 
 167. The Presidential Commission determined that there is no practical way that women could 
be assigned to combat units only on a voluntary basis. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 5, at C-127 (Finding 4.13). 
 168. See supra note 163, at 3, 4, 7, 8 (“Policy Should Have Voluntary Assignment for Females: 
Officers,” “Policy Should Have Voluntary Assignment for Both Males and Females: Officers,” 
“Policy Should Have Voluntary Assignment for Females: Enlisted Personnel,” “Policy Should Have 
Voluntary Assignment for Both Males and Females: Enlisted Personnel”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. ARI, Sample Survey Fall 2002, Survey Instrument (on file with author). Unlike previous ARI 
Surveys of this kind (in the Fall of 1993, 1994, 1997, 1999, and 2001), this survey did not ask any 
questions about women in combat. 
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It is difficult to think of any other major defense issue where Pentagon 
officials have such politically correct blinders firmly in place. The omission 
served to convey the clear message that Army officials simply do not care what 
men and women think about new combat rules under which they must live—
and possibly die. 
Media reports about the experiences of women in the current war tend to 
quote female soldiers who are enthusiastic about the idea of women in 
combat173—estimated by the ARI surveys to be about ten to fifteen percent of 
women.174 Even if that percentage is much higher among the female officers who 
communicate with the media today, there is no evidence that the majority of 
female soldiers—including those in the enlisted ranks—want to be involuntarily 
assigned in or near close combat on the same basis as men. 
Even if polls and surveys among military personnel showed overwhelming 
majorities in support of women in combat, the Congress and Commander in 
Chief still should implement policies that rest on sound priorities and put the 
needs of the military first. 
C. Complications on Co-Ed Submarines 
Unless the Commander in Chief fulfills his responsibility to enforce the 
congressional notification law regarding women in land combat,175 a similar 
statute mandating advance notice before assigning female sailors to submarines, 
enacted in 2000, will likely have no effect.176 And if high-level Navy officials 
decide to yield to feminist demands for “career opportunities” aboard 
submarines, serious harm could be done to the health of female sailors, their 
children, male submariners, and the “Silent Service” community as a whole. 
 
 173. Phillip Carter, War Dames, WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 2002 (“The most important reason [for the 
new role of women in the military] has been pressure from women within the Army who need 
combat experience to advance their careers, nearly all of them in the officer corps.” (alteration 
added)), available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0212.carter.html. In the 
summer of 2004, several male flag officers told this author during meetings at the Pentagon that they 
favored the lifting of all combat barriers, because that would advance the careers of their own 
daughters. No data is available, but there appear to be many daughters of high-level military 
officials who are military service academy graduates and who seek to follow in their fathers’ 
footsteps to flag rank. Even if career opportunities and promotions were a problem for female 
officers—but figures presented to DACOWITS since the 1980s indicate that they are not—that would 
not be sufficient reason to impose involuntary combat obligations on enlisted women, on the same 
basis as men. See infra note 552. 
 174. ARI SAMPLE SURVEY, supra note 158. 
 175. See 10 U.S.C. § 652 (West Supp. 2007). 
 176. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 573, 114 
Stat. 1654, 1654A-136 (2000) (enacting 10 U.S.C. § 6035 (2000) (requiring the Secretary of Defense to 
give Congress a thirty-day notice before either assigning women to serve aboard submarines or 
configuring submarines to allow for women’s service)). 
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1. Feminist Engineering and the “Silent Service”177 
During the Administration of Bill Clinton, then-Secretary of the Navy John 
H. Dalton issued a memorandum on April 29, 1994, directing the Chief of Naval 
Operations to assess the cost of ship alterations to “give full consideration to the 
importance of expanding opportunities for women into the submarine field, as 
well as the cost effectiveness of the shipboard modifications necessary to 
facilitate mixed gender crews.”178 The Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC) prepared for the Navy an eighty-three page report titled 
Submarine Assignment Policy Assessment (SAIC Report). The SAIC Report set forth 
definitive information on why it would be unwise to assign female sailors to any 
class of submarine. This study was given to DACOWITS in 1995, but it was not 
revealed to the public until the fall of 1999.179 
On June 3, 1999, Secretary Dalton’s former Under Secretary and successor 
Richard Danzig revived the issue during a speech before an annual symposium 
of the Naval Submarine League in Norfolk, Virginia.180 Danzig accused the 
submarine community of being “a white male bastion” and suggested that the 
Navy might lose political support in Congress if it did not consider gender 
integration on submarines.181 The Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jay Johnson, 
resisted Danzig’s pressure, responding that all-male submarine crews were “the 
right thing for us.”182 
 
 177. John Howland, a Naval Academy alumnus and former submarine officer, described the 
term “Silent Service” as follows: 
“Silent Service” was a term coined in the World War II era to describe the submarine 
service and the men who manned the boats in the Pacific. Submarines were the first arm of 
the military to take the attack to the Japanese following Pearl Harbor. By their nature, they 
are stealthy weapons. The silence that they do and must maintain when they are in enemy 
territory is of life or death importance. Submariners are also generally silent about their 
missions and accomplishments. 
E-mail from John Howland to author (Mar. 2007) (on file with author). 
 178. REPORT OF THE SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (SAIC), SUBMARINE 
ASSIGNMENT POLICY ASSESSMENT, at A-3 (Feb. 1, 1995) [hereinafter SAIC REPORT], available at 
http://www.cmrlink.org/viewarticle.asp?f=sapa%20020195.pdf. 
 179. See Navy Responses, Fall 1999 and Spring 2000, infra notes 183, 186. The Center for Military 
Readiness obtained the SAIC Report from a knowledgeable source sometime after Secretary of the 
Navy Richard Danzig delivered a controversial speech advocating gender-mixed submarines in June 
of 1999. See Robert A. Hamilton, 1995 Report Opposed Putting Women on Subs, DAY (New London, 
Conn.), Oct. 23, 1999, at A1; Rowan Scarborough, Mixed-Sex Sub Crews Panned by Navy Study, WASH. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at Al. 
 180. David Brown, Idea of Women on Subs Met with Varied Response, NAVY TIMES, June 21, 1999, at 
12. 
 181. Editorial, No Place for Women, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 1, 1999, at 22. 
In a speech loaded with sociological gobbledygook, he [Danzig] warned the “submarine 
community” last summer to accept women and more minorities or risk being out of touch 
with society. “The most Narcissus-like thing about creating something in your own image, 
about being in love with your own image, is the continued and continuous existence of 
this segment of the Navy as a white male preserve,” he told the Naval Submarine League. 
Id. (alteration added). 
 182. Dale Eisman, Top Admiral Against Women on Subs, VIRGINIAN PILOT, Sept. 3, 1999, at A14; 
CNO Sinks Sub Changes . . . For Now, NAVY TIMES, Sept. 13, 1999, at 5. 
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a. DACOWITS 
In the fall of 1999, the Navy responded to an inquiry from the Defense 
Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), which the 
committee had submitted to the Navy following its spring 1999 meeting. In their 
response, Navy briefers explained the rationale behind Adm. Johnson’s position 
in written responses and a slide presentation before the forty-seven-year-old 
DACOWITS.183 At the time, DACOWITS was a group of twenty-five to thirty-
five mostly civilian women appointed by the Secretary of Defense to advise the 
Pentagon on all issues involving women in the military.184 The committee 
disregarded the Navy’s briefing and passed a resolution recommending that 
untold millions be spent to accommodate mixed-gender crews on submarines.185 
During DACOWITS’s spring 2000 meeting, the Navy presented additional 
information explaining many reasons why the Navy does not assign female 
 
 183. Navy Response to DACOWITS, Fall 1999, San Diego, Cal., presented by Capt. Bob Holland, 
U.S. Navy, Submarine Community Management, Nuclear Propulsion Program Management: 
Submarine Personnel Assignment [hereinafter Navy Response, Fall 1999] (consisting of twenty-nine 
unnumbered slides) (on file with author). Among other things, Capt. Holland’s briefing explained 
that alterations to submarines to accommodate women would further reduce the already below-
standard habitability standards for all crew members, while leaving less space for stowage of basic 
and special equipment required for mission accomplishment. See Andrea Stone, Navy Resists Idea of 
Opening Submarines to Women, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 1999, at 14A; Robert A. Hamilton, Committee 
Urges Female Crew for Subs, DAY (New London, Conn.), Oct. 29, 1999. 
 184. See supra note 159. For several decades after its founding in 1951, the original committee’s 
research and recommendations were helpful to military women and consistent with sound 
priorities. But starting in the 1990s, the mostly civilian women members undermined the 
committee’s credibility by routinely endorsing problematic feminist causes—particularly co-ed basic 
training, women in combat, and gender integration on submarines. See supra note 159. These 
recommendations were primarily aimed at advancing the careers of the female officers who, as 
military representatives to the committee, helped to write them during biannual DACOWITS 
meetings. Full committee meetings were elaborate four- or five-day affairs, hosted by the various 
services in Washington, D.C., and at military bases around the country. Meetings involved extensive 
briefings, field trips, and formal social events. Members making independent visits to military 
installations were treated with the same protocol status as three-star flag officers. (In the opinion of 
this author, who was appointed to the DACOWITS in 1984, some committee members took this 
status much too seriously.) Issues raised during base visit focus groups sometimes led to formal 
“Requests for Information,” which were answered at the next meeting with a written response or a 
briefing from military service representatives. Following these responses, DACOWITS would vote 
on formal recommendations, which usually included a “Rationale” stressing career opportunities for 
women. Recommendations were submitted directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Under 
Secretary for Personnel & Readiness, and prominently reported in the media on a regular basis. The 
circular process put pressure on representatives of the military services to satisfy escalating 
expectations of the committee at each successive meeting. 
 185. DACOWITS Recommendation No. 1 (Oct. 1, 1999) (“DACOWITS recommends that, 
beginning now, plans for future submarine platforms (particularly the smaller Virginia class subs), 
incorporate appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements to accommodate mixed gender crews.”). 
It also recommended that gender-integration begin on larger Ohio-class submarines, armed with 
(Trident) ballistic missiles (SSBNs), starting with female officers. See Recommendations, available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits. See also Stone, supra note 183; Hamilton, supra note 183. This 
recommendation alarmed and agitated the submarine community, which demanded action from 
Congress. The debate tensified in October 1999, when the previously undisclosed SAIC Report came 
to light. See, e.g., Carlisle A.H. Trost, Not in Our Submarines, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., Sept. 2000, at 2. 
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sailors to submarines.186 Again, the DACOWITS disregarded that information 
and reaffirmed their unrealistic Fall 1999 resolution, recommending that smaller 
(Virginia-class) submarines be redesigned to accommodate mixed crews in the 
future and that female officers be assigned to larger Ohio-class (Trident) ballistic 
missile (SSBN) submarines.187 In submitting both of these recommendations to 
the Secretary of Defense, committee members put their own egalitarian agenda 
ahead of the good of the Silent Service.188 
The DACOWITS also ignored compelling information included in the 
report of the Science Applications International Corporation, which had been 
given to the committee in June 1999. Points made by Navy representatives and 
by the SAIC Report, all of which remain equally valid today, included the 
following: 
• “[Alterations for co-ed crews would] further reduce existing below-
standard conditions (for both genders); or require the removal of 
equipment as a space and weight trade-off, which would result in 
reduced operational capabilities of the ship; or in the extreme, require 
lengthening of the ship to obtain additional space and weight margin. 
This option would be very costly.”189 
• Separate quarters for female sailors would further cramp living spaces 
on all submarines, which already fail to meet the habitability standards 
applied to surface ships—and to an intolerable degree:190 fifty enlisted 
 
 186. Navy Response to DACOWITS, Spring 2000, Submarine Personnel Assignment: Briefing 
Session, at 2 [hereinafter Navy Response, Spring 2000], available at http://www.cmrlink.org/ 
cmrnotes/navy-dacowits_0295.pdf. In its response, the Navy referenced the 1995 SAIC Report, which 
had been given to DACOWITS in June 1999. 
 187. See Andrea Stone, Too Cramped for Comfort?, NAVY TIMES, June 5, 2000, at 24; Rowan 
Scarborough, Panel Asks Navy to Put Female Officers in Subs, WASH. TIMES, May 4, 2000, at A1. This 
recommendation and a similar one approved at the committee’s Fall 1999 meeting, see supra note 
185, seriously discredited DACOWITS. In March 2001, controversy about co-ed submarines was one 
of several issues raised when DACOWITS’s charter was due to be renewed in 2001. Following 
months of controversy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness, Dr. David Chu, 
allowed DACOWITS’s Charter to expire, but he later reconstituted the group with fewer than ten 
members and a different agenda that focuses on family concerns and related issues, but not women 
in combat. 
 188. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 10–11. Characteristics of this community are unique in the 
military: 
A U.S. submarine provides stealth, mobility, and firepower and the mere suspicion of its 
presence dramatically changes the military equation for enemy commanders. U.S. 
submarines are able to operate alone, unsupported, and undetected—even in enemy 
waters—for months at a time, limited only by food supplies and the endurance of the 
crew. There are no onboard maintenance personnel; the operating crew must handle any 
emergency, including repairs to the most sophisticated equipment. The submarine carries 
an array of precision weapons that can strike targets ashore, on the surface, or other 
submarines. It requires no escorts; no tankers; no air cover; no supply ships; and there are 
no manufacturers’ representatives on board. It is the platform of choice for many Special 
Forces operations. 
Id. 
 189. Navy Response, Fall 1999, supra note 183, at slide titled “Submarine Alterations—Projected 
Costs” (alteration added). See also Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 5. 
 190. Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 5. 
A driving factor in the privacy and habitability concerns onboard all submarines is the 
collocation of showers and toilet facilities, necessitated by the limited available space . . . . 
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submariners use each shower, compared to twenty-five surface sailors; 
an enlisted submariner has less than half the storage space of his 
surface counterpart (three cubic feet vs. seven-and-one-half cubic feet); 
and vertical space between bunks measures only eighteen inches on 
submarines, compared to twenty-four inches on ships.191 
• Virginia-class attack subs (SSNs) were designed to be smaller than the 
Seawolf in order to reduce costs. Extensive redesign, as demanded by 
DACOWITS, “would have two negative effects: further degrade 
habitability for both genders and require removal of operational 
equipment reducing warfighting effectiveness.”192 
• Ship alterations to accommodate women would cost approximately $5 
million per attack sub, not including redesign costs of approximately 
$15 million per class, plus an unknown amount for required system 
changes and associated costs. The Navy’s minimum estimate is that 
altering a submarine to accommodate women would cost seventy-eight 
times more per crewmember than would making comparable 
alterations on aircraft carriers.193 
• More importantly, estimates of cost do not reflect the operational 
hazards of degrading undersea performance characteristics and combat 
capabilities, which are vastly different from the surface fleet. The crew 
lives in and around equipment—an existence that has been compared 
to living inside a clock. “Critical electronic, hydraulic, and high 
pressure air systems pass through submarine berthing spaces.”194 
Redesignation of space designed for operational equipment could 
 
The common practice onboard some surface ships of using a sign to indicate occupancy by 
a male/female crewmember would not work satisfactorily for long periods onboard a 
submarine. 
Id. 
 191. Id. at 4; SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 11–12, Table 2-1. 
Submarine designers strive to minimize the size of the ship. This is important to achieve 
maximum performance within a reasonable power plant design and to avoid unnecessary 
construction costs. Submarine designers try to take advantage of every cubic foot of space. 
Living spaces are integrated with electrical and mechanical operating systems. The crew 
lives in and around the submarine weapon systems. 
Id. 
 192. Rowan Scarborough, Panel Asks Navy to Put Female Officers in Subs; Military Memo Says the 
Move “Very Costly,” WASH. TIMES, May 4, 2000, at A1 (quoting Navy Response Spring 2000, supra 
note 186, at 4). 
 193. Navy Response, Fall 1999, supra note 183, at slides titled “Surface Ship Alteration Costs,” 
“Submarine Alterations—Projected Costs.” It would cost $5 million, or $313,000 per person, to 
reconfigure a Los Angeles-class submarine for gender-mixed crews, compared to $2 million, or 
$4000 per person, to make similar alterations to an aircraft carrier (CVN 68). “These estimates do not 
include one time design costs of approximately $15 million per ship class. Nor do the projections 
consider required system changes and associated costs. Therefore, projected costs may be 
significantly higher.” Id. See also Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 5 (mentioning the 
considerable “opportunity costs” of taking submarines off line to support major shipboard 
modifications to accommodate mixed gender crews). All of the Navy’s estimated costs, which have 
not been adjusted for inflation, would be considerably higher today. 
 194. Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 7; SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 2–4. 
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“potentially [impact] the ship’s endurance and/or mission 
capability.”195 
• A plan to assign female sailors and officers only to larger Trident 
submarines (SSBNs, also known as “boomers”) would create an 
unacceptable two-tiered officer community: one group that can serve 
on any submarine, and another that can only be assigned to Tridents. 
Without the opportunity to assign sailors to both types of submarines, 
in order to broaden experience in each, it would become increasingly 
difficult to maintain a properly balanced and experienced officer 
community. This would disadvantage women in any fair selection 
process for command. Additionally, assigning women only to the 
larger Trident subs would create a perceived inequity within the 
community.196 
b. The SAIC Report 
The 1995 Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Report 
provided additional information on the complications of co-ed submarines, 
including a simple drawing that was worth 10,000 words.197 The drawing 
illustrated habitability concerns by superimposing the outline of a Boeing 747 
aircraft fuselage over the cramped living spaces of an attack submarine. The 
cabin of a 747 jetliner, in which passengers spend only a few hours while in 
flight, appears roomier than the space in which submariners must live, work, 
and sleep for extended periods. 
The SAIC Report explained that nuclear powered SSBN “boomers” stay 
submerged for as long as seventy-seven continuous days.198 SSN (attack) subs 
deploy for as long as six months at a time, with infrequent port calls.199 The 
thought of spending seventy-seven days on a 747 should give pause to any 
reasonable person. The SAIC Report also put the issue into perspective by 
assigning priority to the needs of the Silent Service: 
Considerations of mixed gender crews must be undertaken in the context of the 
combat effectiveness of the submarine. The Supreme Court has upheld that Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which ensures all individuals are treated 
equally before the law with respect to civilian employment, does not apply to 
the military profession. 
Submarines are unique. They are able to operate alone—submerged and 
unsupported—undetected in a hostile environment for months at a time, limited 
only by food supplies and the endurance of the crew. The vital characteristics of 
submarines generate competing design requirements, including safety of 
submerged operations, quieting, equipment accessibility and density. The final 
design is a trade-off that is dominated by operational effectiveness, engineering 
 
 195. See Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 7; SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 2–4. 
 196. Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 8–9. 
 197. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 15. The SAIC Report was not made public until 1999, when a 
concerned source provided it to the Center for Military Readiness. See http://www.cmrlink.org/ 
viewarticle.asp?f=sapa%20020195.pdf. 
 198. Id. at 16. 
 199. Id. at 16–17. 
04__DONNELLY.DOC 6/18/2007  3:01 PM 
862 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:815 2007 
constraints and cost. In parceling out available space, structure and equipment 
needed for submarine stealth, mobility, endurance and payload take priority 
over habitability. Non-essentials stay ashore. The crew must live in and around 
equipment. There is virtually no space for recreation. 
Berthing and sanitary spaces are cramped. “Hot-bunking,” wherein three crew 
members share two bunks in shifts, is standard operating procedure on attack 
submarines. The total living area for more than 130 people is equivalent to a 
medium-size house. Unencumbered deck space in sleeping areas, toilets, and 
showers, is about one-half to one-third that afforded to a crew member on a 
small surface ship . . . . 
Efforts continue to be made to minimize hot bunking, however the reality is that 
hot bunking is still required to accomplish sea missions. To reduce the number 
of crew required to hot bunk, commanding officers will often grant the option of 
laying down mattresses in the torpedo room where there is some unencumbered 
deck space. Generally, crew members prefer the inconvenience and lack of 
privacy involved in these sleeping arrangements to sleeping in shifts on 
permanent bunks.200 
According to the magazine National Defense, “A nuclear submarine 
embodies the highest form of integrated technologies in the world—more 
complex than even space vehicles—and [it] must operate in a more hostile 
environment.”201 
Safety concerns that cannot be engineered away are even more daunting: 
• A submarine is analogous to an “undersea aircraft,” which patrols the 
oceans for months at a time, unsupported and undetected in an 
environment more hostile than space. “When submerged, even a small 
breach in a seawater piping system can threaten the ship and all 
aboard. The closed atmosphere of a submarine creats physical risks. In 
case of fire, for example, a submarine must quickly get to the surface to 
evacuate smoke or toxic fumes.”202 
• Addressing the notion that submarines can be “stretched” like town car 
wedding limousines, SAIC added the following: “New sanitary 
facilities require more piping modifications in submarines, and may in 
some cases require additional seawater piping or hull penetrations. 
These are not insignificant modifications . . . . Both berthing and 
sanitary facility modifications require corresponding electrical system 
changes as well . . . .” 
• “In both the Los Angeles and Seawolf classes, modifications which 
attain compliance with the [habitability] standards may not be possible 
without lengthening the ship . . . .” Re-assignment of scarce sanitary 
facilities to female sailors—restricting, in many cases, fifty percent of 
facilities to ten percent of the crew—would cause inequities for the 
 
 200. Id. at 2, 12. 
 201. Richard H. Gwinn & Don Tanquin, Submarine Base Viability Relies on Interim Program, NAT’L 
DEF., Nov. 1994, at 22, quoted in SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 10. 
 202. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 16. 
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men. Cross-rank, single-gender berthing arrangements would disrupt 
prerogatives of rank in an already-stressful environment.203 
• According to preliminary work done on the new Virginia-class attack 
submarines, “additional facilities for women would require an increase 
in length from the baseline design and even then, the facilities [would 
not be] fully compliant with the [habitability] standards.”204 
There is no compelling reason to make submarine living spaces even more 
cramped, but that is exactly what DACOWITS recommended. 
c. Birth Defects and Medical Emergencies 
The SAIC Report set forth one of the most compelling reasons why 
submarines should remain all-male. Medical dangers inherent in gynecological 
emergencies, and insurmountable risks of birth defects to unborn fetus 
“passengers” who accompany their mothers to work on the sub, could endanger 
crew members and undermine undersea missions.205 The only female sailors 
who could safely be assigned to submarines would be women without the 
physical capability to have children.206 
There are several reasons why pregnancy would be a greater concern on 
submarines than on surface vessels. First, the primary health risk to pregnant 
females in submarines is not nuclear power (as might be commonly assumed), 
but rather it is the constantly recycled air on submarines. On June 12, 2000, Rear 
Adm. Hugh P. Scott, MC, U.S. Navy (Ret.), an expert in the field of undersea 
medicine, wrote letters to House and Senate Armed Services Committees, 
explaining in detail the medical and operational hazards of assigning female 
sailors of child-bearing age to submarines, due to risks of birth defects caused by 
elements in a submarine’s constantly recycled atmosphere that are safe for 
adults but not for unborn children. While undertaking clinical tests to 
conclusively establish these hazards would be impossible without exposing 
women and children to unacceptable risks in the process,207 Rear Adm. Scott’s 
advice was not mere rhetoric: The Institute of Naval Medicine in the United 
Kingdom, in a study done for the British Royal Navy in 1997, independently 
came to similar conclusion.208 
 
 203. Id. at 25, 26, 27 (alteration added). 
 204. Id. at 26 (citing the Naval Sea Systems Command) (alterations added). 
 205. Id. at 32–36. 
 206. Id.; see also Letter from Rear Adm. Hugh Scott, MC, U.S. Navy (Ret.) to House National 
Security Committee Chairman Rep. Floyd D. Spence, June 12, 2000 [hereinafter Rear Adm. Scott 
letter], available at http://www.cmrlink.org/CMRNoteNotes/HPScott%20061200.pdf. Dr. Scott, a 
former medical corpsman and an expert in the field of undersea medicine, provided more detailed 
information on the high risk of birth defects for the children of female sailors assigned to 
submarines, especially in the earliest weeks when they may not be aware of their pregnancy. 
 207. See Rear Adm. Scott letter, supra note 206. 
 208. A. Brittain, M.R. Dean, H.J. Holden, D.C. Brown & G.H.G. McMillan, Mixed Manning in 
Submarines: Foetal Health, Dec. 1997, in INM REPORT NO. 97074 (1997) (on file with author). This report 
was approved and released by G.H.G. McMillan, Surgeon Commodore Royal Navy Medical Officer-
in-Charge, The Institute for Naval Medicine, Alverstoke, GOSPORT, Hampshire, PO12 2DL 
RESTRICTED, at 1. It was obtained by the author from David Brown, Head of Submarine and 
Radiation Medicine Division, Institute of Naval Medicine, on November 25, 1999. 
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As a practical matter, certain atmospheric molecules, such as carbon 
monoxide and carbon dioxide, cannot be reduced in a submarine’s closed 
undersea environment to a level that is safe for unborn children. Fires, smoking, 
equipment malfunction, and overheated insulation all produce carbon 
monoxide, which presents a real threat to a female submariner’s unborn child. 
According to several studies cited by the SAIC Report: 
The major gases present and routinely monitored aboard submarines include: 
carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, hydrogen, oxygen, fluorocarbon-12 and 
fluorocarbon-114. With regard to toxicological considerations, the carbon 
monoxide present in the closed environment of the submarine can have an 
adverse effect on the development of the fetus . . . While normal adults have a 
reserve capacity and compensatory response . . . the fetus under normal 
situations can be functioning close to a critical level with respect to tissue 
oxygen supply, so even a moderate carbon monoxide exposure could decrease 
the oxygen transport capacity of maternal and fetal hemoglobin and result in 
interference in fetal tissue oxygenation during important developmental stages. 
. . . . 
The fetus is most sensitive and at the greatest risk in terms of the toxicological 
effects of the environment during the first three months of gestation.209 
Second, in addition to the risks inherent in permitting normal pregnancies 
to occur aboard submarines, gender-integrated submarines would be faced with 
emergencies such as ruptured ectopic pregnancies, which are life-threatening 
and untreatable by a medical officer (usually not a doctor) in a sub’s closet-sized 
“sick bay.”210 The SAIC Report noted: 
The medical problems sometimes associated with pregnancy, such as ruptured 
ectopic pregnancy, spontaneous hemorrhagic abortion, or septic abortion would 
be significantly magnified in the submarine environment. The occurrence of a 
ruptured ectopic pregnancy is a life threatening emergency that requires a 
correct diagonosis and a prompt medevac to a medical treatment facility with an 
obstetrical surgical capacity. In the U.S. there is one [such] pregnancy for each 
[sixty] diagnosed pregnancies. Eighty percent of ruptured ectopic pregnancies 
occur between four to eight weeks after the last menstrual period.211 
In his letter to Chairman Spence, Rear Adm. Scott noted, “Testing all 
women for pregnancy will not remove the risk because the pregnancy test may 
not be positive in very early pregnancy, the time at which ectopic pregnancy 
poses the greatest problem.”212 It would be prudent to conduct mandatory 
pregnancy tests prior to deployment, but in the past, female officers have 
 
 209. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 34–35. 
 210. Personal observation and trip report of the author during Presidential Commission visit to 
the USS Polk and USS Scranton (Sept. 13, 1992). 
 211. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 32–33 (quoting several expert sources in the fields of Navy 
medicine, obstetrics, and gynocological surgery) (alterations added). 
 212. See Rear Adm. Scott letter, supra note 206, at 3. See also SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 34. 
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rejected mandatory pre-deployment pregnancy tests as an infringement on 
women’s rights, and intimidated men have capitulated to their demands.213 
If a submarine’s captain were faced with a female sailor in acute medical 
distress, or a pregnant sailor who fears birth defects due to carbon monoxide 
and other toxic elements in the atmosphere, what is the skipper to do? An 
immediate, unexpected trip to the surface would compromise the sub’s 
undersea mission. In addition, mid-ocean evacuations, accomplished by means 
of a basket dangling from a helicopter, would be extremely perilous for all 
concerned, especially when a sub is operating in deep ocean or under polar ice. 
Pregnancy is not a minor concern. According to the Center for Naval 
Analysis, the unplanned loss rate for female sailors on surface ships (twenty-
three to twenty-five percent) is more than two-and-one-half times the rate for 
men (eight to ten percent)—most often due to pregnancy and other medical 
conditions.214 Proportional losses on submarines could compromise stealth 
missions and have a devastating effect on morale and readiness.215 
• The unplanned loss of any sailor from a small-crewed submarine, 
which requires 100% manning for continuous eighteen-hour shift 
cycles, imposes considerable stress on remaining crewmembers. 
Properly trained replacement personnel, who are usually not available 
even on surface ships, would be even more difficult to find and place 
on technologically advanced submarines.216 
• Replacements for unplanned personnel losses would have to match in 
terms of gender as well as qualifications, since replacement of a female 
 
 213. See NAVAL INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION ON THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN INTO 
CARRIER AIR WING ELEVEN (Feb. 10, 1997) [hereinafter AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT] (on file with 
author). During the first deployment of female pilots in tactical aviation in 1994, some female officers 
protested the air wing commander’s (CAG’s) order for mandatory pregnancy testing. When the 
CAG rescinded the order, another storm of protest ensued, causing lingering resentment among 
men and women alike. “No issue was as divisive of men and women as the carrier commanding 
officer’s order that air wing personnel undergo [mandatory] pregnancy testing. The issue was 
routinely cited by women who were critical of the [CAG’s] . . . lack of understanding of women’s 
concerns.” Id. (alterations added). This incident was so contentious that orders for pregnancy tests 
have become virtually anathema in the Navy, except under limited circumstances. 
 214. Rowan Scarborough, Dropout Rate High for Women on Ships; Navy Finds Readiness Woes, 
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1999, at A1 [hereinafter Scarborough, Dropout Rate High]. 
 215. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 41–43. “The submarine’s independent operations, often in 
remote areas, means that access to replacement personnel or assistance from others only occurs in 
extreme emergencies. If such outside assistance is required, it can be obtained only at the expense of 
mission readiness or mission performance . . . .” Id. See also Rowan Scarborough, Navy Finds 
Pregnancy Put at Risk by Sea Duty, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1998, at A1; Scarborough, Dropout Rate High, 
supra note 214. 
 216. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 41–42. 
Because of the highly technical nature of submarining, the range of skills required to 
operate and maintain submarines, the small size of the crew and the independent, 
extended nature of submarine operations, operational submarines are manned at 100 
percent of allowance as a matter of policy. Submarines depend upon 100 percent manning 
to provide the proper number of crew members of the right skills to fight and maintain the 
ship, and to man all watch stations for day-to-day operations with adequate watch 
rotation, usually three sections. 
Id. 
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with a male would lessen the hot bunking burden on women and 
increase it for men, and vice versa.217 
Normal operations and damage control can be physically demanding on 
submarines as well as on surface ships. The last Navy study of its kind found 
that significant percentages of female sailors were unable to perform the 
following tasks: Stretcher carry, level (38%); Stretcher carry, up and down ladder 
(88%); Start P250 Pump (75%); and Remove SSTG Pump (99%). None of the men 
failed to perform any of these tasks, which are commonly performed during 
shipboard emergencies.218 This type of equipment is still used on board Navy 
ships. Often another sailor is not available to share the load, particularly given 
narrow shipboard space constraints. 
d. Interpersonal Relationships 
There are additional reasons why it would be unwise to impose 
unresolvable social and management problems on the submarine community. 
The SAIC Report’s cautionary words to social engineers are comparable to the 
warnings given to NASA mechanical engineers about the dangers of sparks and 
fire in a pure-oxygen environment. 
First, recent experience indicates that inappropriate relationships—ranging 
from harassment to sexual attraction—will occur and be known to the entire 
crew. Displays of affection are sure to undermine morale and discipline, since 
there is no effective way to separate the people involved, short of evacuation. 
Unplanned surfacings to remove sailors due to inappropriate personal behavior, 
as well as for medical/pregnancy emergencies, would further compromise the 
mission.219 
Second, unrelenting stress and an absence of personal comforts and privacy 
place a premium on morale and cohesion of the crew. There is no fresh air or 
communication with the outside world, except for fifty-word family grams that 
are not private.220 Divorce rates in the submarine community are already very 
high.221 Further stress on families, combined with predictable unplanned losses 
and non-deployability problems, could worsen personnel shortages, instead of 
improving them. 
 
 217. Id. at 43. 
 218. Id. at 36 (quoting D.W. Robertson & T. Trent, Documentation of Muscularly Demanding Jobs 
and Tasks and Validation of an Occupational Strength Test Battery (STB), MDTLN REPORT NO. 86-1 
(1985)). The Robertson & Trent Study was also cited with diagrams and findings in the Presidential 
Commission Report, supra note 5, at C-8, C-9. A number of submarine wives, speaking with members 
of the Presidential Commission by phone on October 8, 1992, said that they were most concerned 
about physical disparities between male and female sailors, which could undermine safety 
procedures in emergency situations. See Presidential Commission Panel Three Supplementary Trip 
Report (Oct. 23, 1992) (on file with author). 
 219. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 48–49. This point has been demonstrated, ironically, in the 
highly publicized case of former astronaut Lisa Marie Nowak. See Nasa Fires Astronaut Nowak, supra 
note 149. 
 220. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 18–20. 
 221. Elaine Donnelly, Trip Report to the Presidential Commission Regarding Sept. 13, 1992, Visit 
to Atlantic Submarine Command at Norfolk, Va. (Jan. 15, 1993). See also Elaine M. Grossman, Crew 
Wives Want No Women on Subs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 6, 2000, at 29A. 
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Lastly, by means of comparison, Norway, Sweden, and Australia assign a 
few women to small submarines, but brief coastal deployments are nowhere 
near as demanding as American submarine requirements. On small, thirty-
person Swedish subs, men and women change clothes, bunk, and shower in the 
same spaces. In an interview with Navy Times, Swedish sailors said that 
romantic relationships occurring in submarines are conducted “professionally” 
and treated with wary acceptance.222 Such arrangements are incompatible with 
sound personnel-management practices and American cultural values.223 
The Navy’s responses to DACOWITS and to the SAIC Report made 
additional points in response to concerns about women’s careers. For instance, 
Navy officials explained that it would not be rational to assign women only to 
the larger, more spacious nuclear submarines, because submariners must have 
operational experience in all classes of submarines in order to advance their 
careers. Limiting women only to larger nuclear submarines would disadvantage 
women, even while being perceived as preferentrial treatment unfair to men.224 
Furthermore, opportunities for women in specialized fields, such as nuclear 
propulsion, are readily available in other advanced classes of ships, such as 
AEGIS cruisers and Nimitz-class aircraft carriers.225 
The SAIC Report and the Navy’s Fall 1999 and Spring 2000 responses did 
not matter to DACOWITS, which nonetheless recommended that women be 
assigned incrementally to larger Ohio-class (Trident) ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBNs), and eventually to the new Virginia-class attack submarines, which are 
much smaller than Los Angeles-class attack subs (SSNs). The Department of the 
Navy, however, has not changed its official position: 
In July 1995, the Secretary of the Navy concurred with the Chief of Naval 
Operation’s recommendation not to open submarines to women. He specified 
that the issue was to be assessed as the Navy’s experience evolved in the 
Women at Sea program on surface combatants. To date, the information which 
has become available in the Women at Sea program does not provide a basis for 
changing this policy. Therefore, in accordance with SECNAVINST 1300.12B, 
Assignment of Women Members in the Department of the Navy, submarines 
remain closed to women.226 
 
 222. Bradley Peniston, Swedish Subs Serve as Model to U.S. Fleet, NAVY TIMES, July 5, 1999. 
Peniston talked to Swedish sailors stationed at Gdynia, Poland, who approved of Sweden’s policy of 
putting female sailors on small submarines since 1989. Id. A male officer acknowledged that there is 
no privacy, and people wind up changing clothes together. Id. A female sailor who shares her 
stateroom with three male officers said, “I think we think differently” from Americans. Id. “It’s the 
natural way of doing it.” Id. A chief petty officer from the American guided missile cruiser USS Hue 
City said, “No way would that work.” Id. A female lieutenant junior-grade, also from the Hue City, 
agreed, telling the reporter that she was headed for nuclear training for aircraft carriers. Id. 
 223. See id. 
 224. Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 8. 
 225. Navy Response, Fall 1999, supra note 183, at slide titled “Women in the Nuclear Propulsion 
Program.” 
 226. Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 2–3. 
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2. The Bartlett Amendment Mandating Oversight 
Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.), a member of the HASC Personnel 
Subcommittee, recognized that advocates of women on submarines were 
misguided.227 Rep. Bartlett also realized that a single incremental step to put 
female sailors on any class of submarine would inevitably lead to irreversible 
changes on all classes of subs—all without congressional oversight or 
approval.228 Such actions become inevitable when policymakers assign highest 
priority to equal opportunity and career considerations—at the expense of the 
needs of the military—and knowingly create career path problems that cannot 
be solved without taking additional steps in the wrong direction.229 
Noting that “[a]ny policy change of this magnitude simply must undergo 
review by Congress and public debate,” Rep. Bartlett wisely sponsored and 
successfully passed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2001, which forbids the use of DoD funds to gender-integrate 
submarines unless Congress is formally notified thirty legislative days (when 
both houses of Congress are in session, or approximately three months) in 
advance.230 
Such a mandate would not be necessary if the power of gender politics in 
the Pentagon were not so great—both then and now. In 2006, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Adm. Mike Mullen, departed from long-standing Navy policy in 
several speeches and interviews, speaking favorably about the prospect of 
assigning women to submarines.231 A statement by Adm. Mullen promoting 
“diversity in the ranks,” which he said should be “mandatory,” apparently has 
encouraged unnecessary gender quotas at the U.S. Naval Academy,232 which the 
Superintendent, Vice Adm. Rodney Rempt, has promoted as a solution to sexual 
harassment.233 Adm. Mullen and Vice Adm. Rempt seem to be unconcerned 
 
 227. See Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, News Release, Women on Subs Amendment Included in Defense Bill, 
Oct. 12, 2000. 
As a practical matter, this is a no-brainer. The Constitution reserves the exclusive authority 
to Congress to make regulations concerning the military. Without this provision, the 
Administration could have imposed this radical and exorbitantly expensive change over 
the objections of the Navy, with no public debate or consideration by the Congress. 
Id. See also supra note 176. 
 228. See supra note 227. 
 229. See SAIC REPORT, supra note 178. Historically, the typical DACOWITS answer to career 
limitations for women was to demand the removal of all “barriers,” regardless of the consequences. 
 230. See Bartlett, supra note 227 (alteration added). 
 231. Andrew Scutro, Full Steam Ahead, NAVY TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at 14–16. Adm. Mullen was 
quoted as saying that officials in the submarine community were “looking at” the possibility. In 
another interview, then-Master Chief Petty Officer Terry Scott was quoted as saying that he favored 
the inclusion of women on subs because his daughter said when she was eight years old that she 
wanted to ride on submarines. Mark D. Faram, Coming Soon? Women on Subs, Pay Parity, Top Enlisted 
Sailor Says Only Outdated “Culture” Stands in Way, NAVY TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006, at 12. 
 232. See Scutro, supra note 231, at 15. 
 233. Hearing on Sexual Assault and Violence Against Women in the Military and at the Academies 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats, & Int’l Relations, of the H. Comm. on Gov’t 
Reform, 109th Cong. (June 27, 2006) [hereinafter House, Hearing on Sexual Assault and Violence 
Against Women in the Military and at the Academies] (testimony of Vice Adm. Rempt) (citing TASK 
FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:33682.wais. See also id. (statement of Elaine 
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about the illogic of creating an artificially large cohort of female officers who are 
not eligible for assignment to combat communities that must, under DoD 
regulations and Navy policy, remain all-male. 
Marine infantry are sorely needed to train Iraqi men for combat in Iraq, and 
the undermanned SEAL community is the Navy’s number one recruiting 
priority.234 The submarine fleet is shrinking, but skilled officers and crewmen are 
difficult to find. Women cannot fill those billets due to habitability and health 
considerations. Self-sterilization is not a civilized option. Furthermore, given the 
most pressing personnel needs of the Navy and Marine Corps, it is not prudent 
for the Chief of Naval Operations and the Superintendent of the Naval Academy 
to keep increasing gender quotas, which will produce more female officers than 
the Navy needs. These discriminatory quotas are an egregious example of 
double standards involving women (DSIW), and they comprise a self-created 
demographic dilemma in the making. DSIWs cause otherwise intelligent and 
honorable men to do irrational things. 
D. Double Standards in Naval Aviation 
1. Death of an Aviator 
The ramp of an aircraft carrier is unforgiving, and the penalty for errors can 
be death. The story of the first two women trained to fly the F-14 Tomcat 
demonstrates the dangers of advancing female trainees with special concessions 
that elevate risks in extremely hazardous occupations. 
a. The Kara Hultgreen Story 
Shortly after Defense Secretary Les Aspin issued regulations permitting the 
training of female pilots in tactical aviation,235 Lt. Kara S. Hultgreen and Lt. 
Carey Dunai Lohrenz became the first two women trained to fly the F-14 
Tomcat.236 
On October 25, 1994, Lt. Hultgreen lost control of her aircraft on approach 
to the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln.237 Her back seat radar intercept officer barely 
ejected in time, but Lt. Hultgreen plummeted into the ocean and died.238 The 
 
Donnelly). The Task Force Report suggested that acceptance of women at the USNA might improve if 
their numbers were significantly increased. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 22. The theory 
was based on civilian sociology only, but the USNA nevertheless has increased its percentage of 
female midshipmen from 15.8% in the Class of 2006 to 22.8% in the Class of 2010. 
 234. W. Thomas Smith, Jr., Burning Up SEALS: Misusing Special Warfare Assets, NAT’L REV. (online 
ed.), Aug. 31, 2006, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MTY1MDgxOTU2YTA3NWE3ODQyZD 
AwZTc1OGMxOThhNTU=. The USNA should be concentrating on meeting the primary recruiting 
needs of the Navy and Marine Corps today—i.e., men for the combat arms and submarines. 
 235. See Policy on the Assignment of Women, supra note 44. 
236. AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 23. See also Nancy Klingener, A Fighting Chance: 
Female Pilots Finally Will Be Flying Fleet F-14s, MIAMI HERALD, May 16, 1993, at B6; Scott D. Williams, 
Blacklions Fly Into Naval Aviation History, COMPASS (San Diego, Cal.), Sept. 9, 1994, at A1. 
 237. See Tony Perry, Navy’s 1st Woman Combat Pilot Killed During Training Mission, L.A. TIMES 
Oct. 27, 1994, at A12; N.Y. Times News Service, Female Combat Pilot’s Death Sparks Debate, CHI. TRIB., 
Oct. 30, 1994, at C3. 
 238. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 237; Michael E. Ruane, Knight Ridder Newspapers, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Oct. 27, 1994, at A4; NBC Nightly News: Navy’s First Female Pilot is Lost at Sea (NBC television 
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carrier platform videotape and subsequent investigations confirmed that the 
primary cause of Hultgreen’s mishap was pilot error.239 The crash was a tragedy 
but no disgrace, since most aviation mishaps are caused by inadvertent 
mistakes. This fatal accident was different, however, in that it involved double 
standards in aviation training—DSIW of the most dangerous kind. 
The glide-slope errors that caused Lt. Hultgreen to stall the engine and 
depart from safe flight on approach to the carrier ramp were similar to mistakes 
that she had made twice before. Lt. Hultgreen’s instructors gave her “pink 
sheets” marking unsatisfactory performance for similar errors in training. Lt. 
Hultgreen was well-liked and respected by her colleagues, and she probably 
would have developed into a skilled aviator if given sufficient time.240 Her 
graduation into carrier aviation, however, was accelerated before she was 
ready.241 The second female trainee, Lt. Carey Lohrenz, washed out of carrier 
aviation in May 1995.242 Lt. Lohrenz frequently blamed others for the low scores 
and numerous “pink sheets” that she had received, which were far worse than 
those earned by Lt. Hultgreen, and historically would have disqualified male 
aviation trainees.243 When officers in her squadron removed Lt. Lohrenz from 
 
broadcast Oct. 26, 1994). See also MISHAP INVESTIGATION REPORT (Apr. 4, 1995) [hereinafter MIR 
REPORT], available at http://www.panix.com/~baldwin/hultgreen_mir.txt. 
 239. MIR REPORT, supra note 238, at 12. The MIR analyzed glide slope errors in detailed, technical 
terms, and summarized: “The causal factors of this mishap and injury are a result of overcontrol, 
external distraction, cognitive saturation, channelized attention, wear debris, complacency and 
problem not foreseeable.” Id. at 16. See also infra note 263. This document, normally kept in strict 
confidence, was initially revealed by Newsweek magazine on March 27, 1995. See Becky Garrison, COs 
Irked by Handling of Hultgreen Case, NAVY TIMES, June 5, 1995, at 6. 
 240. CENTER FOR MILITARY READINESS, CMR SPECIAL REPORT: DOUBLE STANDARDS IN NAVAL 
AVIATION 3–6 (Apr. 25, 1995) [hereinafter CMR SPECIAL REPORT] (supported by training records at 
B1-1–B13-1). This author met and talked with Lt. Hultgreen and other aviators in her squadron, VF-
213, during a visit to the San Diego Naval Air Station on October 13, 1994, twelve days before her 
tragic death. It was obvious that Lt. Hultgreen enjoyed being in the F-14 squadron, and her 
colleagues held her in high regard. 
 241. See infra notes 256–258. 
 242. AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213 (discussing the REPORT OF THE FIELD NAVAL 
AVIATION EVALUATION BOARD (FNAEB) 94–103 (June 19, 1995) and individual FNAEB documents 
referenced in the AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT). See also infra note 243. A FNAEB is an administrative 
board that may be called to evaluate the performance, potential judgment, and motivation for 
service of the aviator ordered to appear before the board. The FNAEB evaluating the performance of 
Lt. Lohrenz removed her from carrier aviation but recommended A-3 status, which would permit 
her to fly non-tactical aircraft. The squadron commander went further in assigning her to B-1 (non-
flying) status, and the decision was upheld by a Naval Aviation Evaluation Board (NAEB), which 
removed her wings on June 17, 1995. In response to letters from Lohrenz’s parents to the Under 
Secretary of the Navy, Richard Danzig, several investigations ensued. The Air Wing Eleven 
investigation concluded that, at the time of the FNAEB, “Lt. Lohrenz’s grades were below minimum 
standards.” AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 103. Nevertheless, for questionable reasons, 
Lohrenz was returned to non-carrier aircraft flight status by a second Naval Aviation Evaluation 
Board in July 1996. See Ernest Blazar, Navy Gives Grounded Female Pilot 2nd Chance, NAVY TIMES, June 
30, 1997. After filing a lawsuit against the Navy regarding the release of her records, Lohrenz agreed 
to leave the Navy in October 1998. 
243. REPORT OF THE FNAEB [hereinafter FNAEB REPORT], FRS (Fleet Replacement Squadron) 
Training Jacket Summary, Memorandum from Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron 213 to LCDR 
Warren S. Ryder, USN, at encl. 16 (May 31, 1995) (on file with author). See also James W. Crawley, 
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carrier aviation following a Field Naval Aviation Evaluation Board (FNAEB), 
she complained of sex discrimination.244 
Several investigations were conducted, but they found no evidence of bias 
against Lohrenz or other women in Air Wing Eleven.245 Adm. Brent M. Bennit, 
Commander of the Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, reviewed available 
documentation and conducted oral interviews with key officers familiar with 
events leading up to Lohrenz’ FNAEB. Adm. Bennit concluded that the decision 
to terminate Lt. Lohrenz’s flight status in the F-14 was “an appropriate 
decision,” due to several documented factors, including, in part: “[c]ontinued 
substandard carrier landing performance;” “[e]rratic and, at times, dangerously 
unpredictable carrier landing performance;” “[r]epeated instances of slow or 
unresponsive compliance with landing signal officer advice or direction;” 
exhibiting “a consistent and disconcerting tendency to minimize her personal 
responsibility for her substandard carrier landing performance;” and exhibiting, 
“[a]t best, a marked tendency to seriously exaggerate her accounts of events or, 
at worst, a lack of truthfulness in accepting responsibility for deficiencies.” 
 
Navy Grounds Female F-14 Pilot for Evaluation of Flying Skills, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 30, 1995, at 
B1. 
In a statement filed with the FNAEB, the Commanding Officer of the Squadron, Cmdr. F. J. 
Killian, wrote: 
I feel that all the warning signs of impending danger exist, and that my tools, the tripwires 
set forth by governing instructions, indicate a safety hazard. I believe that to allow her to 
continue in the carrier environment could in fact put lives at risk, and [I] am unwilling to 
do that. 
Id. at encl. 6 (alteration added). Lt. Jeffrey Trent, Senior Landing Signal Officer (LSO), said in a 
statement that Lohrenz’s performance was “undisciplined, unresponsive, and unpredictable.” Id. at 
encl. 9. The Commander of the Air Wing (CAG), Capt. Dennis Gillespie, in his “Second 
Endorsement,” dated June 21, 1995, expressed agreement with the FNAEB Report: “The buck stops 
here. Continued and unwarranted effort to achieve mediocrity in the face of ‘the ramp’ would be an 
irresponsible act of cowardice on my part.” Id. at 11–12. The Air Wing Eleven Report noted that 
“[Navy] investigators determined that Lt. Lohrenz went to a FNAEB because those who observed 
her carrier landings thought she was unresponsive, unpredictable, and unsafe . . . .” AIR WING 
ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 102 ¶ 338 (alteration added). 
 244. Letter from Lt. Lohrenz to Commander, Naval Air Force (June 18, 1995) (asking for 
reconsideration of the FNAEB decision to remove her from carrier aviation) (on file with author). See 
also Ernest Blazar, Wing of Fate: What Went Wrong, NAVY TIMES, July 14, 1997, at 4. 
 245. See, e.g, NAVY HOTLINE COMPLETION REPORT 1–35 (Nov. 30, 1995, rev. Jan. 31, 1997) 
[hereinafter CARMAN REPORT], published in AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at app. Lt. 
Lohrenz demanded and did receive some revisions in the Carman Report, but the conclusion that she 
had not been a victim of sex discrimination remained. It stated that, “As early as October 1994, 
certain aspects of Lt. Lohrenz’ night carrier landing performance were below minimum carrier 
qualification standards.” CARMAN REPORT, supra, at 11. The Carman Report (rev.) noted, 
When Lt. Lohrenz’ commanding officer referred her to a Field Naval Aviator Evaluation 
Board on 30 May 1995, she ranked 113 of 113 among air wing pilots . . . . Lt. Lohrenz 
received equivalent opportunity to train compared to her contemporaries. Thus, claims 
that she was not given a reasonable opportunity to succeed are not substantiated. 
Id. at 16. It added, “Documentation was provided verifying command level monitoring of aviators 
whose landing performance tended to be below required standards.” Id. at 17. See also Blazar, supra 
note 244, at 6. 
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Adm. Bennit met with Lt. Lohrenz on April 26, 1996, but he denied her request 
for reinstatement of flight status on June 12, 1996.246 
Lt. Lohrenz remained dissatisfied, and her parents sent a letter of 
complaint to Under Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, who promised 
another investigation.247 In 1996, the Naval Inspector General conducted yet 
another probe of possible sex discrimination against female aviators in Air Wing 
Eleven.248 Over a period of months the Navy IG conducted scores of sworn 
interviews with male and female pilots, wing commanders, instructors, medical 
personnel, and Pacific Fleet commanders. With only a few minor exceptions no 
evidence was found to support allegations of discrimination against Lt. Lohrenz 
or any another female aviator in Air Wing Eleven.249 
Unredacted transcripts of Navy IG interviews and documents, revealed, 
however, that special concessions had been extended to ensure that the first two 
women trained to fly the F-14 in combat would not be allowed to fail.250 The 
squadron commanding officer commented that, after regulations changed in 
 
 246. Memorandum from Adm. Brent M. Bennit, Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 
Second Endorsement on Lt. Carey D. Lohrenz, USNR, to Chief of Naval Personnel, Subj: Request for 
Reinstatement of Flight Status, June 12, 1996, at 1–3 (Feb. 28, 1996) [hereinafter Bennit Memo] (on file 
with author). 
 247. Letters from Robert and Carol Dunai, the parents of Carey Lohrenz, to high level Navy 
officials (July 20, 1995; Jan. 9, 1996) (on file with author). See also Blazar, supra note 244, at 8. In view 
of the record of unequivocal statements by experts evaluating Lohrenz’s performance first-hand, the 
solicitous response of Under Secretary Danzig to the Lohrenz FNAEB was unusual. His response, 
and objectives that the Naval Inspector General set for the huge Air Wing Eleven investigation that 
followed, were examples of DSIWs, which had become pervasive in the aftermath of the 1991 
Tailhook scandal. 
 248. See AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213. The Naval Inspector General investigation of 
Carrier Air Wing Eleven examined the initial work up and deployment of women assigned to 
combat aviation positions aboard the USS Lincoln. The resulting report of the Naval Inspector 
General was dated February 10, 1997, but it was not released, in redacted form, until July 1997. The 
report examined the experiences of several female pilots in Air Wing Eleven, but its primary focus 
was on Lt. Lohrenz, whose parents had sent letters complaining of sex discrimination when she was 
removed from carrier aviation in May 1995. In 1996, scores of Navy personnel and officials were 
interviewed under oath, with verbatim transcripts. 
 249. AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 92. 
[W]hatever the reason—stress, lack of motor skills, problems with scanning, inability to 
comprehend what she was being told to do, unwillingness to comply with the signals of 
the LSOs due to lack of trust or a belief that she knew what was better for her—the bottom 
line is that a pilot must respond to the signals of the LSO; Lohrenz did not. A pilot who 
cannot, or will not, follow the directions of the LSO is inherently unsafe and must be 
removed from the carrier flying environment. 
Id. (alteration added). Additional allegations regarding Lohrenz and several other female aviators 
who claimed or suspected discrimination were found to be minor or unsubstantiated. See id. at 149, 
154, 165, 172, 185, 195, 198, 208, 211–30. See also Robert J. Caldwell, A Rough Flight for the Navy’s 
Female Pilots, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 13, 1997, at G1. 
 250. See AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 23–26 (publishing many excerpts of sworn 
statements obtained by Naval Inspector General investigators, but without attribution or identifying 
information). Unredacted transcripts of Naval Inspector General interviews, obtained by this author 
during the discovery process of litigation, revealed identifying information and more statements 
expressing serious concerns about Lt. Lohrenz’s landing techniques, which had preceded her 
FNAEB and removal from carrier aviation. 
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1993, there was a “race with the Air Force” to get women into combat aviation.251 
Lts. Hultgreen and Lohrenz technically were qualified to fly—both were given 
keys to the aircraft. The definition and concept of “qualified,” however, was 
effectively changed to ensure the women’s graduation to the fleet. Instead of 
pursuing excellence and high standards first, the Navy was giving priority to a 
political goal: making amends for the Tailhook scandal.252 This was done despite 
performance problems that historically had not been accepted in aviators 
aspiring to be pilots in carrier aviation—the Navy’s most hazardous 
occupation.253 Questions persisted about the readiness and competency of the two 
women—particularly Carey Dunai Lohrenz—to fly the F-14 Tomcat in combat.254 
Prior to the death of Lt. Hultgreen, Lt. Patrick Burns and others in the 
training squadron expressed concerns about the competency of the two female 
pilots to the training squadron (VF-124) commanding officer, Cmdr. Thomas 
Sobiek, but were told that the women were going to graduate, no matter what.255 
 
 251. Id. at 41 ¶ 157. Cmdr. Thomas Sobiek, the commanding officer of the F-14 fleet replacement 
(training) squadron (VF-124), initially denied that there were unusual pressures to graduate the 
female trainees from the training squadron. He later conceded that Navy public affairs officers were 
pressuring the training squadron to win “a race with the Air Force” to get women into tactical 
aviation. See See 60 Minutes: Double Standard? (CBS television broadcast Apr. 19, 1998) (interview of 
Cmdr. Thomas Sobiek and Lt. Patrick Burns by Mike Wallace) (transcript on file with author). 
 252. See 60 Minutes, supra note 251 (statement of Adm. Stanley Arthur). 
 253. Id. In many conversations with this author, Lt. Patrick J. (Jerry) Burns, a former radar 
intercept officer (RIO) and F-14 instructor who had trained Lt. Lohrenz, stated that carrier 
qualification historically had been defined by high standards and competency, not minimal 
standards and mediocrity. This same belief was stated by other naval aviators. See, e.g., AIR WING 
ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 91 (“Everyone [interviewed] was consistent in their description of 
Lt. Lohrenz’ typical pass, which she said was high and fast or overpowered . . . to many of the LSOs 
[landing signal officers], her technique presented the profile of the classic ramp strike they all 
feared.”). Lt. Burns documented his statements with records of carrier qualification washout rates of 
F-14 aviators from January 1986 to July 1994, which were subsequently published in the CMR Special 
Report, see supra note 240, at B5-1–B5-14. See also Aff. of Lt. Patrick Jerome “Pipper” Burns, USN 
(Ret.), at 52, Lohrenz v. Donnelly & CMR, 223 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. 96-777) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Burns Affidavit]. 
I reject the notion, as stated by Plaintiff Lohrenz during her December 7, 1999, deposition, 
that it was not a matter of general public concern whether some female pilots were 
receiving preferential treatment in order to qualify for carrier aviation. Both of these 
women [Hultgreen and Lohrenz] were technically “qualified,” but the issue was 
competence to fly the F-14. I saw this as a life and death issue, and it still is. 
Id. (alteration added). See also infra note 275. 
 254. See Pat Flynn, Pilot Qualified, Files Show, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 20, 1994, at A1; 
Editorial, An Inevitable First, NAVY TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994. During this interim time, following the death 
of Lt. Hultgreen and prior to publication of the CMR Special Report, see supra note 240, rumors about 
double standards in the training of both women were widespread in the San Diego naval aviation 
community. Some speculators who did not have first-hand information may have confused the 
training records of Lt. Hultgreen with those of her colleague, Lt. Lohrenz, which were far worse. 
Training records retained by Lt. Burns—an F-14 instructor who feared that one of the women would 
die and that the Navy would try to deny double standards that elevated risks for both women—did 
constitute first-hand information. Copies of the records published in the CMR Special Report, which 
Rear Adm. Lyle Bien had conceded were “largely accurate” in his January 1995 report, drew 
distinctions between Lt. Hultgreen and the second female F-14 aviator, who was identified only as 
“Pilot B.” See also Bien Report, infra note 271. 
 255. See 60 Minutes, supra note 251. Contradicting his previous denials to Naval Inspector 
General investigators, Cmdr. Sobiek admitted on 60 Minutes that he did say something to squadron 
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Navy officials normally do not speculate on the cause of aircraft mishaps. In this 
case, Navy spokesmen began almost immediately to mislead the public about 
the circumstances of Lt. Hultgreen’s crash and the controversial training that 
preceded it.256 
In the days and weeks following the death of Lt. Hultgreen, Navy officials 
continued to insist that she had been fully qualified to fly an F-14. Aviators who 
knew of problems in the training of Lt. Hultgreen and, to a greater degree, Lt. 
Lohrenz, expressed their dissatisfaction publicly but anonymously in the San 
Diego area. Months later, evidence came to light that there was good reason for 
their concerns. 
During the Air Wing Eleven investigation, one of the Navy IG witnesses, 
Lt. Cmdr. Rheinhart Wilke, testified that he had previously evaluated the 
performance of Lt. Hultgreen during her second attempt to carrier qualify, 
which took place on July 19–21, 1994. Lt. Cmdr. Wilke told investigators that he 
had recommended a Field Naval Aviation Evaluation Board (FNAEB) to review 
Lt. Hultgreen’s performance before granting her carrier qualification.257 An 
Evaluation Board proceeding might have delayed her graduation to the fleet, 
but she probably would have improved and eventually succeeded as an F-14 
pilot. Lt. Cmdr. Wilke’s recommendation was overruled, and Lt. Hultgreen was 
assigned to a squadron on the carrier Lincoln.258 
Three months after the women’s carrier qualification, on October 25, 1994, 
Lt. Cmdr. Wilke was a senior landing signal officer on the Lincoln. It was Wilke’s 
voice heard on the chilling videotape of Hultgreen’s crash, pleading with her to 
“Raise your gear!” apply “Power, power!” and finally “Eject!” Hultgreen was 
unable to regain control of the plane to make a second approach, or to save her 
own life by ejecting in time. During testimony given to the Naval Inspector 
General on July 3, 1996, which was not mentioned in the publicly released 
report, Lt. Cmdr. Wilke said, “Watching Kara Hultgreen die was the worst thing 
in my life.”259 
On February 28, 1995, Navy officials in San Diego conducted a news 
conference releasing the Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) report on 
the fatal crash.260 The videotape was shown and broadcast repeatedly on 
 
instructors that could have been interpreted as pressure to graduate the female aviators, no matter 
what. See AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 27. 
 256. Eric Schmitt, Miramar Pilot’s Death Revives Issue of Women’s Military Roles, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Oct. 30, 1994, at A6; Flynn, supra note 254. 
 257. Interview of Lt. Cmdr. Rhinehart Wilke before Naval Inspector General, in Naval Air 
Station San Diego., Cal. (July 3, 1996) (unredacted transcript on file with author). During the Air 
Wing Eleven Investigation, few questions were asked about the death of Lt. Kara Hultgreen or the 
training that preceded her fatal mishap on October 25, 1994. Unredacted copies of interview 
transcripts were provided to this author in the course of litigation discovery. 
 258. Id. The redacted copy of the Naval Inspector’s General’s Report, released to the public in 
July 1997, did not include any reference to this significant statement by Lt. Cmdr. Wilke. Exposure of 
his testimony would have called into question the judgment of Navy officials and advocates who 
created the perception of a “race with the Air Force” to get female pilots into combat aviation. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet News Release No. 09-95, Navy Releases Investigation 
Findings on F-14 Accident (Oct. 1994) (Feb. 29, 1995) (announcing release of the public JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GEN. MANUAL (JAGMAN) REPORT (Feb. 28, 1995) [hereinafter JAGMAN REPORT]). See 
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network television. Although technical details contained in that report indicated 
that the pilot had precipitated the engine stall and caused the aircraft to depart 
from controlled flight,261 Navy Public Affairs officials continued to suggest that 
engine failure, not pilot error, was the primary cause of the crash.262 The Navy’s 
dissembling caused even more controversy nationwide, particularly within the 
aviation community.263 During subsequent testimony given during a deposition, 
Lohrenz admitted that she knew her colleagues would be agitated by the 
controversy, and that she herself was incredulous about statements being made 
about the cause of Lt. Hultgreen’s crash.264 San Diego Union-Tribune Insight 
Editor Robert J. Caldwell later reported that simulator tests had been rigged to 
show that engine failure was the primary cause of Lt. Hultgreen’s mishap.265 
 
also Pat Flynn, Hultgreen Cleared of Blame in F-14 Crash, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 28, 1995, at A1; 
Pat Flynn, F-14’s Fate Sealed in Split Seconds, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 1, 1994, at A1; Dana Priest, 
Female Pilot’s Crash Blamed on Engine Stall, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1995, at A7. 
 261. JAGMAN REPORT, supra note 260, at 27 (Finding 13) (“Her response was dual engine wave 
off technique and this unwittingly exacerbated the single engine situation by increasing left yaw and 
setting an AOA (angle of attack) in excess of NATOPS (flight manual) recommended single engine 
wave off procedures.”). 
 262. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 260; Nightline (ABC broadcast Feb. 28, 1995); Editorial, Robert J. 
Caldwell, Hultgreen Case Puts the Navy’s Credibility at Risk Again, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 26, 
1995, at G1; A Whitewash Serves No Purpose, SOUNDINGS (Norfolk, Va.), Mar. 8, 1995; Becky Garrison, 
What Killed Hultgreen?, NAVY TIMES, Mar. 13, 1995, at 3. 
 263. See MIR REPORT, supra note 238, at 12–13. The confidential Mishap Investigation Report, 
revealed by persons unknown, was far more explicit than the JAGMAN Report, but consistent with 
it. The MIR analyzed in detail five errors made by Kara Hultgreen, the “Mishap Pilot,” or “MP,” 
which caused her to depart from safe flight and crash into the sea. They were summarized as 
follows: (1) “MP’s attempt to salvage overshooting approach with left rudder led to reduced engine 
compressor stall margin, contributing to left engine compressor stall;” (2) “MP failed to execute 
proper single engine waveoff procedures;” (3) “MP failed to inform MR (mishap radar intercept 
officer, in the back seat) of single engine emergency;” (4) “MP failed to respond to LSO (landing 
signal officer) calls;” and (5) “MP failed to make timely decision to eject.” Id. It should be noted that 
most aviation mishaps are caused by pilot errors. These realities do not detract from the respect 
owed to Lt. Hultgreen, a pioneering aviator. See also MITCHELL, supra note 15, at 300–02; Rowan 
Scarborough, Pilot Error Acknowledged, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, at A1; Becky Garrison, Internal 
Report Confirms Hultgreen’s Error, NAVY TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995. 
 264. Deposition of Carey D. Lohrenz at 373–76, Lohrenz vs. Donnelly & CMR, No. 96-777 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 6, 1999) (transcript on file with author). 
 265. Robert J. Caldwell, Were the Simulator Tests Rigged?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 9, 1995, at 
G1; GREGORY VISTICA, FALL FROM GLORY: THE MEN WHO SUNK THE U.S. NAVY 386–87 (1995). Vistica 
noted that the Navy went to great lengths to prove that mechanical failure had caused the Hultgreen 
mishap—even raising the aircraft from the sea to study the engines, which was not an ordinary 
practice: 
Test results, however, revealed that both engines were working fine, with the exception of 
a malfunctioning valve, which in itself is not enough to ground an aircraft. The Navy even 
manipulated and rigged a simulator test so the majority of the naval aviators trying to 
replicate Hultgreen’s crash could do nothing but crash. Without the rigged restrictions, 
most of the pilots would have survived . . . When stories about [the secret Mishap 
Investigation Report] appeared first in Newsweek, then The Los Angeles Times, the Navy 
tried to discredit them, claiming they were inaccurate. And when Robert Caldwell, a 
former Army veteran and conservative columnist at The San Diego Union-Tribune, began 
lifting the veil on the admirals’ obfuscation of the facts, the Navy resorted to personal 
attacks on his character in an effort to undermine his thorough reporting. The Navy’s 
public affairs officers then began calling reporters to warn them off the story. Interest in 
the mishap investigation report was so high because it clearly contradicted the Navy’s 
official position, that Rear Admiral Kendell Pease, the chief of public affairs, had released 
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b. The Truth Comes to Light 
Lt. Patrick (Jerry) Burns, F-14 instructor and naval flight officer, was 
present at an all-officers meeting in the summer of 1994, during which his 
commander made it clear that the women would graduate to the fleet, no matter 
what.266 Lt. Burns had two major concerns: (1) that one of the women would die 
in an F-14 mishap; and (2) that, should a crash occur, Navy authorities would try 
to deny that its own double standards in training the women had led to the 
crash.267 Lt. Burns was, unfortunately, correct on both counts. Lt. Burns had 
expressed his concerns to local commanders several times, but they refused to 
acknowledge or correct the situation.268 When communications broke down 
completely, Lt. Burns contacted the Center for Military Readiness and asked for 
 
a memorandum for correspondents [regarding “errors of fact” about the 
MIR]. . . .Commander Stephen Pietropaoli, a Navy spokesman, even bragged to H. G. 
Reza of The Los Angeles Times that he had kept The Boston Globe and The Washington Post 
from publishing stories. 
Id. (alterations added). 
See also Editorial, The Crash of Kara Hultgreen, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 9, 1995. 
The nation has been led to believe that mechanical failure caused the fatal crash last 
October of Lt. Kara Hultgreen, the Navy’s first female combat pilot. Now comes an 
internal investigation, leaked online, citing pilot error as the primary factor in the 
crash . . . . Without question, Lt. Hultgreen was a brave and committed pilot. Whether she 
was sufficiently trained and qualified for carrier duty, however, is a matter of some 
dispute. Double standards are an unfortunate consequence of the political decision to 
expand opportunities for women . . . . [Release] of the public [JAGMAN] report was a 
masterpiece of obfuscation . . . . Lt. Hultgreen wished only to be judged against her fellow 
pilots. By applying a double standard, the Navy has heaped dishonor upon her memory, 
and put other pilots at risk. 
Id. (alterations added). 
 266. The training squadron commander, Cmdr. Thomas Sobiek, flatly denied that he had made 
such a suggestion in his interview with the Naval Inspector General. See AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, 
supra note 213, at 29 (inquiring about this understanding: “A: That is a flat-ass lie. And whoever told 
you that, if they were under oath, should be taken to task.”). But during his interview with Mike 
Wallace, Cmdr. Sobiek admitted that he may have conveyed that impression, and he added that 
some female pilots were advanced in combat aviation ahead of many men who were kept waiting or 
forced to resign. See 60 Minutes, supra note 251. Another aviator told Naval Inspector General 
investigators on July 5, 1996, that he remembered Cmdr. Sobiek saying, “Read my lips. These 
women will make it to the fleet, and they will make it on time, period, and we’ll do what it takes to 
get them there.” See Testimony of William G. Bond, USN, in Naval Station San Diego, Cal. (July 5, 
1996) (transcript on file with author). 
 267. Burns Affidavit, supra note 253, at 25–27. Burns wrote that he had asked for the assistance of 
the Center for Military Readiness because his local chain of command had been unresponsive to his 
concerns, and because he 
felt that it was imperative that Congress and senior officers within the Department of 
Defense (DoD) be made aware of what was happening within the Department of the 
Navy: that lives were being lost or put at risk, assets destroyed, and millions of tax dollars 
wasted in order to execute what amounted to little more than a questionable and 
ineffective public relations campaign intended to “make amends for the Tailhook 
scandal.” 
Id. 
 268. Id. at 26. See also Interview of Lt. Patrick Jerome Burns, USN, at the Office of the Naval 
Inspector General, Washington Navy Yard, Wash., D.C. (Dec. 19, 1996) (transcript on file with 
author); Memorandum from Vice Adm. J.R. Fitzgerald, Naval Inspector General, to Vice Chief of 
Naval Operations, Subj: Investigation into the Unauthorized Release of Flight Training Records (Jan. 
10, 1997) (on file with author). 
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assistance in conveying his concerns about safety to the highest levels of the 
Navy.269 Lt. Burns was not opposed to women participating in combat aviation, 
but he did not want to see another aviator die due to compromises and double 
standards in training. In a letter dated January 16, 1995, Elaine Donnelly of the 
Center for Military Readiness asked Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), then-
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to investigate whether the 
statements and detailed information provided by her confidential source, Lt. 
Burns, were true.270 
Donnelly met to discuss the matter with the Vice Chief of Naval 
Operations, Adm. Stanley Arthur, on January 6, February 8, and March 24, 1995. 
She also met with the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jeremy (Mike) Boorda, 
on March 6, 1995. Rear Adm. Lyle Bien, who was sent to San Diego to 
investigate the situation, reported to Adm. Arthur that Donnelly’s information 
was “largely accurate.”271 An experienced aviator reviewing Lt. Lohrenz’s 
records told Donnelly that they were the worst he had ever seen.272 
In the hopes that disclosure of the information would enable Navy 
personnel and Americans to engage in a responsible discussion that would lead 
to constructive reforms, the Center for Military Readiness published the twenty 
page CMR Special Report: Double Standards in Naval Aviation on April 25, 1995.273 
The meticulously researched report included 104 pages of related documents 
and training records showing numerous “pink sheets” and low scores given to 
the women in training.274 These were the same records that the January 1995 
investigation had found to be “largely accurate.”275 
 
 269. Telephone conversation between Lt. Patrick Burns and author (Nov. 27, 1994); Letter from 
Lt. Patrick Burns to author (Dec. 15, 1994) (on file with author). 
 270. Letter from Elaine Donnelly, Center for Military Readiness, to Sen. Strom Thurmond, U.S. 
Senate (Jan 16, 1995) [hereinafter Thurmond Letter] (on file with author). 
 271. Report of Rear Adm. Lyle G. Bien to Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Subj: 
Preliminary Inquiry into the Circumstances Connected with the Allegation that Standards Used to 
Qualify Naval Aviators for Assignment to Operational F-14 Tomcat Squadrons from September 1993 
until the Present Varied with Gender of the Officer in Training (Jan. 31, 1995) [hereinafter, Bien 
Report] (referring to CMR letter Jan. 16, 1995 (“reference (b)”): “We found the facts contained in 
reference (b) to be largely accurate.”) (on file with author). See also Robert J. Caldwell, Navy Admits 
“Concessions” for Female F-14 Pilots, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 2, 1997, at G1; MITCHELL, supra 
note 15, at 298–302. 
 272. Dep. of Capt. W. S. Orr, U.S. Navy (Ret.), at 115, Lohrenz v. Donnelly & CMR, 223 F. Supp. 
2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. 96-777) (transcript on file with author). Orr, an experienced aviator, 
affirmed that, even though the training records that Donnelly had shown him in 1995 did not 
include every flight, “What I saw was enough information for me to believe that there was 
substandard performance that would never have been accepted in any other environment that I 
have been exposed to.” Id. 
 273. See CMR SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 253. A condensed version of this report is available at 
http://www.cmrlink.org/viewarticle.asp?f=87mr11cmrrpt09j95.pdf. 
 274. Id. See also Rowan Scarborough, Navy Accused of Giving Women Special Treatment, WASH. 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at A1; Robert Caldwell, Navy Files Cast Doubt on “Gender Neutral,” SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., May 14, 1995, at G1; David Stump, A Double Standard?, SOUNDINGS, Apr. 26, 1995, at 
A1. 
 275. On April 22, 1996, Lt. Lohrenz filed a libel suit against the Center for Military Readiness and 
The Washington Times, claiming that the publication of this report caused her to be washed out of 
carrier aviation. On August 16, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed 
the case, ruling that Lohrenz was a limited-purpose public figure and that Donnelly had good 
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2. The Dangers of DSIW in Carrier Aviation Training 
At the time Lt. Lohrenz was removed from carrier aviation by a FNAEB in 
May 1995, she ranked 113th of 113 pilots and washed out because her flying 
techniques were “unsafe, undisciplined, and unpredictable.”276 Senior landing 
signal officers testified that her flawed “high and fast” flying patterns, combined 
with her tendency to blame others for her own mistakes and to disregard 
instructions, made Lt. Lohrenz an “accident waiting to happen.”277 
Lt. Lohrenz’s rocky F-14 training records, the same ones published by 
CMR, were among the documents considered by the evaluation board, but she 
did not take the opportunity to challenge those records. The Air Wing Eleven 
investigation revealed that Lt. Lohrenz had been on a “watch list” for poor 
performance as early as January 3, 1995278—well before Donnelly’s initial letter to 
Sen. Thurmond,279 which Lt. Lohrenz later claimed had ruined her career.280 
During an interview with reporter Mike Wallace of CBS 60 Minutes on 
April 19, 1998, former Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Vice CNO) Adm. Stanley 
Arthur said that the Navy had hoped that putting women on aircraft carriers 
would help its “image problems.” He added, “This was a way that we could at 
least demonstrate that the . . . [apparent] reluctance of the Navy to deal properly 
with women coming out of Tailhook could be put aside; that we were in fact, 
not the ogres that we were painted to be.”281 During a sworn deposition taken on 
April 28, 2000, Adm. Arthur admitted under cross-examination that “in this case 
we sent people to the fleet not qualified.”282 
 
reason to question the Navy’s “party line” on double standards in training. See Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 
223 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 350 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1042 (2004). 
See also MITCHELL, supra note 15, at 288–302. 
 276. See Bennitt Memo, supra note 246. See also CARMAN REPORT, supra note 245, at 16. 
 277. See Bennitt Memo, supra note 246. See also FNAEB REPORT, supra note 243, at 7. 
Lt. Lohrenz’s carrier landing performance has been sub-standard. Her performance in that 
regime has been declining since January 1995. This performance has declined to the point 
that it is unsafe. Due to this documented substandard, unpredictable and unsafe 
performance, she should be allowed to continue performing in the carrier-based 
environment. 
Id. 
 278. CARMAN REPORT, supra note 245, at 17. 
 279. See Thurmond Letter, supra note 270. 
 280. See Lohrenz, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 33. Contrary to Lohrenz’s complaint, the January 16, 1995, 
letter to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. Strom Thurmond was a private letter of 
inquiry and a request for his assistance in determining if the information received from Donnelly’s 
known but unnamed source, Lt. Burns, was accurate. At the time the letter was sent to Sen. 
Thurmond and referred to Navy officials for investigation, Lohrenz already was on a “watch list” 
due to poor performance. See CARMAN REPORT, supra note 245, at 17. The CMR Special Report was not 
published until April 25, 1995. 
 281. See 60 Minutes, supra note 251 (alteration added). 
 282. Dep. of Adm. Arthur at 192–93, Lohrenz v. Donnelly & CMR, 223 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 
2002) (No. Civ. 96-777) (transcript on file with author). During the same deposition, Adm. Arthur 
admitted that he had not examined the training records of the two women personally, but he 
understood that the women were doing well. That information, he said, probably came from the 
Chief of Naval Information, Rear Adm. Kendell Pease, known as CHINFO. Dep. of Adm. Arthur, 
supra, at 135–37. The Navy public affairs office, known as CHINFO, was identified in the Air Wing 
Eleven report as the orchestrator of much of the media attention given to issues surrounding the 
04__DONNELLY.DOC 6/18/2007  3:01 PM 
 CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY 879 
This stunning statement confirmed a mountain of evidence that Navy 
officials had vainly tried to keep from coming to light. What had begun as a 
public relations campaign ended in the death of a pioneering female pilot. Lt. 
Hultgreen was the victim of political correctness and DSIW taken to an extreme. 
On June 12, 1995, The San Diego Union-Tribune published a news 
photograph of the ruined F-14 aircraft in which Lt. Hultgreen had died.283 The 
caption beneath the photo read, “The F-14 is an unforgiving aircraft. Its safe 
operation is an issue that is bigger and more important than any individual 
pilot.”284 That photo and caption summarized an issue that has yet to be 
acknowledged by Navy leaders, much less resolved. 
The CMR Special Report was published with the hope that Navy officials 
would affirm the importance of high, uncompromised standards in all forms of 
naval aviation training.285 By all accounts, female pilots are performing 
courageously and well in the current war. Repercussions from the Tailhook 
incident are long past. But high, uncompromised standards do not 
spontaneously come into being by themselves—military leaders should insist on 
excellence as the highest priority, especially in hazardous occupations such as 
carrier aviation. This is why it is important to understand the story of Kara 
Hultgreen. Will Navy officials remember the hard lessons learned? 
In a June 2006 speech, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Mullen 
promoted “diversity” as what he called a “strategic imperative” at all levels of 
the Navy.286 After his remarks, Adm. Mullen was asked what role qualifications 
plays in increasing diversity. Mullen responded, “I think I have seen a stunning 
number of examples where we thought more qualified was really more 
 
female aviators before and after the death of Lt. Hultgreen. See AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 
213, at 39; Conversation between Lt. Hultgreen and author at Naval Air Station San Diego, Cal. (Oct. 
13, 1994). Rear Adm. Pease also testified on April 28, 2000, that he had no firsthand knowledge of the 
training records of Lts. Hultgreen and Lohrenz. Dep. of Adm. Pease at 41–42, Lohrenz, 223 F. Supp. 
2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. 96-777) (transcript on file with author). 
 283. Photo by Sean Haffey of the San Diego Union-Tribune, accompanying article by Robert J. 
Caldwell, For Naval Aviation, Gender Quotas Don’t Fly, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 12, 1995, at G1. 
 284. Id. Unlike the usual practice when male pilots crash in the ocean, which is to only seek 
recovery of the human remains, this aircraft was retrieved from the ocean at a reported cost of 
$100,000, even though there was video of the mishap and there were no nuclear weapons on board. 
See Becky Garrison, The Grounding of Morale at Air Wing 11, NAVY TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at 6; Navy 
Finds, Retrieves Body of Pilot Lt. Kara Hultgreen, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 16, 1994, at A20. 
 285. CMR SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 253, at 1–2. 
Background and Purpose: The question at issue here is not whether women should serve 
in combat squadrons, but whether women—and all naval aviation—trainees—should be 
held to the same high standards that have reduced accident rates in recent years . . . . 
Double standards and concessions that heighten inherent risks—for the sake of women or 
any other favored group—are simply indefensible . . . . Above all, CMR hopes that 
disclosure of this information will enable Navy personnel, family members, and the 
American people to engage in a responsible discussion that leads to constructive reforms, 
before heightened risks result in the needless loss of more young lives. 
Id. (alterations added). 
 286. Adm. Mike Mullen, Remarks at the Patuxent River Naval Air Systems Command “Total 
Force Diversity Day” Luncheon (June 26, 2006); Brian Seraile, NAWCAD (Naval Air Systems 
Command) Public Affairs, CNO Delivers Message of Diversity, NAVY TIMES, June 29, 2006; Andrew 
Scutro, CNO Stresses Need for Diversity, NAVY TIMES, June 29, 2006. 
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qualified, where it wasn’t. So I don’t want to get stuck on an absolute definition 
of more qualified.”287 
Diversity and high standards should not be in conflict, but an 
overemphasis on diversity as a “strategic imperative” could result in 
compromises that detract from the pursuit of excellence and non-discrimination 
as primary institutional goals.288 It will take wise, unwavering leadership to 
avoid past mistakes and to maintain sound priorities. If high-level officials really 
want to advance the status of women in the military, they should consciously 
address the issue of compromises in training and other forms of DSIW that are 
dangerous and demoralizing to women and men alike.289 
III. GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE 
A. Aberdeen to Abu Ghraib 
In March 2004, graphic photographs of decadent behavior at the Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq were published and broadcast worldwide. Outraged 
members of Congress demanded to know why and how the Army had allowed 
such a thing to happen. But the scandal, repugnant as it was, should not have 
been a complete surprise. Abu Ghraib was not the first or only place where poor 
training, indiscipline, and inadequate supervision created prime conditions for 
sexual misconduct within the military. 
The admirable service of the majority of our female soldiers has been—and 
should be—documented. The purpose of this discussion is to analyze personnel 
policies that have tried to test the theory that men and women are 
interchangeable beings in what could be described as a New Gender Order. 
Scandals involving sexual misconduct in the military are not isolated incidents. 
They are indicators of a social experiment gone wrong. 
1. Co-Ed Basic Training 
a. Gender-Normed Illusions 
In the fall of 1994, civilian policy makers led by Sara Lister, Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, effectively forced 
Army officials to acccept co-ed basic training. This was a policy trade-off to 
avoid implementation of her plans to assign women to some direct ground 
combat positions.290 The plan for gender-integrated basic training disregarded 
 
 287. See Seraile, supra note 286. 
 288. See supra notes 286, 288. 
 289. See supra note 285. 
 290. 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-
RELATED ISSUES 219–22, 228–30 (July 1999) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY 
TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES]. See also Eric Schmitt, Generals Oppose Combat by Women: 
Secretary Withdraws Plan After Bitter Disagreement, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1994, at A1 (reporting on the 
withdrawal of Secretary Togo West’s controversial June 1, 1994, memorandum ordering gender 
integration in close combat units, such as multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) helicopters). 
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the results of a prior experiment with Army co-ed basic training that had been 
tried and discontinued once before.291 
Gender-integrated basic training is based on the unrealistic assumption 
that men and women are interchangeable in all military roles. The concept tries 
to circumvent or disguise physical differences with gender-normed training 
standards that reward equal effort rather than equal results. Advocates make the 
disingenuous claim that men and women are doing the same things with 
identical rating systems, even though everyone knows that they are not. 
Gender norming is to social engineering what false façades are to poorly 
designed buildings. To create the appearance of “equality,” scoring and 
rating/qualification systems are adjusted in various ways to make it “fair” for 
women in physical training exercises. Every service is different, but the Navy 
Fitness Standards for males and females, age twenty to twenty-four, 
demonstrate how gender-normed scores and rating systems work to create the 
illusion of “equality.”292 
• In the 1.5-mile run, the Navy PRT Score minimum is fifty points. To 
achieve a “Satisfactory/Medium” rating (and fifty points), a man must 
run 1.5 miles in thirteen minutes and fifteen seconds, or 13:15.293 To 
earn the same 50 points, a woman must run 1.5 miles in fifteen minutes 
and fifteen seconds, or 15:15.294 She is given a two-minute advantage, 
but due to the gender-normed scoring system, her performance is rated 
as “equal” to that of the man, earning her the same fifty points.295 
• In the push-up category, male trainees must do forty-two pushups for 
a minimum score;296 women must do seventeen.297 Men must swim 500 
yards in 12:15;298 women get 14:00 to do the same thing.299 Under the 
Navy PRT rules, all scores are averaged and measured against a rating 
system, in categories ranging from “Outstanding” (High, Medium, and 
Low) down to “Probationary.”300 
• Turning to the highest scores and ratings, in order to get an 
“Outstanding/High” rating a man must do eighty-seven pushups, do 
the 1.5-mile rule in 8:30, and do the 500-yard swim in 6:30.301 
 
 291. A five-year experiment with gender-integrated basic training that began during the Carter 
Administration was terminated in 1981 because women were suffering too many injuries and men 
were not being challenged enough. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-78 (Finding 
2.4.1A). 
 292. Compare Navy Fitness Standards, Male, Age 20–24, Oct. 1, 2002, http://usmilitary.about. 
com/od/navy/l/blfitmale20to24.htm [hereinafter Navy, Male Standards], with Navy Fitness 
Standards, Female, Age 20–24, Oct. 1, 2002, http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/ 
navfitness/blfemale20-24.htm [hereinafter Navy, Female Standards]. 
 293. Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292. 
 294. Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292. 
 295. See Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292; Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292. 
 296. Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292. 
 297. Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292. 
 298. Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292. 
 299. Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292. 
 300. Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292; Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292. 
 301. Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292. 
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Achievements required for women to earn the same top rating are 
forty-eight, 9:47, and 7:15, respectively.302 
• The “curl-up” category in the PRT test is the only one with 
requirements identical for both sexes.303 However, the standard really 
ought to be higher for women because their bodies have more strength 
in the midsection. The physiology is related to the female potential for 
pregnancy. Of greater importance in the military context, however, is 
upper body strength and aerobic capacity for endurance—qualities in 
which men have an undisputed advantage.304 
Gender-normed rating systems are misleading because they award equal 
“points” for unequal accomplishment. This explains why some female soldiers 
attempt to convince credulous reporters that they have to meet the same 
standards, i.e., “points” as their male colleagues. Nevertheless, sensible women 
and men in the military understand the illusion. 
A 1997 study done for the Army by a Senior Review Panel largely 
composed of officials responsible for or supportive of gender-integrated basic 
training detected doubts about gender-normed standards.305 Among military 
men surveyed, sixty percent were either “not sure” or “disagreed” that “[t]he 
soldiers in this company have enough skills that I would trust them with my life 
in combat.”306 The combined figure for women was seventy-four percent.307 
Another survey done by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) found that only thirty-six perecent of male and female respondents 
agreed that female personnel would pull their fair share of the load in combat or 
hazardous situations.308 These findings were not a reflection of sexism but 
instead showed an honest concern about mission accomplishment and survival. 
In Great Britain in 1997, Army Training Regiment commanders at 
Purbright Barracks, Surrey, noted that co-ed basic training was causing many 
young women to drop out early, due to injuries to their lower limbs. Restoration 
of all female platoons for a one-year trial in 1996 reduced women’s injury rates 
by fifty percent, and first-time pass rates increased from fifty percent to seventy 
percent. Incidents of sexual misconduct between instructors and recruits also 
decreased significantly.309 
 
 302. Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292. 
 303. Compare Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292, with Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292. 
 304. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-70–C-71 (Findings 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 
2.1.3, 2.1.4B, 2.1.5). 
 305. Steven Komarow, Soldiers Lack Confidence in Their Officers, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 1997, at A1; 
Steven Komarow, Boot Camp Training Goes Back to Basics, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 1997, at A4. 
 306. See generally SEC’Y OF THE ARMY, 2 SENIOR REVIEW PANEL REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT, 
at A19 (July 1997) (discussing survey question 24). 
 307. Id. 
 308. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS), AMERICAN MILITARY CULTURE 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 27 (Feb. 2000). 
 309. Michael Evans, Army Hits the Target With Female Units, LONDON SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999. 
See also Correspondence between Lt. Col. Simon Vandeleur, Army Training Regiment, Alexander 
Barracks, Purbright, Woking, Surrey, U.K., and author (Feb. 10–19, 1999) (on file with author). 
Despite this success, another experiment with “gender-free” (co-ed) training began in 1998. 
Minister of Defence Geoffrey Hoon, who took office in October 1999, initiated a two-year “Army 
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The trust that soldiers have in buddies who are capable of saving their lives 
is part of the cohesion that binds soldiers together in small military units. The 
definition of “unit cohesion,” as presented to the Presidential Commission, uses 
the word “survival” three times in one paragraph.310 
Questions about the physical abilities of female soldiers in extreme, close-
combat circumstances create an element of hesitation and doubt that women 
cannot overcome. Social engineers demand “education” to teach illusions about 
the physical capabilities of women. Soldiers are more interested in reality. 
Soldiers willing to put their lives at risk cannot forget that there are no gender-
normed scores on the battlefield. 
b. Sex Scandals and Soldierization 
Co-ed basic training assigns higher priority to faux “equality” than to the 
fundamental purpose of the exercise. In a process known as “soldierization,” 
ordinary civilians are transformed and shaped into disciplined soldiers. 
Soldierization requires concentration and sound leadership—not illusions or 
distractions that can be avoided if men and women are initially trained 
separately. 
In November 1996, two years after the Army began mixing women with 
men in basic training, sex scandals at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland 
made headlines nationwide.311 Male drill sergeants were abusing female trainees 
there and at the Army’s basic training camps.312 Rape or “consexploitation”—
consensual but exploitive sex—occurred between instructors and trainees at 
several Army training bases. Whether voluntary or coerced, such misconduct 
 
Study Into Combat Effectiveness and Gender,” raising expectations that women soon would be 
assigned to infantry units. But women participating in “gender free” training along with the men 
suffered twice as many stress fractures and were eight times more likely to be discharged with back 
pain, tendon injuries, and bone fractures. See David Derbyshire, Tougher Army Training Doubles 
Female Injuries, LONDON TELEGRAPH (online ed.), Jan. 2, 2002, available at http://www.telegraph.co. 
uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=news/2002/01/03/narmy03xml; Kate O’Beirne, The Empire Strikes Back, 
NAT’L REV. ONLINE, June 26, 2001, available at http://www.nationalreview.clom/kob/ 
kob062601.shtml. 
A system of “gender-fair” training allowing for physical differences was restored, and the 
Ministry of Defence decided that female soldiers would not be assigned to direct ground combat 
units. See Michael Evans, LONDON TIMES ONLINE, Women Pay Painful Price for Equal Military Training, 
Mar. 22, 2005, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article434024.ece; Michael 
Smith, British Won’t Put Women on Front Lines, DAILY TIMES (Pakistan) (online ed.), May 26, 2002, 
available at http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_26-5-2002_pg4_2. 
 310. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-80 (Finding 2.5.1). 
Cohesion is the relationship that develops in a unit or group where (1) members share 
common values and experiences; (2) individuals in the group conform to group norms and 
behavior in order too ensure group survival and goals; (3) members lose their personal 
identify in favor of a group identity; (4) members focus on group activities and goals; (5) 
unit members become totally dependent on each other for the completion of their mission 
or survival; and (6) group members must meet all standards of performance and behavior 
in order not to threaten group survival. 
Id. 
 311. See, e.g., Elizabeth Gleick, Scandal in the Military: Reports of Rape at Army Training Base Suggest 
that the Services’ Tolerance for Sexual Harassment Is More than Zero, TIME, Nov. 25, 1996, at 28. 
 312. See id. 
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was and is contrary to military law and is inherently disruptive to good order 
and discipline.313 
In the ensuing uproar about Aberdeen, then-Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen appointed former Sen. Nancy Kassebaum-Baker (R-Kan.) to head an 
independent advisory committee to study the issue in 1997. In its concise, 
unequivocal report, the Kassebaum-Baker Committee unanimously declared,” 
[Co-ed basic training] is resulting in less discipline, less unit cohesion, and more 
distraction from training programs.”314 
In 1998, the House followed the Kassebaum-Baker Committee’s 
recommendations and passed legislation to end co-ed basic training.315 The 
Senate stalled and set up another commission to study the issue. The 
ideologically divided Congressional Commission on Military Training and 
Gender-Related Issues did a thorough study, resulting in a 1999 report that filled 
four volumes. In a significant admission, the commission concluded: “Whether 
[gender-integrated basic training] improves the readiness or the performance of 
the operational force is subjective.”316 
The same sort of damning faint praise appeared in a 2002 briefing 
presented to the Secretary of the Army, which endorsed gender-integrated basic 
training but conceded that the program was “not efficient” and was “effective” 
only in sociological terms.317 Various “inefficiencies” documented in that and 
previous official reports included the following: 
• Less discipline, less unit cohesion, and more distraction from training 
programs; 
 
 313. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552(a)(1), 
(f), 119 Stat. 3136, 3256–63 (2006) (amending 10 U.S.C. § 920 (effective October 1, 2007) (codifying the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 120) to include “rape, sexual assault, and other sexual 
misconduct”). As of the printing of this article, the Manual for Courts-Martial has not been changed to 
reflect the new law. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, pt. IV, Art. 120 (2005) 
[hereinafter MCM], available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf. 
 314. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER-INTEGRATED TRAINING AND 
RELATED ISSUES TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 15 (Dec. 16, 1997) (alteration added) [hereinafter 
KASSEBAUM-BAKER COMMISSION REPORT]. See Rowan Scarborough, Segregate the Sexes, Panel Urges 
Military, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at A1; Charles Moskos, The Folly of Comparing Race and Gender in 
the Army, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1998, at C1; John Hillen, Prudent Triumph of Common Sense, WASH. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1997, at A18; Bill Gertz & Rowan Scarborough, Inside the Ring, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2003, at A7 (alteration added). 
 315. See Military Recruit Training Policy Restoration Act of 1997, H.R. 1559, 105th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 1997) (proposing to mandate separate basic training regimens for men and women within each 
service branch). 
 316. CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES, supra 
note 290, at 122 (alteration added). 
 317. At the request of Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Cal.) and Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.), the Center 
for Military Readiness compiled a comprehensive report listing dozens of reasons why the Army 
should end co-ed basic training. See CENTER FOR MILITARY READINESS, SUMMARY OF RELEVANT 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: ARMY GENDER-INTEGRATED BASIC TRAINING (GIBT), 1993–2002 
(May 2003), available at http://www.cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/gibtsp01.pdf, with Appendices A–D 
available at http://www.cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/gibttapdx.pdf. Rep. Bartlett subsequently placed the 
eighteen-page document into the Congressional Record. See 149 CONG. REC. E1223–26 (daily ed. June 
11, 2003) (statement of Rep. Bartlett). See also Rowan Scarborough, Army Endorses Mixed-Sex Training, 
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at A1. 
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• Voluntary and involuntary misconduct, due to an emotionally volatile 
environment for which immature recruits are not prepared; 
• Higher physical injury and sick-call rates that detract from primary 
training objectives; 
• Diversion from essential training time due to interpersonal distractions 
and the need for an extra week of costly “sensitivity training” 
(mandated after Aberdeen); 
• A perceived decline in the overall quality and discipline of gender-
integrated basic training; lack of confidence in the abilities of fellow 
soldiers; and the need to provide remedial instruction to compensate 
for military skills not learned in basic training; 
• Re-defined or lowered standards, gender-normed scores, and 
elimination of physically demanding exercises so that women will 
succeed; 
• Additional stress on instructors who must deal with different physical 
abilities and psychological needs of male and female recruits; 
• Contrivances to reduce the risk of scandal, such as extra changing 
rooms, security equipment, and personnel hours to monitor barracks 
activities, and “no talk, no touch” rules, which interfere with informal 
contacts betweeen recruits and instructors; 
• No evidence of objective, military-oriented benefits from gender-
integrated basic training (social effects primarily benefited women in 
subjective ways); and 
• Little or no evidence that restoration of separate-gender training would 
have negative consequences for women or men.318 
Army leaders were close to announcing a decision to end gender-integrated 
basic training in the fall of 2001. The September 11 attacks, however, diverted 
their attention to urgent requirements of the war. Secretary of the Army Thomas 
L. White, a former business executive, also was distracted for months by 
corporate scandals involving Enron, his former employer. As a result, the Army 
stuck with the status quo, instead of restoring separate-gender basic training. 
That format, which is known to produce better results for women as well as 
men, is still being used by the Marine Corps.319 
Military discipline does not just happen—it must be taught. Basic training 
is the building block on which the “soldierization” process rests. To improve 
discipline that deters misconduct in the ranks, men and women should be 
trained separately until they learn basic principles and are mature enough to 
live by them. 
 
 318. See generally SENIOR REVIEW PANEL REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 10; 
KASSEBAUM-BAKER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 314; CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY 
TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES, supra note 290. 
 319. See KASSEBAUM-BAKER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 314, at 16. The Commission found 
that the Marines’ single-sex approach was producing “impressive levels of confidence, team 
building, and esprit de corps in all female platoons at the Parris Island base.” 
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2. The “Ungendered” Military 
a. Abu Ghraib 
Two years after the war began in Iraq, the Abu Ghraib sex scandal broke. 
Photos of naked Iraqis at the mercy of undisciplined male and female soldiers 
enraged the media and members of Congress, who demanded action to end 
sexual misconduct in the military. By October of 2005, twelve major 
investigations had been conducted, one of which was headed by former Nixon-
Ford Administration Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.320 
Secretary Schlesinger’s Independent Panel report concluded that abuses at 
Abu Ghraib prison were not related to prisoner interrogations. Panel Chairman 
Schlesigner, however, described the atmosphere there as an “Animal House on 
the night shift.”321 In testimony before a military court, Pfc. Lynndie England, the 
soldier photographed holding a leash attached to the neck of an Iraqi man, 
confirmed that attempts to embarrass the prisoners were made not to soften 
them up for interrogation purposes, but for the amusement of the guards and 
their girlfriends.322 
A Wall Street Journal editorial commenting on this finding quoted a military 
source who had seen all of the photos—not just the ones released to the press—
and noted that they were date and time stamped.323 
The sequence begins with naked photos of Ms. England and her boyfriend, 
convicted abuse ringleader Charles Graner. It progresses to photos of the two 
engaged in lewd acts, and then to photos involving other soldiers in lewd acts. 
Finally, the detainees enter the pictures. In other words, the Abu Ghraib crew 
degraded themselves before they degraded any Iraqis.324 
In an intellectually honest op-ed, self-identified feminist Barbara 
Ehrenreich confessed she was unsettled and heartbroken by the pictures coming 
out of Abu Ghraib: 
I had no illusions about the U.S. Mission in Iraq—whatever exactly it is but it 
turns out that I did have some illusions about women. Of the seven U.S. soldiers 
now charged with sickening forms of abuse at Abu Ghraib, three are women: 
Spc. Megan Ambuhl, Pfc. Lynndie England and Spc. Sabrina Harman. . . . 
 
 320. See generally REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DETENTION OPERATIONS (Aug. 24, 2004) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL]; James 
Schlesinger, The Truth About Our Soldiers, WALL STREET J., Sept. 9, 2004, at A16. 
 321. CNN, Report: Abu Ghraib was “‘Animal House’ at Night” (Aug. 25, 2004), quoting Independent 
Panel Chairman Arthur Schlesinger (speaking at a news conference, Schlesinger noted, “There was 
sadism on the night shift at Abu Ghraib, sadism that was certainly not authorized.”). See also REPORT 
OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL, supra note 320, at 13 (“The aberrant behavior on the night shift in Cell 
Block 1 at Abu Ghraib would have been avoided with proper training, leadership and oversight.”); 
Allen G. Breed, Witness: Iraq Abuse Photos “Just for Fun,” ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 4, 2004, available at 
http://www.pakistanidefenceforum.com/lofiversion/index.php/t34466.html; Third Soldier Guilty in 
Abu Ghraib Case, ARMY TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at 5 (regarding plea bargain of Spc. Megan Ambuhl). 
 322. Thomas E. Ricks, Incidents Grew in Severity, Report Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at A17; 
Schlesinger, supra note 320. 
 323. Review & Outlook, “Torture” on Trial, WALL STREET J., May 4, 2005, at A18. 
 324. Id. 
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Here, in these photos from Abu Ghraib, you have everything that the Islamic 
fundamentalists believe characterizes Western culture, all nicely arranged in one 
hideous image—imperial arrogance, sexual depravity . . . , and gender 
equality. . . . 
Secretly, I had hoped that the presence of women would over time change the 
military, making it more respectful of other people and cultures, more capable 
of genuine peacekeeping. That’s what I thought, but I don’t think that anymore. 
A certain kind of feminism, or perhaps I should say a certain kind of feminist 
naivete, died in Abu Ghraib. 
You can’t even argue, in the case of Abu Ghraib, that the problem was there just 
weren’t enough women in the military hierarchy to stop the abuses. The prison 
was directed by a woman, Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski. The top U.S. intelligence 
officer in Iraq, who was also responsible for reviewing the status of detainees 
before their release, was Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast. . . . The struggles for peace and 
social justice and against imperialist and racist arrogance, cannot, I am truly 
sorry to say, be folded into the struggle for gender equality.325 
Ehrenreich’s candor in reevaluating her previous beliefs is admirable but 
rare in feminist circles. The elitist philosophy that women are inherently 
superior and incapable of doing anything wrong is widespread, prejudicial, and 
just as misguided as the idea that all men are perfect. Human beings are flawed. 
Military policies must recognize and consciously work to counter failings that 
are present among women as well as men. 
Stripped to its essence, Abu Ghraib began with sexual misconduct between 
one man and two women who were competing for his attention. Lynndie 
England had Charles Graner’s baby, but he married Megan Ambuhl, who 
pleaded guilty to reduced charges for her actions at Abu Ghraib.326 
The psychological dynamics of this triangle, as described in The New York 
Times, are not difficult to understand.327 According to reports, England posed 
with the leash to please Graner. He gave her photos of detainees masturbating 
as a birthday gift for her. Sexual misconduct escalated into gross indecency and 
cruelty against prisoners. Unlike Barbara Ehrenreich, social engineers have not 
been intellectually honest enough to figure out where their assumptions went 
wrong. The theory that sexuality is of no consequence helped to create a 
combustible atmosphere that ignited with explosive military and political 
consequences. 
b. Camp Bucca 
The female soldiers of Abu Ghraib, including the one- and two-star 
generals responsible for the military police and intelligence operations there, 
were by no means typical of our women in uniform. There is no “typical” female 
soldier; they come in all kinds. The discussion here is about personnel policies 
that either support or detract from discipline in the military. 
 
 325. Barbara Ehrenreich, Feminism’s Assumptions Upended, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2004, at M1. 
 326. Kate Zernike, Behind Failed Abu Ghraib Plea, a Tangle of Bonds and Betrayals, N.Y. TIMES, May 
10, 2005, at A1. 
 327. Id. 
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Images of partying civilian “girls gone wild,” flashed in racy videos sold on 
the Internet, coarsen and degrade our culture. When similar behavior develops 
in a military setting, disciplined enemies can take advantage of the distraction. 
Witness an October 2004 going-away party for the departing 160th MP Battalion 
at Camp Bucca, Iraq, as reported by the New York Daily News: 
In front of a cheering male audience, two young women wearing only bras and 
panties throw themselves into a mud-filled plastic kiddie pool and roll around 
in a wild wrestling match. At one point a man in the audience raises a water 
bottle and douses the entwined pair. At another, a ‘referee’ moves in to break up 
the scantily clad grapplers. A young blond lifts her T-shirt to expose her breasts. 
A brunette turns her back to the camera and exposes her thong undies. 
These scenes, taken from 30 photos leaked to the New York Daily News, could 
have been snapped at an out-of-control frat party. But this happened a world 
away from any American college. The photos were taken in Camp Bucca, the 
military prison at Umm Qasr in the hot sands of southern Iraq near the Kuwaiti 
border. The women are not co-eds but military policewomen who had left their 
uniforms in a pile not far off. The men are soldiers, too. Most of them wore T-
shirts emblazoned with Army logos, but at least one was still wearing his 
uniform. 
Some were sergeants, including the referee, and some allegedly were drunk. The 
photos were taken last October 30, in the same period when enemy detainees 
were being transferred to Camp Bucca from Abu Ghraib, the prison made 
notorious by photos of Americans torturing naked Iraqis.328 
The article also reported allegations that sergeants were lending rooms for 
sexual encounters.329 
Pvt. Deanna Allen, a nineteen-year-old prison guard with the 105th MP 
Battalion, was the only participant whose name appeared in connection with 
punishment for the infamous October 30, 2004, mud-wrestling match.330 After a 
photo of Allen exposing her breasts appeared in the New York Daily News in 
February 2005, she was forced out of the military with a general discharge. She 
returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for medical treatment, where she 
complained about the loss of her veterans benefits and said she would appeal.331 
Up until that time, Camp Bucca was thought to be a model camp because 
prisoners were not being abused. The salacious mud wrestling photos and 
allegations quickly vanished from public awareness,332 but the situation at Camp 
Bucca was more unsettled than met the eye. 
On January 31 and April 1, 2005, scores of Iraqi prisoners staged two 
violent uprisings and, on March 25, 2005, came dangerously close to pulling off 
 
 328. Brian Kates, Out of Control at Camp Crazy!, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Feb. 6, 2005, at 29 (italics 
added). 
 329. See id. 
 330. See id. 
 331. Brian Kates, She’s Mud as Hell, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Mar. 22, 2005, at 27. 
 332. Compare Bradley Graham, Prisoner Uprising in Iraq Exposes New Risk for U.S., WASH. POST, 
Feb. 21, 2005, at A1 (mentioning the mud-wrestling incident), with Steve Fainaru & Anthony Shadid, 
In Iraq Jail, Resistance Goes Underground, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2005, at A01 (not mentioning the mud-
wrestling incident only six months later). 
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a massive prison break.333 According to The Washington Post, the prisoners began 
constructing a 357-foot “Great Escape” tunnel in January 2005.334 An inmate 
released on May 27, 2005, said, “It was a military operation. It was very 
organized, and it was very disciplined. If only 200 people would have escaped, 
it would have been a blow to the Americans.”335 
Hours before the planned prison break, on March 24, 2005, an informant 
tipped off the Americans.336 They discovered and destroyed the remarkably 
engineered tunnel, which had narrow walls as smooth and strong as concrete, 
sculpted with water and possibly milk.337 About a week later, the prisoners 
began a full-scale riot that raged for four days. “The violence was just absolutely 
incredible,” said one soldier.338 Cinderblock rocks, taken from a mosque that the 
military had kept off limits to the guards, were thrown at the guards with 
surprising precision.339 The sheer volume of the well-aimed barrage caused the 
soldier to have an epiphany: “I realized . . . these guys have been fighting riots 
and wars a lot longer than we have. They have been fighting this way for 
hundreds of years.”340 
Is the word “duh” in the dictionary yet? How else would one describe this 
belated awareness of cultural differences between American guards and 
cunning prisoners in a war zone? The Iraqis knew exactly how to take 
advantage of western “sensitivity” to their religion and mosque in the aftermath 
of Abu Ghraib. In the same way, future adversaries will find ways to take 
advantage of weaknesses in American military culture, including weaknesses 
caused by social experimentation with human sexuality. 
The soldiers of the 105th MP battalion, some of whom were present at the 
mud wrestling party with the 160th MP unit in October, were not solely 
responsible for the unruly behavior of the MP mud wrestlers. Nor were 
battalion-level commanders primarily responsible for the politically correct but 
naïve restrictions on the prison guards or the quality of the training provided to 
male and female soldiers before they deployed to Iraq. The sexually charged 
mudfest in October 2004—which occurred even after Abu Ghraib—betrayed a 
weakness in co-ed military culture that enemy prisoners were quick to exploit. 
The responsibility for chaos at Camp Bucca should be laid at the feet of 
Department of Defense officials and Army policymakers who underestimated 
our adversaries and assumed that it was all right to impose known 
“inefficiences,” such as co-ed basic training, on the gender-integrated force. 
Uniformed and civilian Pentagon officials should be held accountable for 
serious miscalculations in a social engineering project gone awry. It is not 
enough to punish a nineteen-year-old “girl gone wild” at Camp Bucca. 
 
 333. Graham, supra note 332. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Steve Fainaru & Anthony Shadid, In Iraq Jail, Resistance Goes Underground, WASH. POST, Aug. 
24, 2005, at A01. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
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c. Social Fiction: The New Gender Order 
During a 1996 debate about the wisdom of housing men and women in co-
ed tents in Bosnia, then-Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) suggested that 
American colleges and the congressional page system proved that a 
“desexegrated” environment is workable.341 Also, in 1996, Duke Law Professor 
Madeline Morris suggested that, in an “ungendered” military, “masculinist 
attitudes” and sexual complications could be reduced by a concerted effort to 
instill what she called the “incest taboo.”342 
The full inclusion of women would require adjustment of the mechanisms for 
continued minimization of sexual relationships within units. Just as military 
units have traditionally been “a band of brothers,” gender integrated units 
would have to be carefully shaped and defined as a band of brothers and sisters 
between whom sexual relationships would be unacceptable. The incest taboo 
approach would amount to a broadened fraternization policy, prohibiting not 
only inappropriate relationships between ranks but also sexual relationships 
regardless of rank within military units.343 
Some soldiers do relate to each other as brothers and sisters in the military. 
Deep bonds of friendship can develop in almost any profession. But in close-
combat environments where soldiers depend on each other for survival, Prof. 
Morris’ prescriptions for a socially engineered military “incest taboo” and other 
types of “social fiction” were no more realistic than science fiction.344 
When social problems develop in co-ed training or on active duty, 
professionals in the “victim advocate” or “diversity” industry request more 
funds to fix problems that their own philosophy and previous programs helped 
to create.345 Mandatory, continuous sensitivity training is supposed to instill 
politically correct attitudes. In the New Gender Order, military people are 
supposed to be immune to the full range of emotions associated with hostilities, 
tensions, and attractions. This is social engineering—elitist experimentation with 
the lives of other people. But when spark-induced “explosions” occur, as they so 
often have from Aberdeen to Abu Ghraib, social engineers rarely get the blame. 
There is no compelling need—particularly in a time of war—to ask our 
military to engage in a vast social experiment designed to test the limits of 
human sexuality. 
 
 341. Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 18, 1996) (Rep. Patricia Schroeder 
appearing opposite then-Rep. Robert Livingston (R-La.)). 
 342. Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 747–60 
(1996). 
 343. Id. at 757. 
 344. E.g., In the 1996 feature film Star Trek: First Contact, an android character named Lt. Cmdr. 
Data was equipped with an “emotion chip” to help him experience human emotions and sexuality. 
The enemy Borg Queen tied up Lt. Cmdr. Data and attempted to extract information from him by 
activating the emotion chip, making him vulnerable to her seduction. The science-fiction screenplay 
was entertaining, but military social policy cannot be based on the social fiction that human 
emotions can be “deactivated” at will. See Star Trek: First Contact, Synopsis, http://www.star 
trek.com/startrek/view/series/MOV/008/synopsis.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007). 
 345. Sean D. Naylor, Values Instruction to be Added to Basic Training, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at 
4. This article reported Army plans to extend basic training from eight weeks to nine, a move that 
would cost the Army’s force structure three battalions of soldiers. 
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d. Morality and Morale 
Sexual misconduct is not peculiar to the Army alone. Officials in all the 
armed services keep trying to implement policies based on the notion that 
sexual relationships can be managed perfectly and prevented from veering to 
extremes on either end of the emotional spectrum. Social engineers seem to 
think that, with a few sensitivity training sessions here and a few courts-martial 
there, the most basal human feelings can be contained and managed in a 
volatile, “pure oxygen” environment, without predictable sparks. And if 
problems do arise, “masculinist” men—not women—are always to blame. 
Most men and women in the military conduct themselves like 
professionals; the nation is proud of all who volunteer to serve. Nevertheless, 
there have been a number of recent news stories highlighting problems in the 
co-ed military, as illustrated by the partial list of headlines below: 
Not So Ship Shape: Admirals Are Concerned About the Unprofessional Attitudes, 
Behaviors of Sailors.346 
Warship or L' veboat? One Destroyer. 19 Months. 13 Cases of Fraternization and/or 
Adultery. And the Courts-Martial Aren’t Over Yet.347 
Pimping Alleged at Patrick, NCO Arranged for Subordinate to Have Sex.348 
Cutter CO Relieved After “Inappropriate Relationship.”349 
Adultery, Fraternization, Drugs, Graft & Guns: The Disturbing Tale of a Brand-New 
Destroyer.350 
Captain Given 60 Days in Patrick [AFB] Sex Case: Verdict Allows Honorable 
Discharge.351 
Some KY Guard Women May Have Posed Nude.352 
Stories about sexual misconduct appear frequently in military newspapers. 
However, with the exception of occasional wire-service dispatches and 
sensational photo-illustrated stories such as Abu Ghraib, headlines like these 
rarely show up in The New York Times or The Washington Post. The exception is 
military sex scandals that center on allegations of harassment or abuse of 
women at the service academies. 
 
 346. William H. McMichael, Not So Ship Shape: Admirals Are Concerned About the Unprofessional 
Attitudes, Behaviors of Sailors, NAVY TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, at 8–9. 
 347. William H. McMichael, Warship or Loveboat? One Destroyer. 19 Months. 13 Cases of 
Fraternization and/or Adultery. And the Courts-Martial Aren’t Over Yet, NAVY TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at 14 
(regarding the destroyer U.S.S. Chung Hoon). 
 348. Rod Hafemeister, Pimping Alleged at Patrick: NCO Arranged for Subordinate to Have Sex, AIR 
FORCE TIMES, June 19, 2006, at 8, available at http://www.airforceots.com/portal/modules.php? 
name=News&file=article?sid=115. 
 349. Cutter CO Relieved After “Inappropriate Relationship,” NAVY TIMES, June 28, 2004. 
 350. William H. McMichael, Adultery, Fraternization, Drugs, Graft & Guns: The Disturbing Tale of a 
Brand-New Destroyer, NAVY TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at 14 (regarding the U.S.S. Momsen). 
 351. Captain Given 60 Days in Patrick [AFB] Sex Case: Verdict Allows Honorable Discharge, AIR FORCE 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at 10. 
 352. Andrew Wolfson, Some Ky. Guard Women May Have Posed Nude, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), 
Sept. 28, 2006, at 1A. 
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If a tree falls in the woods but no one hears, did it really fall? And if 
demoralizing problems happen in the military, but they are not reported in The 
New York Times and The Washington Post, do they really happen? They do, and 
they are ignored at great peril. 
B. The Military Service Academies 
In recent years, most of the attention regarding military sex scandals has 
focused on the military service academies. Women who accuse male colleagues 
of sexual assault or rape are automatically labeled “victims,” even before it is 
known that a crime has been committed. News and commentaries fitting this 
template have led to dozens of congressional hearings, investigations, Pentagon 
task forces, advisory committees, and relentless criticism of “masculinist” men 
in the military. 
1. Mixed Signals on the Severn River 
This author began using the phrase “double standards involving women,” 
or DSIW, shortly after a Task Force Report on Sexual Harassment at the Military 
Service Academies was presented to the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) Board of 
Visitors in August 2005.353 Many of the panel’s forty-four recommendations, 
largely crafted by civilian “victim advocate” professionals, were contrary to 
sound military principles and potentially harmful to morale at the academy.354 
Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.), a member of the Board of Visitors, did not 
seem to notice flaws in the Task Force Report. Instead, she berated 
Superintendent Vice Adm. Rodney Rempt for not doing enough to protect 
women from allegedly abusive midshipmen.355 Adm. Rempt announced several 
responses to the Task Force Report, including a “zero tolerance” policy against 
sexual harassment.356 
a. Blue Language and Lt. Black 
Into the gender-war crossfire wandered Lt. Bryan Black, a USNA 
instructor, who had used graphic profanity in the presence of a female 
midshipman.357 He apologized and she accepted, but another female officer 
decided that Black’s apology for that incident—and another incident—were not 
sincere enough.358 The Black case rose to the desk of Superintendent Rempt, who 
overruled a Marine investigator’s recommendation for a letter of reprimand, 
 
 353. DEFENSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10. An analysis of the report is available at 
http://www.cmrlink.org/viewarticle.asp?f=cmr-pa%20092105a.pdf. 
 354. Center for Military Readiness, CMR Notes, DoD Task Force Proposals Target Men of West 
Point & Annapolis (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.cmrlink.org/search.asp. 
 355. Bradley Olson, Mikulski Presses Naval Academy Officials on Harassment, BALT. SUN, Sept. 21, 
2005, at 7A; Christopher Munsey, Culture Change Needed at West Point, Panel Says, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 
5, 2005, at 13. 
 356. Bradley Olson, Admiral Hammers on Gender Inequity, BALT. SUN, Feb. 27, 2006, at 1. 
 357. Andrew Scutro, Foul Comments; Academy Instructor’s Remarks Land Him in Court-Martial, 
NAVY TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at 8; Earl Kelly, Academy Professor Unfairly Targeted for Sex Comments? 
CAPITAL (Annapolis) (online ed.), Jan. 14, 2006, http://www.hometownannapolis.com/cgi-
bin/read/2006/01_14-40/NAV. 
 358. Earl Kelly, supra note 357. 
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which probably would have ended Black’s military career. Lest anyone think he 
was soft on sailors who use profane language, Rempt ordered a Special Court 
Martial and filed charges of “conduct unbecoming an officer” against the 
hapless Lt. Black.359 
But Adm. Rempt’s zero tolerance policy had an asterisk beside it. In the 
same week that Lt. Black’s story made national news, the Superintendent 
invited all midshipmen to attend campus performances of a civilian play called 
Sex Signals.360 Actors performing the racy, interactive play, which was subsidized 
by the Academy, used the same vulgarities that Lt. Black had used.361 Four-letter 
words and slang for intimate body parts were perfectly acceptable, it seemed, 
provided that they were recited by civilian actors in an “educational” 
production that was supposed to teach midshipmen about date rape.362 
Crude language is rude and unprofessional; it should be discouraged or 
punished in appropriate ways. But are women truly helpless when they hear 
mild cuss words that don’t make sailors blush? In a December 2005 survey of 
sexual harassment at the military academies, one hundred percent of Naval 
Academy women who did not file official complaints said they thought they 
could handle such problems themselves.363 
When it comes to the oxymoronic etiquette of profanity, there are no easy 
answers. Some women like to compete with men who use profanity as 
 
 359. Id. According to Lt. Black’s attorney, Charles Gittins, the Superintendent wanted to conduct 
Black’s Article 15 (non-judicial punishment) hearing publicly, in order to make an example of him. 
Id. See also The Situation: “Swearing Like a Sailor” Gets Navy Man in Trouble (MSNBC television 
broadcast Jan. 19, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10928032); Rowan 
Scarborough, Naval Academy Teacher Cautioned Over Language, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2006, at A07 
[hereinafter Scarborough, Naval Academy Teacher Cautioned]. Article 15 (nonjudicial punishment) 
hearings are usually conducted in private. See Scutro, supra note 357. Realizing that such a spectacle 
would be neither objective nor fair, Black opted for a court-martial, which offered better protection 
for his rights. See id. The Superintendent decided to proceed with the court-martial, but the outcome 
was delayed for almost a year. See Scarborough, Naval Academy Teacher Cautioned, supra. After 
months of controversy and criticism for what was perceived as an over-zealous prosecution, Adm. 
Rempt transferred the case to another Navy authority, who dismissed the case and ordered the same 
type of letter of reprimand that Lt. Black was prepared to accept in the first place. Id. 
 360. E-mail from Vice Adm. Rodney P. Rempt to nonmids@unsa.edu, Subject: Faculty and Staff 
Invitation, (Jan. 4, 2006) (inviting USNA faculty, staff, and their families to join members of the Class 
of 2007 for performances of the interactive play Sex Signals at Mahan Hall on the USNA campus on 
January 9, 10, and 11, 2006, at 7:30 p.m.). The e-mail acknowledged that the production is geared to 
college students with discussions of dating, sex, and date rape. Id. The e-mail recommended that due 
to “graphic language,” children under the age of thirteen should not attend. Id. See also infra note 362. 
 361. Id. See also Center for Military Readiness, Naval Academy Prosecution Taken to PC Extreme 
(Jan. 13, 2006), http://www.cmrlink.org/social.asp?docID=261. 
 362. Letter from Attorney Charles Gittins to Vice Adm. Rodney Rempt (Jan. 11, 2006) (on file 
with author). Gittins, a USNA alumnus who witnessed the play, criticized its raunchy language, 
which he considered inappropriate for the Academy’s Mahan Hall, and noted that the players had 
presented misinformation about “date rape” that conflicted with military law. 
 363. DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER, SERVICE ACADEMY 2005 SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND 
ASSAULT SURVEY vi (Dec. 23, 2005) [hereinafter SASA 2005], available at http://www.sapr.mil/ 
contents/references/DMDC%20Academy%202005%20Survey.pdf. This survey was conducted in 
response to section 527 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004 and was the second in 
a series of annual surveys that will continue through 2008. An analysis of this and previous surveys 
is available at http://www.cmrlink.org/social.asp?docID=260 (last visited Apr. 12, 2007). 
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performance art. Witness the book Love My Rifle More Than You, written by 
former Army sergeant Kayla Williams about her experiences in Iraq.364 The 
provocative book takes the prize for equal-opportunity raunchiness in a gender-
mixed environment.365 
Some women expect men to be protectors, while others fume if a man 
extends simple courtesies to women under his command. In the minefield of 
sexual politics, what’s a military guy to do? Miss Manners wouldn’t have a clue. 
b. Inconsistency and Favoritism 
The Superintendent could help Naval Academy women most by working 
to avoid the perception and reality of double standards involving women. The 
following incidents are prime examples of DSIW: 
• In June 2006, Annapolis Capital reporter Earl Kelly quoted two 
unnamed, former midshipmen who said they knew a female company 
commander who did not take the physical readiness test, but lied and 
said that she did.366 Investigators recommended her dismissal, but 
Commandant of Midshipmen Capt. Bruce Grooms “overrode the 
decision because ‘she is a woman in power’ and the Naval Academy is 
under pressure to recruit and retain female midshipmen.”367 So much 
for the USNA Honor Concept, which directs midshipmen to “Tell the 
truth and ensure that the full truth is known . . . do not lie.”368 
• In Fall 2004, a male midshipman used mild profanity with an angry 
female colleague who responded in kind.369 The man was dismissed 
and ordered to repay the cost of his education, but the woman 
graduated normally in 2005.370 USNA spokesmen claimed to be 
unaware of any case fitting the description, dissembling with stock 
replies claiming “fair and equitable treatment for all.”371 
• A male midshipman who asked a reporter not to use his name said that 
he was dismissed from the Academy for having consensual sex with a 
female midshipman.372 The brief summer “fling” occurred during a ten-
day training exercise away from the yard in July.373 He added that his 
partner and three more female midshipmen who engaged in similar 
 
 364. KAYLA WILLIAMS & MICHAEL E. STAUB, LOVE MY RIFLE MORE THAN YOU: YOUNG AND 
FEMALE IN THE U.S. ARMY (2005). 
 365. Id.; see also Kathleen Parker, Guys & Dolls: The Facts of Life about Co-Ed Combat, WEEKLY 
STANDARD, Oct. 31, 2005, at 38. 
 366. Earl Kelly, Mids Say Discipline Is Not Consistent, CAPITAL (Annapolis), June 6, 2006, at A1. 
 367. Id. 
 368. U.S. Naval Academy, Honor Concept, http://www.usna.edu/OfficerDevelopment/ 
honor/honorconcept.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007). 
 369. E-mail correspondence and telephone conversation between confidential sources and author 
(May 2006) (on file with author). 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id.; E-mails from USNA spokesmen to author (Mar. 3, 2006–May 19, 2006) (on file with 
author). 
 372. Earl Kelly, Academy Double Standard on Sex Dismissals?, CAPITAL (Annapolis), Mar. 6, 2006, at 
A1. 
 373. Id. 
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activities were counseled, but not punished.374 A USNA spokesman 
cited privacy concerns in refusing to discuss the case with the 
reporter.375 Nor did the spokesman provide information on the number 
of midshipmen—either cumulatively or by gender—who had been 
discharged in the previous two years for sexual harassment, assault, or 
misconduct.376 
Harsh discipline of male midshipmen for certain offenses, which are 
excused when committed by female midshipmen, constitute double standards 
that are divisive and demoralizing in the fullest sense of the word. Most women 
in the military are not responsible for DSIW in disciplinary matters, but the 
resulting backlash and hard feelings are harmful to women and men alike. 
Double standards of any kind weaken the structural integrity of the military as 
an institution. 
2. Rape and Victimology 
The most controversial examples of double standards and misconduct at 
the Military Service Academies have involved charges of assault and rape. In 
January 2003, ABC News set off a wave of publicity and criticism about 
allegations of rape at the Air Force Academy.377 Several full-scale investigations 
and congressional hearings were conducted to determine how those cases had 
been handled. Some of the details footnoted in a report by an Air Force Working 
Group read like pornographic movie scripts, but records showed that most of 
the cases had been handled properly, under military law.378 
Media critics and professional victim advocates remained dissatisfied 
because, in their view, all accusations of assault are credible and any 
punishment short of court-martial and jail means that the case was mishandled 
and unfair to the “victim.”379 Several more investigations of sexual misconduct at 
the academies were conducted, creating opportunities for professional victim 
advocates seeking Department of Defense funds and prestige. 
a. DoD Office of Victim Advocate (OVA) 
Sensational scandals at the Air Force and Naval Academies were 
intensified by release of the Service Academy 2005 Sexual Harassment and 
Assault Survey (SASA)—the first of a series of annual polls of military academy 
 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Lynn Sherr, Rape Without Repercussion? Women Say Assaults Are Not Prosecuted at Air Force 
Academy (ABC News television broadcast Feb. 28, 2003). 
 378. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. AIR FORCE, THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP 
CONCERNING THE DETERRENCE OF AND RESPONSE TO INCIDENTS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AT THE U.S. AIR 
FORCE ACADEMY 156–64 (June 2003), available at http://www.usafatoday.com/docs/usafa_ 
report.pdf. 
 379. Christine Hansen, The Miles Foundation, Inc., A Considerable Sacrifice: The Costs of Sexual 
Violence in the U.S. Armed Forces (Sept. 16, 2005) (presented at the Military Culture and Gender 
Conference, University of Buffalo, N.Y.), available at http://www.law.buffalo.edu/BALDY 
CENTER/pdfs/MilCult05Hansen.pdf. 
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cadets and midshipmen, which was done on an anonymous basis.380 Most news 
reports about the 2005 survey failed to notice that its findings regarding 
incidents of sexual harassment did not differentiate between minor incidents 
and serious offenses. Nor did the survey differentiate between allegations and 
substantiated cases. News reports nationwide accused West Point of having the 
worst record of the three,381 creating the impression that the U.S. Military 
Academy is a sexual battleground for female cadets. A closer look at survey 
numbers revealed that anonymous reports of assault at the military service 
academies are relatively few and probably comparable to or lower than 
incidents in the civilian world. 
For example, six percent (thirty-seven of 618) women at the Military 
Academy, five percent (thirty-five of 693) women at the Naval Academy, and 
four percent (thirty of 738) women at the Air Force Academy reported some sort 
of sexual assault, defined most often as “unwanted touching of a sexual 
nature.”382 Even one case is too many, but perspective is in order. All the bad 
publicity aimed at West Point, tagged with the largest number (six percent), 
resulted from anonymous reports from only seven more women than those who 
reported assaults at the Air Force Academy. Exaggerated reports of this kind are 
not helpful to the military, or to female cadets and midshipmen. They do create 
perceptions, however, as well as a potential growth industry for professional 
“victim advocates.” 
In 2004, Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-N.Y.) sponsored a ninety-five-page bill 
that would have authorized more than $218.6 million for an Office of Victim 
Advocate (OVA) in the Pentagon.383 This costly piece of feminist “pork,” or even 
a fraction of the proposed funding, would empower civilian feminists who seem 
to believe that men are innocent only until they are accused.384 In 2006, The 
Wellesley College Centers for Women produced a $50,000 report commissioned 
by DoD on “prospects” for a Pentagon OVA—but DoD did not endorse the 
proposal.385 Establishment of such an office would have been a huge mistake. 
Victim advocates almost always consider accusers to be “victims” even before it 
is known that a crime has been committed. They also react in horror any time 
expert investigators suggest that false allegations of sexual assault are common 
and distinguishable from truthful ones.386 
 
 380. SASA 2005, supra note 363. 
 381. Id. at 13–15 (“Survey Metholodgy”). See also Lolita C. Baldor, Military School Sex Harassment 
Continues, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 28, 2005; Josh White, Air Force Academy Shows Improvement, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 23, 2005, at A02; Rowan Scarborough, Military Academies See Less Harassment, WASH. 
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at A1. 
 382. SASA 2005, supra note 363, at iv–vii (“Executive Summary”); Center for Military Readiness, 
Sex Survey Scolding Unfair to Service Academies (Jan. 11, 2006), www.cmrlink.org/SOCIAL.ASP? 
DOCID=260 (last visited Apr. 4, 2007). 
 383. Dep’t of Defense Office of the Victim Advocate Act of 2004, H.R. 4587, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 384. See Center for Military Readiness, Pentagon Doesn’t Need an Office of Male Bashing (Dec. 1, 
2005), http://www.cmrlink.org/social.asp?docID=257. 
 385. Bryan Bender, Wellesley College Advised Pentagon on Victim Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 
2005, at A1. 
 386. See Center for Military Readiness, Sex, Lies, and Rape (Sept. 4, 2006), http://www. 
cmrlink.org/social.asp?DocID=276. 
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The DoD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) has 
established some useful guidelines to strike a balance between the privacy of 
accusers and the rights of the accused.387 There is no need for a Pentagon Office 
of the Victim Advocate, which would operate as an “Office of Male Bashing” 
that all DoD officials would fear to challenge. Such an office in the Pentagon 
would nuclearize the war between the sexes by meddling in distant “he said, 
she said” disputes that are local and highly emotional.388 Sexual harassment 
problems should be handled at the local level, with full respect for the rights of 
the accused. 
b. Alcohol and the Owens Case 
Even though alcohol is supposed to be off limits to cadets and midshipmen, 
it is almost always present in military service academy sex scandals. So it was in 
the 2006 case of former USNA quarterback Lamar Owens, who was accused of 
raping a female midshipman in Bancroft Hall.389 The Academy granted legal 
immunity to the accuser, an admitted binge drinker, but the unnecessary 
privilege backfired.390 Legal immunity did not help to lift the fog of alcohol that 
blurred both parties’ memories of what happened that night.391 
 
 387. Dep’t of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), DoD Issues 
Confidentiality Policy for Sexual Assault Victims (Mar. 18, 2005), http://www.defenselink. 
mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8320; Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense to 
Secretaries of the Military Departments, Confidentiality Policy for Victims of Sexual Assault (Mar. 
16, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318dsd.pdf. See also Dep’t 
of Defense Directive No. 6495.1, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program (Oct. 6, 
2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/649501p.pdf; K.C. McClain, 
We’re Making Progress, USA TODAY, Mar. 27, 2005, at 14A. 
 388. The Defense Department opposed OVA legislation that was reintroduced in 2006. See 
Military Domestic and Sexual Violence Response Act of 2006, H.R. 5212, § 111, 109th Cong. (2006). 
On June 12, 2006, the DoD Office of Domestic Violence issued this statement: 
An office of the OVA is unnecessary. DoD is committed to maintaining a strong focus on 
preventing these crimes, effectively responding to them and holding offenders 
accountable for their actions. In the military, the responsibility for maintaining this focus 
lies with commanders, not with victim advocates. While victim advocates are important, 
victims often times need additional resources within the military community. Victims 
need strong support from commanders and other responders to ensure that medical, legal 
and investigative systems remove barriers to reporting, reduce bureaucratic hurdles for 
victims and survivors, and ensure access to treatment services. 
See Telephone call and facsimile from Pentagon official to author (June 12, 2006) (on file with 
author). 
 389. See Bradley Olson, Mid Tells Jury of Rape in Her Dorm: Defense Attacks Credibility, Says Navy 
QB Had Consensual Sex, BALT. SUN, July 12, 2006, at 1A; Earl Kelly, Judge Blasts Prosecution in Owens’ 
Trial, CAPITAL (Annapolis), July 14, 2006, at A1; Steve Vogel, Superintendent Faulted Over Rape Case E-
Mails, WASH. POST, July 7, 2006, at B04; Bradley Olson, Message is Focus in Rape Case: Woman Might 
Have Invited Quarterback to Her Dorm Room at Naval Academy, BALT. SUN, July 13, 2006, at 1B; Arlo 
Wagner, Alcohol an Issue in Accuser’s Recall, WASH. TIMES, July 18, 2006, at B3. 
 390. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., “Rape” and the Navy’s P.C. Policy, NAT’L J., Apr. 9, 2007 (reporting that 
Vice Adm. Rempt, the USNA Superintendent and “convening authority” in the Owens case, told 
alumnus Peter Optekar at a social event that he had to submit Owens to a court martial: “Pete, I had 
no other choice. If I did not take him to a GCM, we would have had every feminist organization and 
the ACLU after us.”). 
 391. See Arlo Wagner, Alcohol an Issue in Accuser’s Recall, WASH. TIMES, July 18, 2006, at B3. 
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Reasonable doubt remained, so Owens was acquitted of rape.392 He was 
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer, but the jury recommended no 
punishment.393 Superintendent Rempt referred the case to the Secretary of the 
Navy, recommending that Owens be expelled for “unsatisfactory conduct,” but 
not be required to repay the cost of his education. Navy Secretary Donald 
Winter approved the expulsion, but also ordered that Owens repay $90,000 of 
the $136,000 cost of his education the smaller amount in recognition of Owens’ 
contributions to the academy as an athlete. As of this writing, Owens’ defense 
team is appealing that order. In contrast, Owens’ accuser, a known binge 
drinker who had been given immunity for her testimony, was allowed to 
graduate normally. The Academy’s intervention in what should have been an 
unbiased trial left the Superintendent with a troubled female officer, a muddled 
message about alcohol, and a glaring example of DSIW that demoralized the 
Academy for months.394 
c. Guilt by Accusation 
In 2004, DoD Inspector Gen. Joseph E. Schmitz conducted an extensive 
survey to measure opinions on sexual harassment and assault at the military 
service academies. Among other things, the Schmitz DoD IG Report, released in 
March 2005, found that fraudulent complaints are perceived as a problem by an 
average of seventy-three percent of women at the Air Force Academy, West 
Point, and Annapolis. The comparable average percentage for men at all three 
academies was seventy-two percent.395 
Figures of that size indicate a problem worthy of further investigation and 
honest plans to reduce the problem, not cover it up. But in the Sexual 
Harassment and Assault (SASA) Survey of December 2005, described as a 
“baseline” in a series of authorized studies, there were no questions about 
fraudulent complaints.396 Nor did the SASA 2005 ask any questions about 
concerns that standards have been lowered, even though statements about such 
concerns were identified by the GAO in 1991 and 1994 as the second most 
prominent form of sexual harassment at the academies.397 
 
 392. Nathan Barney, Owens Cleared of Rape Charge, WASH TIMES, July 22, 2006, at B1. 
 393. Id.; Derrill Holly, Military Jury: No Punishment for Navy Quarterback, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 
21, 2006. 
 394. Nia-Malika Henderson, Annapolis Alderwoman Seeks Support for Owens, BALT. SUN, Feb. 7, 
2007, at 3B; Chris Amos, Worthy of Commission?, NAVY TIMES, Mar. 12, 2007, at 8; Bradley Olson, 
Owens, Alumni Plead for Support: Navy Ex-Quarterback Uses Web to Ask for Character References, BALT. 
SUN, Feb. 17, 2007, at 1A; Earl Kelly, Academy Criticized for Unequal Punishment: Some Say Owens Trial 
Proves Double Standard for Female Midshipmen, CAPITAL (Annapolis), Aug. 20, 2006, at A1; Bradley 
Olson, Mid Vows to Fight Expulsion: Owens’ Lawyer also Objects to Order to Repay Navy $90,000 Navy for 
Education, BALT. SUN, Apr. 14, 2007, at 5B. 
 395. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE SERVICE 
ACADEMY SEXUAL ASSAULT AND LEADERSHIP SURVEY xi n.15 (Mar. 4, 2005), available at http://www. 
dodig.mil/Inspections/IPO/reports/Final%20Survey%20Report.pdf; see also Daniel de Vise, Defense 
Dept. Surveys Academy Sex Assaults, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2005, at A01; Robert F. Dorr, Lies and 
Victims’ Inaction Have Skewed Service Academies’ Sex Assault Reports, NAVY TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, at 46. 
 396. See supra note 363. 
 397. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOD SERVICE ACADEMIES: MORE ACTIONS NEEDED TO ELIMINATE 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 3 (Jan. 1994) (“The most common forms of harassment were derogatory 
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In 2006, many news stories created the misimpression that sexual 
harassment and assaults were increasing at the military service academies. 
Reporters frequently repeated questionable figures obtained from victim 
advocates, who seem to believe every allegation to be true and consider a case to 
be mishandled if the accused person is not court martialed and sent to jail. The 
truth was that numbers of women alleging harassment were remarkably small, 
and on a downward trend.398 
Military officials should not endorse the notion that men are always wrong 
and women are always right—a suggestion as ludicrous as the idea that all 
women think alike. Men who assault women should be punished. Women who 
drink to excess or make false accusations should be punished, too. Mishandled 
accusations of rape are not about sex; they are about power—the power of 
women over men. 
C. The 1993 Law Regarding Homosexual Conduct 
A common thread in the debates about social policy in the military center on 
the institution’s unique character, culture, and mission. The armed forces exist to 
defend the republic—a purpose that sets the military apart from all other 
institutions in the civilian world. 
Advocates of allowing homosexuals to serve in the military almost always 
discuss the issue in terms of civil rights. But participation in the military is 
sometimes a duty; it is never a right. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does 
not apply to the military.399 
The issue was discussed in a comprehensive law review article by Professor 
William A. Woodruff of the Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law at Campbell 
University: 
The armed forces are unique. In a government based upon the consent of the 
governed, the military is autocratic. In a society that treasures individual 
freedom, the soldier must conform and sacrifice individual freedom for mission 
accomplishment. In a country where the right to speak one’s mind is 
paramount, the soldier is called upon to defend that right while not enjoying its 
full extent. To some, it is paradoxical that the defenders of freedom must forfeit 
their own freedom. Consider the mission of the military, however, and the 
paradox vanishes. The mission of the United Armed Forces is to fight and win 
our nation’s wars. It takes an army to do that, not a debating society . . . . 
 
personal comments and comments that standards had been lowered for women.”), available at 
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat4/150664.pdf. 
 398. Center for Military Readiness, supra note 382. 
 399. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-40 (Finding 1.32). 
Title VII has not been legally applied to the military in recognition of the fact that its 
provision could impose constraints on the United States by which potential military 
opponents, not operating under the same constraints, might derive an advantage. Warfare 
is a supranational survival contest in which opposing sides vie for any advantage; 
unilateral policies adopted to promote principles other than military necessity may place 
the adopting party at increased risk of defeat. 
Id. 
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Wars are won not by individuals, but by units functioning under extremely 
difficult circumstances . . . . In the final analysis, all military rules, regulations, 
policies, traditions, and customs are related to, and in some manner support, the 
ultimate goal of combat effectiveness.400 
As famously articulated by the Supreme Court in Goldman v. Weinberger, 
we have repeatedly held that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society 
separate from civilian society. The military must insist upon a respect for duty 
and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life, in order to prepare for and 
perform its vital role. . . . The essence of the military service is the subordination 
of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service.401 
The military guards individual rights, but it must be guided by different 
rules. This principle should inform all discussions about social policies, including 
the question of homosexuals in the military. 
1. Congressional Oversight 
a. Clinton Vows to Repeal Department of Defense Regulations 
The contemporary public debate about homosexuals in the military began in 
1992, when former Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton challenged President George 
H.W. Bush for re-election. President Bush did not raise the issue much during the 
campaign, but homosexual activist groups contributed heavily to the campaign 
of Bill Clinton and Al Gore and expected Clinton to deliver on his promise to 
“lift the ban” on homosexuals in the military.402 
Shortly after the election, on Veterans Day, President-elect Clinton vowed to 
deliver on his campaign promise and announced his intention to change policies 
that excluded homosexuals from the military.403 At the time, the ban was not 
inscribed in law, but in Department of Defense directives that were adopted in 
1981.404 On January 29, 1993, the newly inaugurated president ordered the 
 
 400. William A. Woodruff, Homosexuality and Military Service, 64 UMKC L. REV. 121, 123–24 (Fall 
1995). Prior to retiring from active duty in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Professor Woodruff 
served as Chief of the Litigation Division in the Office of the Judge Advocate General, where he was 
responsible for defending the Army’s interests in civil litigation, including litigation challenges to 
the homosexual exclusion policy. Id. 
 401. 475 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1986) (alteration added; quotations, citations, and alteration omitted). 
 402. See J. Jennings Moss, Clinton to Allow Gays in Military, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1992, at A1; J. 
Jennings Moss, Gays See Clinton Backing Agenda, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1993, at A8. 
 403. See Bill Gertz, Nunn Defies Clinton on Gays in Military, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1992, at A1; Bill 
Gertz, Clinton to Move Fast for Gays in the Military, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1993, at A4; Chandler Burr, 
Friendly Fire: How Politics Shaped Policy on Gays in the Military, CAL. LAW., June 1994, at 54–55. In this 
article, Burr reported that about an hour after his swearing-in, President Clinton saw Rep. Gerry 
Studds (D-Mass.), one of two openly gay members of the House, in the Capitol rotunda. “[S]haking 
his hand, [President Clinton] said with deep conviction, ‘I’m going to do this, Gerry.’ ‘This’ was 
Clinton’s campaign promise to lift the ban on gay and lesbian soldiers in the military.” Id. (alteration 
added). A few weeks later, Clinton intimate Paul Begala was present at the inception of the 
Campaign for Military Service, an ad hoc coalition of the American Civil Liberties Union, People for 
the American Way, the National Organization for Women, and other groups that joined together to 
do the lobbying, public relations, and vote counting. 
 404. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations (Jan. 15, 1981); 
Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.30, Separation of Regular Commissioned Officers, at encl. 2 (Jan. 15, 
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Department of Defense to cease asking “the question” about homosexuality, 
which used to appear on military induction papers.405 This change was described 
as an “interim policy,” pending further review by Congress and the Defense 
Department.406 
A storm of spontaneous opposition ensued. Many congressional offices 
needed extra staff to answer thousands of phone calls and letters protesting the 
president’s move, and it quickly became apparent that even a Congress controlled 
by the president’s own party would not permit the Administration to repeal the 
ban on homosexuals in the military arbitrarily.407 Then-Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin formed an internal Military Working Group and charged the panel to 
come up with a suitable plan for accommodating homosexuals in the military by 
July 15, 1993.408 The Joint Chiefs and military experts argued for continuation of 
the status quo, but task force members were under pressure from the White 
House and activist groups to devise a plan to accommodate gays in the military. 
Feeling political backlash, in March 1993, President Clinton said at a news 
conference that he might consider a plan that would allow homosexuals in the 
military but restrict them from certain assignments. Self-identified homosexual 
Bob Hattoy, Associate Director of Presidential Personnel and an advisor to 
Clinton on the issue, flatly rejected that option.409 The internal and public debate 
 
1981); Woodruff, supra note 400, at 131–32 nn.56 & 60, reprinted in 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, ¶ (H). Both 
directives were republished in 1982. See also Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense to 
Military Departments (Jan. 16, 1981) (“I am promulgating today a change to DoD Directive 1332.14 
(Enlisted Administrative Separations), including a completely new Enclosure 8 on Homosexuality. 
The revision contains no change in policy. It reaffirms that homosexuality is incompatible with 
military service.”). Although these changes were put into place under the Carter administration, the 
directive on Enlisted Administrative Separation was again revised in 1982. See Dep’t of Defense 
Directive No. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations (Jan. 28, 1982), available at 
http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/regulation41.pdf. The 1982 revision did not affect the policy 
on homosexuality. Nevertheless, the 1982 date has caused some to erroneously attribute this 
language to the Reagan administration. 
 405. Memorandum from President Clinton to the Secretary of Defense, Ending Discrimination on 
the Basis of Sexual Orientation in the Armed Forces (Jan. 29, 1993), available at http://dont. 
stanford.edu/regulations/pres1-29-93.pdf. 
 406. See id. 
 407. See Michael Hedges, Support for Gay Ban Seen as Spontaneous, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at 
A1; Rowan Scarborough & Ronald A. Taylor, Clinton Seeks a Deal to Avoid Battle on Ban, WASH. TIMES, 
Jan. 28, 1993, at A1. Veterans, conservative, and pro-family groups were relatively unprepared for 
the controversy because it had not been widely debated during the 1992 presidential race. Following 
extensive hearings, members of Congress and staff eventually formulated a legislative strategy. 
 408. Memorandum from the Military Working Group to the Secretary of Defense, Recommended 
DoD Homosexual Policy Outline (June 8, 1993). See also Peter Copeland, Gay-Sex Video Set for Battle, 
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1993, at A1; Rowan Scarborough, Study Urges Ban on Overt Gays: Pentagon 
Report to Seek Compromise, WASH. TIMES, May 21, 1993, at A1; Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Speeds Plan to Lift 
Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1993, at A20; Rowan Scarborough, Gay-Ban Supporters Seek Equal Time 
with Pentagon, WASH. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at A3; Rowan Scarborough, Aspin Policy Follows “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell,” WASH. TIMES, June 22, 1993, at A1. The Military Working Group did not meet with 
opponents of President Clinton’s plan until June 8, 1993—the date they submitted their policy 
outline to Secretary Aspin. 
 409. Richard H.P. Sia, Top Military Officers Favor Gays Staying in Closet, BALT. SUN, FEB. 23, 1993, 
available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/user/scotts/bulgarians/joint-chiefs-ban.html; 
Joyce Price, Clinton Aide Rips Deal on Gay Ban, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at A1; Paul Bedard, 
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intensified when a coalition called the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Military 
Freedom Project drew up a list of “recommendations” that left no doubt that 
activists would not be satisfied with the option of homosexuals serving in the 
military discreetly. The wish list included, inter alia: (1) an Executive Order to 
ban discrimination based on homosexual or bisexual orientation or conduct in 
the armed forces; (2) an end to all discharge procedures for homosexual 
orientation or conduct; (3) training programs on the acceptance of homosexual 
or bisexual personnel into the military, on the same basis as racial and gender 
issues; and (4) an official Defense Department committee, similar to the Defense 
Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), to advise the 
Secretary on matters relating to homosexuals and bisexuals in the armed 
forces.410 Some items on the wish list were partially granted by the Clinton 
Administration in 1994.411 
Homosexual activist groups staged a large (though not as large as planned) 
rally in Washington, D.C., on April 25, 1993. Organizers promoted the march as 
what would be “the largest civil rights demonstration in [U.S.] history” and 
were disappointed when President Clinton did not promise to be there in 
person.412 The event included bizzarre elements that were aired on C-SPAN, 
including some provocatively dressed marchers and a group holding up posters 
depicting President Clinton with a “Pinnochio” nose.413 President Clinton did 
not show up at the rally, but he met in the Oval Office with a large group of 
organizers, who consulted frequently with officials from the Deparments of 
 
Clinton Softens Gay Plan, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at A1; Rowan Scarborough, Senator Questions 
[Bernard] Nussbaum’s Role in Gay-Ban Case, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at A4. 
 410. See Rowan Scarborough, Gay Rights Groups Ready Wish List for Military in Case Ban is Lifted, 
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1993, at A1. The Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Military Freedom Project was a 
coalition of nine human rights and gay activist organizations, including: Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual 
Veterans of America; American Civil Liberties Union; American Psychological Association; the 
Human Rights Campaign Fund; National Gay and Lesbian Task Force; Military Law Task Force; 
National Lawyer’s Guild; Lambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund; and Queer Nation. See id. 
 411. On September 8, 1994, the Department of Defense co-sponsored a day long “Diversity Day 
Training Event” in Arlington’s Crystal City near the Pentagon with eighteen other government 
agencies. The program featured lectures, panel discussions, exhibits, workshops, and video 
presentations, including a video titled “On Being Gay.” Id.; see also Rowan Scarborough, Navy 
Officers Balk at Pro-Gay Seminar, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1994, at A1; Dep’t of the Navy, Memorandum 
for All Hands from the Cmdr. G.R. Stermer, Naval Sea Systems, Subj.: Diversity Day 1994 Training 
Event, Aug. 26, 1994. See also Elaine Donnelly, Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 522, Social 
Experimentation in the Military (Apr. 3, 1995) (transcript available at http://www.heritage.org/ 
Research/NationalSecurity/HL522.cfm). 
 412. Gary Lee & Linda Wheeler, Gay-Rights March Organizers Say 1 Million May Participate, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 19, 1993, at A41 (alteration added); Joyce Price, Possible Clinton No-Show Angers Gay March 
Leaders, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1993, at A4; Joyce Price, Clinton Plans Hookup to Gay-Rights Rally: 
Meets Leaders in Oval Office, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at A1; Cindy Loose, Gay Activists Summon 
Their Hopes, Resolve, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1993, at A1. 
 413. Michael Hedges & J. Jennings Moss, “The Queer ‘90s”: 300,000 March to Celebrate Rites with 
Demand for Rights, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at A1; Ruth Fremson, Photo (Apr. 25, 1993) (showing 
estimated 300,000 marchers); Kenneth Lambert, Photo (Apr. 25, 1993) (showing Pinocchio signs); 
Michael Hedges, Emotions Bared, Among Other Things, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at A1; Michael 
Hedges, Were Marchers Just Too Far “Out”?, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1993, at A1. 
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Defense and Justice on legislative and legal strategies to advance the cause of 
homosexuals in the military.414 
Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in an awkward situation, but 
they did their best to resist the president’s original, radical plan without 
challenging his authority as Commander-in-Chief.415 Following pressure from 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, all of the chiefs of staff were lined up behind 
President Clinton for a media event at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., when 
President Clinton announced his “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” proposal on July 19, 
1993.416 Departing significantly from DoD directives in effect since 1981, 
President Clinton’s July 19 policy maintained that “Sexual orientation is 
considered a personal and private matter, and homosexual orientation is not a 
bar to service entry or continued service unless manifested by homosexual 
conduct.”417 
b. Congress Exercises Oversight Responsibilities 
Enactment of Clinton’s proposal appeared possible at first, but in response 
to political pressure, members of Congress became engaged. They exercised 
effective oversight by asking a lot of questions. For example, in May 1993, Senate 
Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Ranking Member 
John Warner (R-Va.) visited several ships and submarines at Naval Station 
Norfolk, Virginia. An Associated Press photo of that visit showed the senators 
crouched down to solicit the opinions of three men occupying cramped sleeping 
spaces in the torpedo room of the nuclear attack submarine USS Montpelier.418 
One gay activist leader called Nunn’s tour an “inflammatory spectacle,” while 
another denounced Sen. Nunn as a “bigot” for having any hearings at all.419 
Various drafts of a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” type proposal started to emerge and 
fire from both sides.420 Proponents of gays in the military saw them as a betrayal of 
 
 414. See Burr, supra note 403, at 57–61, 98–100. 
 415. See Sia, supra note 409; Detroit News Wire Services, Top Brass: Rethink Gay Ban Lift, DETROIT 
NEWS, Jan. 25, 1993, at A1. 
 416. See Grant Willis, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue: Despite Compromise on Gay Ban, Congress 
Will Get the Last Word, ARMY TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993, at 12. 
 417. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations, at encl. 3 
¶ E3.A1.1.8.1.1 (1994), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/ corres/pdf/133214p.pdf; 
cf. Dep’t of Defense Instr. 5505.8, Investigations of Sexual Misconduct by the Defense Criminal 
Investigative Organizations and Other DoD Law Enforcement Organizations, at §§ 4, 6, & encl. 2 
(2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/ directives/corres/pdf/i55058_012405/i55058p.pdf. 
The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” concept announced by Clinton on July 19, 1993, formed the basis for 
congressional testimony by Defense Department officials, and for enforcement regulations 
announced on December 22, 1993, with DoD News Release No. 605-93, available at 
http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDN_ARTICLES/pdf_file/1100.pdf. 
 418. Steve Helber, Photo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 11, 1993. 
 419. Richard A. Ryan, Senators Take Gay Battle to Sea, DETROIT NEWS, May 11, 1993, at 1A.; Rowan 
Scarborough, Witnesses Detail Risks of Lifting Ban, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1993, at A1. 
 420. See Rowan Scarborough, Furor Grows Over Gay-Ban Policy, WASH. TIMES, June 23, 1993, at 
A1; Burr, supra note 403, at 56–57. Burr described the concerns of activist lawyer Chai Feldblum, who 
tried to achieve a significant (though limited) step in favor of gays in the military by going along 
with the original “compromise” reportedly agreed to by President Clinton and Sen. Sam Nunn. 
Under what Burr described as the “Clinton-Nunn political deal,” “service members who stated they 
were gay would be placed on inactive reserve, stripped of pay and benefits—essentially given a 
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their justified expectations, while opponents criticized such proposals as incremental 
steps in the wrong direction. During this time both Houses held a total of twelve 
legislative hearings, which heard from diverse panels of experts and advocates on all 
sides of the issue.421 
Immediately following President Clinton’s announcement on July 19, 1993, the 
House and Senate Armed Services Committees heard testimony from several 
prominent officials, including Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, DoD General 
Counsel Jamie Gorelick, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Colin Powell, the Chief of 
Staff of each of the services, and key members of the Pentagon’s Military 
Working Group. Under close questioning, all gave candid answers that 
revealed serious flaws in the July 19 “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” concept; in both 
Houses of Congress, members started to question and doubt the wisdom of “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell.422 Then-Rep. James Talent (R-Mo.) commented, 
when I listened to the Chiefs and the Secretary yesterday, what I basically heard 
them saying was that they had resolved this debate in favor of essentially 
keeping the old policy, . . . [but] [w]hen I read the policy as a totality . . . [it] 
doesn’t seem consistent with what I understood the Secretary and the Chiefs 
have been saying about the policy.423 
The sticking point was an inherent inconsistency that could be easily 
exploited by activist lawyers challenging the policy in court: If homosexuality is 
not a disqualifying characteristic, how can the armed forces justify dismissal 
 
suspended discharge. (Those found to have had sex were still expelled under the new terms, which, 
in Clinton’s formulation, separated homosexual ‘status’ from homosexual ‘conduct.’)” Id. But 
attorney Chai Feldblum, an activist with the Campaign for Military Service Coalition, became 
“increasingly concerned” about Clinton’s “‘status versus conduct’ distinction, which the president 
repeated whenever he was asked about his forthcoming policy.” She and fellow activist Tom 
Stoddard, who headed the Campaign for Military Service and met with Clinton at the White House 
on April 16, 1993, maintained that the distinction should be “status versus misconduct.” They 
recognized that Clinton’s “status versus conduct” concept was an “artificial distinction as 
unworkable as accepting left-handed soldiers while forbidding them from shooting left-handed.” See 
Burr, supra note 403, at 56–57. Those opposed to gays in the military recognized the same anomaly. 
 421. See Woodruff, supra note 400, at 144. The Senate Armed Service Committee conducted 
hearings on the policy generally on March 29, 31, April 29, May 7, 10, and 11, 1993. Id. at 144 n.137 
(citing Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed 
Servs., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 255–56 (1993)). Oversight hearings on the Administration’s July 19, 1993, 
policy were held on July 20, 21, and 22, 1993. Woodruff, supra note 400, at 144 n.137 (citing Policy 
Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 255–56 (1993)). Oversight hearings in the House were held July 21, 22, and 23, 1993. 
Woodruff, supra note 400, at 144 n.137 (citing Assessment of the Plan to lift the Ban on Homosexuality in 
the Military: Hearings Before the Mil. Forces & Personnel Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)). 
 422. See Woodruff, supra note 400, at 149–50 (citing Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed 
Forces: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 255–56 (1993); Assessment of 
the Plan to lift the Ban on Homosexuality in the Military: Hearings Before the Mil. Forces & Personnel 
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)). Senators on both sides of the 
aisle, including SASC Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Dan Coats (R-Ind.), expressed concern that 
the courts would “find inconsistencies in the policies as written,” and interpret them in a way that 
would hinder the goal of maintaining military effectiveness and unit cohesion. Id. at 150. 
 423. Id. (quoting Assessment of the Plan to lift the Ban on Homosexuality in the Military: Hearings 
Before the Mil. Forces & Personnel Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993)) (alteration added). 
04__DONNELLY.DOC 6/18/2007  3:01 PM 
 CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY 905 
of a person who merely reveals the presence of such a characteristic? Members 
of Congress recognized that such a policy would be unenforceable, unworkable, 
and indefensible in court. 
With the exception of Clinton administration insiders trying to 
finesse what had become a hot-potato issue, and a few gay leaders who 
were willing to accept compromise in order to avoid codification of the 
ban on gays in the military,424 there were no significant constituencies 
advocating passage of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” by Congress. Following 
extensive floor debate in both Houses, Congress rejected President 
Clinton’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” proposal with overwhelming, veto-proof 
bipartisan majorities.425 Instead, Congress passed a law that continued the 
pre-Clinton (1981) policy of excluding homosexuals from the military.426 In 
so doing, members wisely chose language almost identical to the 1981 DoD 
Directives regarding homosexuality, which had already been challenged 
and upheld as constitutional by the federal courts.427 Congress allowed 
President Clinton’s “interim policy” of not asking questions of inductees 
regarding homosexuality to stand with the provision that a future 
Secretary of Defense can restore such questions, without additional 
legislation, if the needs of the service require it.428 
Legislation dealing with intensely controversial issues does not 
become law by accident. In this case, Congress codified the policy in 
place long before Clinton took office. Contrary to frequent misstatements of 
the law then and now, there is no way that bipartisan, veto-proof majorities 
 
 424. Jim Abrams, Associated Press, Nunn, Frank Trade Jabs Over Gays, DETROIT NEWS, May 31, 
1993, at 1A; Rick Maze, Frank Talk About Compromise: Gay Congressman Backs “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
To Avert Gay-Ban Law, ARMY TIMES, May 31, 1993, at 8 [hereinafter Maze, Frank Talk About 
Compromise]. These articles reported on a version of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” proposed by Rep. 
Barney Frank (D-Mass.), which would have drawn a line between “on-base” and “off-base” 
behavior. The proposal was seen as a way to provide “political cover” to Clinton, but gay activists 
rejected it. Marvin Liebman of the radical group Queer Nation, for example, said in response, “We 
will not accept compromise. We will not tolerate appeasement.” See Maze, Frank Talk About 
Compromise, supra. 
 425. On Sept. 9, 1993, the Senate approved language in the FY 1994 Defense Authorization bill 
that codified the homosexual ban, using language almost identical to that in the Defense Department 
directive that had been in place since 1981. See supra note 404 and accompanying text. An 
amendment offered by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.), which would have allowed the president to 
decide policy regarding gays in the military, was defeated on Sept. 9, 1993, on a bipartisan sixty-
three to thirty-three vote. S. amend. 783 to S. 1298, 103d Cong. (1993). On Sept. 28, the House rejected 
a similar amendment, sponsored by Rep. Martin Meehan (D-Mass.) and Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-
Colo.), which would have stricken the Senate-approved language and expressed the sense that the 
issue should be decided by the President and his advisors. H. amend. 315 to H.R. 2401, 103d Cong. 
(1993). The Meehan/Schroeder amendment was defeated on a bipartisan roll-call vote, 264 to 169. 
Id.; see also Rowan Scarborough, Schroeder, Meehan Hope to Alter Compromise on Gays in Military, 
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at A4; Rowan Scarborough, Gay-Ban Deal Nearer to Becoming Law, WASH. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at A4; Rowan Scarborough, Senators Reaffirm Gay Ban: Boxer’s challenge rejected 
by 63–33, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at A1. 
 426. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No 103-160, § 571, 107 
Stat. 1547, 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000)) (reprinted infra Appendix A). 
 427. See Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 
(7th Cir. 1989); see also Scarborough, Senators Reaffirm Gay Ban, supra note 425. 
 428. See Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571(d), 107 Stat. at 1673 (reprinted infra Appendix A). 
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would have passed a law making it “easier” for homosexuals to serve. Rep. Steve 
Buyer (R-Ind.), then-Chairman of the HASC Personnel Subcommittee, 
underscored the point in a December 16, 1999, memorandum to his 
colleagues: 
Although some would assert that section 654 of Title 10, US Code . . . embodied 
the compromise now referred to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” there is no evidence 
to suggest that the Congress believed the new law to be anything other than a 
continuation of a firm prohibition against military service for homosexuals that 
had been the historical policy. 
The law, as well as accompanying legislative findings and explanatory report 
language, makes absolutely clear that known homosexuals, identified based on 
acts or self admission, must be separated from the military. After extensive 
testimony and debate, the Congress made a calculated judgment to confirm the 
continued bar to the service of homosexuals in the military. The case supporting 
the Congressional position is well documented and compelling. 
. . . . 
Those that claim that the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy has failed simply do not 
understand the underlying law. The prospect of a homosexual openly serving in 
the military was never contemplated by the Congress and any policy that 
suggests that the military should be receptive to the service of homosexuals is in 
direct violation of the law.429 
c. Conditional Compromise 
In the course of debate, Congress considered whether the armed forces 
should be required to assume the risk that homosexuals would remain celibate. 
The Senate Report addressed the issue directly: 
It would be irrational . . . to develop military personnel policies on the basis that 
all gays and lesbians will remain celibate. . . . [W]hen a person indicates that he 
or she has a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, the armed forces 
are not required to wait until the person engages in that act before taking 
personnel action.430 
The House Report also discussed the possibility of accommodating 
homosexuals, provided that they refrain from homosexual acts: 
[A]ny effort to create as a matter of policy a sanctuary in the military where 
homosexuals could serve discreetly and still be subject to separation for 
proscribed conduct would be a policy inimical to unit cohesion . . . and 
discipline, unenforceable in the field, and open to legal challenge.431 
Instead of codifying the legally questionable “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
concept, Congress chose to adopt unambiguous statements that were 
understandable, enforceable, consistent with the unique requirements of the 
 
 429. Memorandum from Rep. Steve Buyer to Members of the Republican Conference (Dec. 16, 
1999), available at www.cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/buyer121699.pdf. 
 430. S. REP. NO. 103-112, at 284 (1993) (maintaining that it would be “irrational . . . to develop 
military personnel policies on the basis that all gays and lesbians will remain celibate”). 
 431. H.R.REP. NO. 103-200, at 288 (1993). 
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military, and devoid of the First Amendment conundrums that were obvious in 
President Clinton’s July 19 proposal. 
The only concession made during this process in 1993 was ommision of 
“the question” about homosexuality, which President Clinton had eliminated 
with his January 29, 1993, “interim policy.”432 Congress nevertheless authorized 
restoration of routine inquiries about homosexuality by a future Secretary of 
Defense,433 who can (and should) restore “the question” without additional 
legislation. This concession did not nullify the language of the law itself, but it 
allowed the Congress, which was controlled by the Democrats at the time, to give 
political cover to President Clinton by calling the plan a “compromise” and 
referring to it as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” The politically expedient strategy has 
caused problems ever since. 
Widespread misunderstandings about the rationale and meaning of the law 
have continued for four major reasons. First, in 1993, major media inaccurately 
reported that Congress had passed Clinton’s “compromise” plan to accommodate 
homosexuals in the military, known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Reports did not 
note that the statute actually said something quite different: “The prohibition 
against homosexual conduct is a long-standing element of military law that 
continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances of military service.”434 
Second, President Clinton had an interest in appearing to deliver on his campaign 
promise to lift the ban on gays in the military, even though he had not done so. 
Disregarding the legal mandate to provide documents and briefings that “set 
forth” the provisions of the law, in December 1993, Clinton issued 
enforcement regulations that implement his original proposal, “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” even though Congress had rejected that concept as 
unworkable.435 Third, the law passed by Congress is widely misunderstood 
because no one gave it a distinctive and appropriate name. Absent a name of 
its own, the law that Congress passed was frequently misidentified with the 
catchphrase “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which is easier to remember than the 
utilitarian “Public Law 103-160” or “Title 10, United States Code, Section 
654.” And fourth, there was no individual author or descriptive “short title” 
for the legislation because the statutory language came directly from Defense 
Department regulations, which were promulgated in 1981.436 
 
 432. See Memorandum from President Clinton to the Secretary of Defense, supra note 405. 
 433. See supra note 425 and accompanying text. 
 434. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13) (1993). See supra note 425. The New York Times and The Washington Post 
stayed uncharacteristically silent on the historic House vote that occurred on September 28, 1993. A 
thorough search of contemporaneous news accounts reveals only two reports on the House vote for 
Senate-passed legislation codifying long-standing Defense Department regulations banning 
homosexuals from the military. See Michael Ross, House Backs Modified Ban on Gays in Armed Forces, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at A11; Rowan Scarborough, Gay-Ban Deal Nearer to Becoming Law, WASH. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at A4. Neither of these reports quoted key legislative language making it clear 
that the statute does not authorize accommodation of homosexuals in accordance with Clinton’s 
controversial “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” proposal. The only “compromise” involved was 
administrative, not substantive, since the law authorizes a reinstatement of the induction form 
“question” regarding homosexuality at any time. 
 435. See supra note 429. 
 436. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993); S. REP. NO. 103-112, at 263–97 (1993); H.R. REP. NO. 103-200, at 
287–90 (1993). 
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To clarify the difference between the law regarding homosexual conduct 
and President Clinton’s “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” enforcement policy, this 
Article hereinafter will refer to P.L. 103-160, Section 654, Title 10 as the 1993 
law regarding homosexual conduct in the military, or “The Military Personnel 
Eligibility Act of 1993.” 
d. The Purpose of the “Military Personnel Eligibility Act of 1993.” 
Referring to 10 U.S.C. § 654 as the “Military Personnel Eligibility Act of 
1993” is appropriate because the language of the law that Congress actually 
passed makes it clear that homosexuals are not eligible for service in the armed 
forces. It restates the rationale of the 1981 DoD Directives almost word for word,437 
and sets forth fifteen points in support of the principle that homosexuality is 
incompatible with military service.438 
Prof. Woodruff explained the rationale behind the 1981 DoD Directives, 
which was carried over into the statute passed by Congress in 1993: 
The [1981] policy was an exclusion policy premised upon the policy 
determination that “homosexuality is incompatible with military service.” . . . 
The policy operated on the logical conclusion that as a class, homosexuals 
engaged in or were likely to engage in homosexual activity. In order to reduce, if 
not eliminate, the instances of homosexual activity in military units, the policy 
excluded from service the category most closely associated with homosexual 
activity: homosexuals.439 
The law states, “there is no constitutional right to serve in the armed 
forces,” and affirms that military life is fundamentally different from civilian 
life.440 Military society “is characterized by its own laws, rules, customs, and 
traditions, including numerous restrictions on personal behavior that would not 
be acceptable in civilian society.”441 Military standards of conduct “apply to a 
member of the armed forces at all times that the member has a military status, 
whether the member is on base or off base, and whether the member is on duty 
or off duty.”442 
The law also distinguishes itself from the July 19 “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
policy by affirming “[t]he prohibition against homosexual conduct is a long-
standing element of military law that continues to be necessary in the unique 
circumstances of military service.”443 
The 1981 policy required separation of persons found to be engaging in 
homosexual acts, but also those who disclosed by their own statements that they 
were homosexuals within the meaning of the DoD Directives.444 The statute does 
the same.445 Prof. Woodruff explained: 
 
 437. See supra note 404 and accompanying text. 
 438. Woodruff, supra note 400, at 135–42. 
 439. Id. at 132–33 (citation omitted; alteration added). 
 440. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2), (a)(8) (reprinted infra Appendix A). 
 441. Id. § 654(a)(8)(B) (reprinted infra Appendix A). 
 442. Id. § 654(a)(10) (reprinted infra Appendix A). 
 443. Id. § 654(a)(13) (reprinted infra Appendix A) (alteration added). 
 444. See supra note 404 and accompanying text. 
 445. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (reprinted infra Appendix A). 
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The admission of homosexuality placed the soldier in an excluded class; a class 
defined by conduct or the propensity to engage in conduct the military 
determined was inimical to good order, morale, unit cohesion, and ultimately, 
combat effectiveness. Because the definition of homosexual was tied to sexual 
conduct rather than to amorphous concepts of sexual tendencies, preferences, or 
orientation, the policy presumed that one who claimed to be a homosexual has, 
will, or was likely to engage in the conduct that defines the class.446 
As was the case with the 1981 Directives, the 1993 homosexual conduct law 
allows a military person to “rebut the presumption” of homosexual conduct, but 
only under narrow circumstances—i.e., a service member says or does 
something entirely out of character while intoxicated, or to escape military 
service. In general, however: 
Discharging soldiers based solely upon their self-identification as a homosexual 
without additional evidence of homosexual conduct avoided the necessity for 
intrusive investigations and inquiries into the soldiers’ sexual practices. 
Furthermore, because it is reasonable to believe homosexuals will engage in the 
conduct that defines the class, discharging those who claim to be homosexuals 
served the goal of preventing the disruption and adverse impact upon unit 
readiness, morale, and discipline that homosexual conduct within the military 
environment causes.447 
The “Military Personnel Eligibility Act” recognized the need for military 
people to be always ready for possible deployment worldwide to a combat 
environment. The statute also respects the power of sexuality and the desire of 
human beings for sexual modesty, even when they must accept living 
conditions offering little or no privacy. 
In gender-neutral terms, the law states that persons living in conditions of 
“forced intimacy” should not have to expose themselves to persons who might 
be sexually attracted to them.448 To the greatest extent possible, the same 
principle applies to the housing of men and women in the military. 
Prof. Woodruff noted that the statute’s findings reveal several important 
principles that remain unchanged and support the statute’s legitimacy: 
First, Congress was acting pursuant to a clear grant of constitutional power to 
establish the qualifications and conditions of service in the military. Second, 
American society demands unique rules that may not be the same as those 
found in other countries or in civilian society. Third, Congress made clear the 
statutory policy was aimed at creating and preserving military effectiveness and 
cohesion. Noticeably absent from the findings section is any indication that 
military readiness was being balanced against the individual interests of 
homosexuals who wished to serve. In other words, combat effectiveness, not 
accommodation of homosexuals, either individually or as a class, was the 
purpose of the statute. Fourth, Congress set out the factual predicate for the 
long-standing professional military judgment that homosexuality is 
incompatible with military service and carried that principle forward into the 
new law. Both the House and Senate reports specifically note that the statute 
 
 446. Woodruff, supra note 400, at 134. 
 447. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)(A)–(D). 
 448. Id. at § 654(a)(11), (12). 
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recognizes and adopts the principle that homosexuality is incompatible with 
military service.449 
The “Military Personnel Eligibility Act” defines homosexual conduct but 
avoids using the vague phrase “sexual orientation.” As explained by Professor 
Woodruff: 
Significantly, Congress did not say that “sexual orientation” was a private 
matter or that it was a benign, non-disqualifying factor. The law did not define 
“sexual orientation” or try to artificially separate homosexual orientation from 
homosexual conduct. . . . Equally as important, Congress made no mention of 
passing a law to accommodate homosexuals or creating a situation where they 
could serve under color of law like the July 19, [1993,] policy contemplated.450 
It is unfortunate that constant, inaccurate references to the law as “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” have perpetuated confusion about its meaning. As a result of this 
mislabeling, many young people who are homosexual are being misled about 
their eligibility to serve. 
2. Enforcement Regulations Inconsistent with the Law 
a. The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy/Enforcement Regulations 
President Clinton signed the “Military Personnel Eligibility Act” on 
November 30, 1993, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1994.451 Two months later, he released enforcement regulations, known as 
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which are inconsistent with the law.452 It is 
significant to note that the DoD news release announcing regulations to enforce 
10 U.S.C. § 654 made reference to the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy announced 
by President Clinton on July 19, 1993. The release and accompanying documents 
claimed that the enforcement regulations were “consistent” with the law, but 
they were actually written to implement Clinton’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
proposal, which was not “consistent” with the law at all.453 Few members of the 
media noticed (or chose to write about) the glaring discrepancy, which has been 
the source of confusion and controversy ever since.454 
Prof. Charles Moskos, the respected military sociologist who proposed the 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” idea in 1993, noted in a Wall Street Journal article that 
“[t]he Pentagon policies are, in fact, somewhat more lenient than the language of 
the statute.”455 Indeed, the key passage in the Clinton Administration’s 
 
 449. Woodruff, supra note 400, at 153 (citations omitted). 
 450. Id. at. 154–55 (citations omitted; alteration added). 
 451. Pub. L. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (reprinted infra 
Appendix A)). 
 452. See infra note 417 and accompanying text. 
 453. See DoD News Release No. 605-93, supra note 417 (announcing regulations to “implement 
the policy that was announced by President Clinton in July”; claiming that the new directives were 
“fully consistent with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994”). 
 454. Rowan Scarborough, Joint Chiefs Were Muzzled on Gay Policy, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1994, at 
A1. 
 455. Charles Moskos, Don’t Knock “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1999, at A22 
(alteration added). 
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inconsistent interpretation of the law, as stated in this regulatory language, was 
an attempt to redefine its meaning to fit Clinton’s July 19, 1993, proposal: 
“Sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and homosexual 
orientation is not a bar to service entry or continued service unless manifested by 
homosexual conduct.”456 
The December 22, 1993, news release, an overview, and a memorandum 
from Defense Secretary Les Aspin to the Service Secretaries directing them to 
implement the new policy, which referred to “the policy as announced by 
President Clinton on July 19, 1993,”457 simply overlooked the fact that Congress 
had forseen problems with that concept and rejected it. The plain language of 
the statute is not based on the vague phrase “sexual orientation.” It is based on 
conduct.458 
In effect, the DoD attempted to help Clinton deliver on his campaign 
promise to gay activists by simply redefining the law and calling it “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell.” The Pentagon also failed to comply with the legal requirement that 
entering servicemembers should be informed of the law, 10 U.S.C. § 654, which 
excludes homosexuals from the military. A subsequent amendment to the DoD 
Directives changed the wording of the quoted sentence slightly but still used the 
phrase “sexual orientation,” which Congress pointedly had not used in the 
statutory language because it was so vague. The Clinton administration’s 
regulatory interpretation reads: “A person’s sexual orientation is considered a 
personal and private matter, and is not a bar to service entry or continued 
service unless manifested by homosexual conduct in the manner described in 
paragraph B.8.b., below.”459 Current briefing materials and training manuals still 
do not include the actual text of the law, or accurate summaries of its meaning. 
Instead, instructional materials keep repeating the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
mantra: “Sexual orientation is considered a personal matter and is not a bar to 
military service unless manifested by homosexual conduct.”460 
b. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
In 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit looked 
beyond the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” catch-phrase and recognized the difference 
between Clinton’s policy and the law.461 In a nine-to-four decision that denied 
the appeal of Navy Lt. Paul G. Thomasson, a professed homosexual who wanted 
to stay in the Navy, U.S. Circuit Judge Michael Luttig wrote about the exclusion 
law: “Like the pre-1993 [policy] it codifies, [the statute] unambiguously 
 
 456. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, supra note 417, at encl. 3 ¶ E3.A1.1.8.1.1. 
 457. See DoD News Release No. 605-93, supra note 417. 
 458. Woodruff, supra note 400, at 168 n.255. 
 459. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, supra note 417, at encl. 3 ¶ E3.A1.1.8.1.1. 
 460. See, e.g., Center for Military Readiness, Army Comic Book Misrepresents Law on Gays in the 
Military (Jan. 14, 2002), http://www.cmrlink.org/Hmilitary.asp?docID=112 (describing an Army 
comic book titled “Dignity and Respect: A Training Guide on Homosexual Conduct Policy”); Joel P. 
Engardio, The Adventures of Capt. GayMan, S.F. NEWS WEEKLY, Aug. 22, 2001, available at 
http://www.sfweekly.com/2001-08-22/news/the-adventures-of-capt-gayman/print; Office of the 
Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army, Questions and Answers About Army’s Policy on Homosexual Conduct, 
HOT TOPICS, Winter 2000, at 6, available at http://www.army.mil/soldiers/HotTopics/winter00.pdf. 
 461. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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prohibits all known homosexuals from serving in the military . . . .”462 Judge 
Luttig added that the Clinton Administration “fully understands” that the law 
and DoD enforcement regulations are inconsistent and has engaged in “repeated 
mischaracterization of the statute itself . . . .”463 
Actually overruling the DoD enforcement regulations was not within the 
purview of the Court. Still, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Thomasson, affirming 
the constitutionality of the law, should have prodded the Administration to 
correct inconsistencies in its administrative policy. But this was the Clinton 
Administration, which was fully committed to accommodating homosexuals in 
the military, one way or another. 
c. Confusion Caused by “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
The difference between what should be called the “Military Personnel 
Eligibility Act” and the Clinton enforcement policy explains why factions on 
both sides of the issue are critical of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Even though 
Congress rejected, with good reason, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” concept in 
1993, the Clinton Administration inscribed it in enforcement regulations that 
remain in effect today. 
Activists keep complaining that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” does not work. The 
most relevant question is, “work to do what?” If the goal is to allow 
homosexuals to serve, Clinton’s permissive “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” regulations 
do not go far enough. But if the goal is to preserve military morale, discipline, 
and readiness for combat (and it is), then the Clinton policy goes too far—in the 
wrong direction. 
Describing the law as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” effectively slanders the 
statute. The result is widespread confusion and inconsistent enforcement. 
Whether intended or not, the unnecessary confusion gives an advantage to 
activists who want to repeal both the policy and law, in order to achieve the goal 
of open homosexuality in the military. 
When President George W. Bush took his oath of office in 2001, he assumed 
the obligation to enforce all laws, including the 1993 law regarding homosexual 
conduct. President Bush is not obligated to retain the enforcement regulations of 
his predecessor. Because the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” regulations are inconsistent 
with the law, President Bush should have directed the Secretary of Defense, 
early in his administration, to eliminate and replace them with enforcement 
regulations that include the language and truly reflect the intent of the statute. 
The Department of Justice has successfully defended the constitutionality 
of the law in several cases, but the Bush Administration has done little to 
improve understanding and enforcement of the law. Unnecessary confusion has 
continued since December 1994, even though the “Military Personnel Eligibility 
Act of 1993” mandates “Entry Standards and Documents” and “Required 
Briefings” that accurately describe the language and meaning of the statute.464 
 
 462. Id. at 937 (Luttig, J., concurring). 
 463. Id. at 939. 
 464. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (c)–(d) (2000) (reprinted infra Appendix A). 
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That mandate could be fulfilled by simply providing to potential enlistees 
and military personnel the actual text of the law and its legislative history, as set 
forth concisely in the House and Senate Reports issued in support of the 1993 
legislation. This would help to clear up widespread confusion about potential 
enlistees’ eligibility to serve, and be a significant improvement over the 
convoluted instructional materials prepared by the Department of Defense to 
explain Bill Clinton’s inexplicable “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy. Activist 
groups and the Department of Defense should stop misleading young people 
about their eligibility to serve in the military. Practicing homosexuals are among 
many groups of people who may serve their country in many ways but who 
remain ineligible to serve in uniform.465 
3. Campaign to Repeal the Law 
a. Legal Efforts Post-Lawrence v. Texas 
On June 26, 2003, in the controversial Lawrence v. Texas decision,466 the 
Supreme Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick467 and invalidated a Texas law 
regarding private, consensual sodomy.468 The decision excited homosexual 
activist groups because several members of the Court quoted foreign court 
rulings that had been cited in an amicus brief filed by the United Nations’ High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson.469 
The Robinson amicus brief cited one such ruling, handed down by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, which upheld gay 
rights in Ireland. In 1996, the same European Court quoted by Justice Kennedy 
in the Lawrence decision ordered Britain to repeal all restrictions on homosexuals 
in the military.470 In a January 2003 treatise posted on the website of Human 
Rights Watch,471 the $14 million international activist group signaled its intent to 
use both European Court decisions and international law as battering rams to 
bring down all restrictions on open homosexual service in the military.472 
 
 465. Henry Levins, Military Bans Go Far Beyond Gays, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 1993. 
 466. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 467. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 468. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct 
today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is 
overruled.”). 
 469. See id. at 573; Brief of Mary Robinson, Amnesty International U.S.A., Human Rights Watch, 
Interights, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2004) (No. 02-102), 
2003 WL 164151. 
 470. See Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Euro. Ct. H.R. 548, 587 (1999) (finding 
that plaintiffs were wrongly discharged “on the grounds of their homosexuality”); Smith & Grady v. 
United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493, 523 (1999) (finding that the applicants were denied “respect 
for their private lives” when dismissed from military service on the grounds of their homosexuality). 
 471. Human Rights Watch: Defending Human Rights Worldwide, http://www.hrw.org. See also 
Lawrence v. Texas: Constitutional Right to Privacy of Gays and Lesbians in the United States, July 2, 2003, 
available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/07/hrw-amicusbrief.htm. 
 472. See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights News, U.S. Military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
Policy Panders to Prejudice (Jan. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch News Release], available 
at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/01/us012303.htm; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIFORM 
DISCRIMINATION: THE “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” POLICY OF THE U.S. MILITARY 38–45 (Jan. 2003) 
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The Bush Administration vigorously and successfully defended the law, 
resulting in three legal victories in 2006. Cook v. Rumsfeld, filed by the 
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network on behalf of twelve former 
servicemembers, was dismissed by U.S. District Judge George A. O’Toole, Jr., on 
April 24, 2006.473 Also, in April 2006, U.S. District Judge George Schiavelli 
dismissed a lawsuit brought by the Log Cabin Republicans on behalf of 
anonymous past and present servicemembers, due to a lack of names in the 
complaint.474 And on July 26, 2006, U.S. District Judge Ronald B. Leighton 
dismissed a challenge filed in Washington by an Air Force Reserve nurse and 
lesbian, Maj. Margaret Witt.475 
All courts are unpredictable, but the 1993 homosexual conduct law should 
continue to withstand constitutional challenge for four basic reasons: (1) the 
federal courts have historically ruled with “deference to the military” in such 
matters; (2) unlike the circumstances of Lawrence, there is no such thing as 
“privacy” in the military; (3) the validity of the statute regarding homosexual 
conduct does not hinge on the overturned Bowers precedent; and (4) the 1993 
exclusion law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) ban on sodomy 
applies to men and women in precisely the same way, so “equal protection” is 
not a valid issue. 
Opening the military to professed homosexuals remains a key goal of a 
determined activist movement, which has worked relentlessly to repeal the 
homosexual conduct law since 1993. For purposes of clarity in future cases, it 
would help to administratively repeal the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” regulations, 
while faithfully enforcing the 1993 homosexual conduct law.476 
 
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: UNIFORM DISCRIMINATION], available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/2003/usa0103/USA0103.pdf. 
 473. See 429 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Mass. 2006) (granting government’s motion to dismiss), reh’g 
denied, 2006 WL 2559766, No. 04-12546-GAO, slip op. at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2006), appeal argued sub 
nom., Cook v. Gates, No. 06-2313 (1st Cir. argued Mar. 7, 2007). See also Denise LaVoie, Judge Tosses 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Suit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 12, 2006, available at http://abcnews.go.com/ 
US/print?id=1885164; Shelly Murphy, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Suit Dismissed, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 
2006, at B1; Associated Press, Gay Veterans Challenge “Don’t Ask,” AIR FORCE TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, 
available at http://www.airforcetimes.com/print.php?f=1-292925-2356305.php. 
 474. Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. 04-08425 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2006) (dismissing 
complaint for lack of standing), refiled sub nom, Nicholson v. United States, No. 04-08425 (C.D. Cal. 
May 2, 2006). See also Bob Egelko, Suit Challenging “Don’t Ask” Dismissed for Lack of Names, S.F. 
CHRON., Apr. 5, 2006, at B2. 
 475. Witt v. U.S. Air Force, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Wash. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-35644 
(9th Cir.). See also Gene Johnson, Associated Press, ACLU Plans to Appeal Ruling on 19-Year AF 
Veteran, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (online ed.), July 27, 2006, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/ 
local/278980_suit27.html. 
 476. In Able v. United States, U.S. District Judge Eugene H. Nickerson struck down both the law 
and the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy because Justice Department lawyers failed to justify 
numerous anomalies in the policy/enforcement regulations. See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 
850, 858–61 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998). For example, the lawyers could not 
explain why the military could say that a certain characteristic (homosexuality) is unacceptable, but 
persons may join or stay in the military as long as they do not say they are homosexual. See 968 F. 
Supp at 858–61. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals later upheld the law, see 155 F.3d at 628, but 
such an outcome is by no means assured in the future. To reduce that risk, the Clinton 
Administration’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” regulations, announced on December 22, 1993, should be 
administratively dropped. 
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b. Legislative Strategy 
Rep. Marty Meehan (D-Mass.), whose amendment to strike the law 
regarding homosexual conduct was defeated overwhelmingly in 1993,477 
introduced legislation to repeal the statute in March 2005478 and again in March 
2007.479 When first introduced, the bill gained a total of 122 co-sponsors, but did 
not make it past the House Armed Services Committee.480 Meehan is now 
Chairman of the House Armed Services Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee. The number of co-sponsors has increased on Meehan’s bill, but 
many of the members signing on seem primarily critical of “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell,” the Clinton administration’s policy and regulations that are inconsistent 
with the 1993 law.481 
There is no need for legislation to repeal the problematic enforcement 
regulations known by the catch-phrase “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” President Bush 
or the Secretary of Defense can eliminate that Clinton-era policy with a stroke of 
the pen. The statute is another matter, requiring an act of Congress to change the 
“Military Personnel Eligibility Act” that a Democratic Congress passed in 1993 
with a veto-proof majority. Nothing has changed that would justify the turmoil 
that would occur in and outside of Congress if Meehan’s legislation were 
seriously considered or passed. 
c. Public Relations Campaign 
The only thing that has changed since 1993 is an illusion of momentum for 
repeal of the law created by a skilled and persistent public relations campaign 
that began in 2003, the tenth anniversary of passage of the law. The campaign 
was energized by the Supreme Court’s decision in the Lawrence v. Texas,482 which 
the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network predicted would help them to win 
the Cook case.483 
Every four to six weeks, homosexual activist groups have generated some 
sort of “news” event, which usually gets national coverage when it appears 
(almost always) in the Associated Press and major papers such as the New York 
Times and the Washington Post. These stories, which rarely describe the law 
accurately, usually focus on “celebrity” (military) endorsers or human-interest 
stories, such as homosexuals who used to be in the military or gay students 
trying to enlist in the military.484 Other student groups have protested the 
 
 477. H. amend. 316 to H.R. 2401, 103d Cong. (1993) (voting record available at 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1993/roll460.xml). 
 478. See H.R. 1059, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 2, 2005). See also Deborah Funk, Lawmaker Pitches 
Bill to Let Gays Openly Serve, AIR FORCE TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005. 
 479. H.R. 1246, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 28, 2007). See also Ted McKenna, “Don’t Ask Don’t 
Tell” Repeal Faces Long Odds, PR WEEK USA, Mar. 2, 2007, at 2. 
 480. H.R. 1059, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 2, 2005) (co-sponsors and status available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.01059:). 
 481. See McKenna, supra note 479. 
 482. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 483. See Human Rights Watch News Release, supra note 471. 
 484. See, e.g., Joseph A. Slobodzian, Walk-In Test Confirms Military’s Gay Ban, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
Aug. 2, 2006, available at http://calbears.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_kmtpi/is_200608/ 
ai_n16603720. The “Right to Serve” campaign of Soulforce, located in Lynchburg, Virginia, has 
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homosexual conduct law by trying to keep recruiters or ROTC units off of high 
school and college campuses—sometimes with anti-military demonstrations.485 
Activist groups also have visited the military service academies486 and 
publicized an award given by the U.S. Military Academy’s Department of 
English to a cadet writing a paper advocating the inclusion of gays in the 
military.487 In 2004 and 2005, a San Francisco-based group of Naval Academy 
graduates calling itself “USNA Out” (later changed to the “Castro Chapter”) 
unsuccessfully demanded official recognition for a group of homosexual 
alumni.488 
The public relations campaign has been advanced most often by periodic 
releases of various “studies,” reports, or polls produced, sponsored, or 
influenced by the University of California, Berkeley-based Center for the Study 
of Sexual Minorities in the Military (CSSMM), now called the Michael D. Palmer 
Center, and like-minded groups.489 A closer look at materials produced by the 
activist groups usually reveals questionable methodology and unsupported 
conclusions. 
d. Surveys and Polls 
In January 2007, retired Army Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997, became a “celebrity endorser” for the 
 
organized visits to recruiting stations by homosexual men or women who say they want to enlist. See 
Soulforce, Right to Serve, http://www.soulforce.org/righttoserve (last visited Apr. 14, 2007). 
Camera crews and reporters are invited to witness the contrived events, which consume the time of 
recruiters and usually portray them in a negative light. 
 485. See Joe Chenelly, Frontline, Recruiters Stay Away: Protest Prompts Office Closing, ARMY TIMES, 
May 30, 2005, at 3; Campus Antiwar Network, Open Letter from to SFSU President Corrigan (Apr. 
19, 2006), http://www.traprockpeace.org/campus_antiwar_network/index.php/2006/04/ (“On 
Friday, April 14, [2006,] ten SFSU students protested military recruitment at the university’s career 
fair. . . . You should be proud of students who will not condone hate against their peers by a 
homophobic and sexist military.” (alteration added)). 
 486. See Gay Riders to Challenge “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” at West Point, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 26, 
2006; Kristen Wyatt, Protesters Object to Naval Academy Policy on Gays, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 21, 
2005. 
 487. Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, West Pointer Wins First-Ever 
Military Award for Challenging Gay Ban (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/ 
PressCenter/press_rel_2006_0808.htm; Thesis Challenges Gay Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 9, 2006; 
Roger Brigham, West Point Grad Takes Aim at DADT, BAY AREA REPORTER (S.F.) (online ed.), Aug. 24, 
2006, http://ebar.com/news/article.php?sec=news&article=1108. The Center for Military Readiness 
raised questions about the suitability of this award. Then-Cadet Raggio had every right to express 
his opinions, but the paper was thinly sourced and did not even cite or accurately describe the text of 
the 1993 law. See CMR Issues Analysis (Oct. 2006), available at http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/ 
analysisraggiothesis.pdf. 
 488. See Gretchen Parker, Gay Academy Alums to Apply Again for Official Recognition, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Nov. 12, 2004; Molly Knight, OK For Gay Group Sought: Naval Academy Alumni Resume Efforts 
for Chapter, BALT. SUN, Nov. 12, 2004, at 1B; Jamie Stiehm, Gay Academy Alumni Seek Anti-Bias Policy: 
Graduate Association Board Insists No Such Action Is Needed, BALT. SUN, Nov. 29, 2005, at 5B; see also 
Gretchen Parker, Naval Alumni Association Rejects Gay Group, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2, 2004. 
Recognition was not granted because affiliate groups are organized geographically, not by 
affiliations of gender, race, service community, or other factors. An affiliated chapter for alumni who 
live in recreational vehicles is the exception that proves the rule. 
 489. See infra notes 510–512 and accompanying text. 
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gays-in-the-military cause by writing an op-ed for publication in The New York 
Times, a newspaper that has been in the forefront of efforts to repeal the 1993 
homosexual conduct law.490 The General’s article drew attention to a December 
2006 poll of 545 service members conducted by Zogby International, indicating 
that seventy-three percent of the respondents said they were “comfortable 
interacting with gay people.”491 
The only surprising thing about this innocuous question was that the 
favorable percentage was not closer to one hundred percent. The Zogby poll 
asked another, more important question that was not even mentioned in the 
news release announcing the poll’s results: “Do you agree or disagree with 
allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military?” On that question, 
twenty-six percent of those surveyed “Agreed,” but thirty-seven percent 
“Disagreed.” The Zogby poll also found that thirty-two percent of respondents 
were “Neutral” and only five percent were “Not sure.”492 
If this poll were considered representative of military personnel, the 
twenty-six percent of respondents who wanted the law repealed could not 
compete with the combined sixty-nine percent of people who were opposed to 
or neutral on repeal. This minority opinion was hardly a mandate for radical 
change. 
Polling organizations recognize that respondents who believe a policy is 
already in place are more likely to favor that policy, while those who know 
otherwise are less likely.493 Incorrect assertions that “homosexuals can serve in 
the military provided that they do not say they are gay” are probably skewing 
polls of civilians, who mistakenly believe that homosexuals are already eligible 
to serve, due to the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. 
People in the military, however, are more likely to understand what the 
law is.494 In the most recent poll announced by the Military Times newspapers, in 
 
 490. John M. Shalikashvili, Op-Ed, Second Thoughts on Gays in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 
2007, at 17. 
 491. ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL, OPINIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ON GAYS IN THE MILITARY, DEC. 
2006, SUBMITTED TO AARON BELKIN, DIRECTOR, MICHAEL D. PALM CENTER [hereinafter ZOGBY POLL], 
available at http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1222. 
 492. See id. at 14–15. Responses to this question revealed additional findings that received little 
notice: 
Within military subgroups, the highest agreement rates [supporting gays in the military] 
were found among Veterans (thirty-five percent) and those having served less than four 
years (thirty-seven percent). The lowest acceptance rates were among Active Duty 
Personnel (twenty-three percent), officers (twenty-three percent), those serving between 
ten and fourteen years (twenty-two percent) and those serving more than twenty 
(nineteen percent). Active Duty Personnel were also among those with the highest 
disapproval rates (thirty-nine percent), as were those serving between fifteen and nineteen 
years (forty percent), those serving more than twenty (forty-nine percent), and officers 
(forty-seven percent). 
Id. at 6 (alteration added). 
 493. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-135 (Commissioner Generated Finding 
14) (citing ROPER ORGANIZATION, INC., ATTITUDES REGARDING THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE 
ARMED FORCES: THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE (Sept. 1992)). 
 494. See Robert Hodierne, We Asked What You Think. You Told Us, NAVY TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005, at 14–
15 (citing the section on Race, Gender, Gay, Question 6), available at http://www.militarycity.com/ 
polls/2004_chart3.php. Annual Military Times surveys are done by mailing questionnaires randomly 
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response to the question “Do you think openly homosexual people should be 
allowed to serve in the military?” thirty percent answered “Yes,” but fifty-nine 
percent answered “No,” and ten percent answered “No Opinion.”495 The same 
percentage—fifty-nine percent in opposition—was reported by the Military 
Times survey in the previous year.496 
A closer look at the Zogby poll reveals more interesting details that should 
have been recognized by news media people reporting on it.497 First, the Zogby 
poll news release clearly states that it was designed in conjunction with Aaron 
Belkin, Director of the Michael D. Palm Center, formerly the Center for Sexual 
Minorities in the Military.498 This is an activist group promoting homosexuals in 
the military.499 Second, the poll claims to be of 545 people “who have served in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (or in combat support roles directly supporting those 
operations), from a purchased list of U.S. Military Personnel.”500 However, the 
U.S. military does not sell or provide access to personnel lists. Due to security 
rules that were tightened in the aftermath of 9/11, personal details and even 
general information about the location of individual personnel is highly 
restricted.501 Third, the apparent absence of random access undermines the 
credibility of the poll, which inflates the claim that, “The panel used for this 
survey is composed of over 1 million members and correlates closely with the 
U.S. population on all key profiles.”502 Fourth, activists frequently claim that the 
 
to subscribers to the affiliated newspapers Air Force Times, Army Times, Navy Times, and Marine Corps 
Times. The polls tabulate only responses from active-duty personnel. Results are published in all four 
affiliated newspapers. 
 495. See Robert Hodierne, Down on the War, ARMY TIMES, Dec. 29, 2006, at 12–14. The Military 
Times survey was done by mailing questionnaires randomly to subscribers of affiliated newspapers, 
but the poll only tabulated responses (954) from active-duty personnel. Results were published in all 
four affiliated newspapers. 
 496. See id. (presenting bar graphs of polling results). 
 497. See ZOGBY POLL, supra note 491. 
 498. See id. The cover page and news release were titled “Zogby Poll: ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Not 
Working.” 
 499. See The Michael D. Palm Center, About Us, http://www.palmcenter.org/about (last visited 
May 10, 2007). 
 500. See ZOGBY POLL, supra note 491, at 2. 
 501. Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to Secretaries of the 
Military Departments et al. (Oct. 18, 2001) (addressing “Operations Security Throughout the 
Department of Defense”) (on file with author); Memorandum from Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Administration and Management Director D.O. Cooke to DoD FOIA Offices (Nov. 9, 2001) 
(addressing “Withholding of Personally Identifying Information Under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA)”) (on file with author). Zogby International did not respond to a telephone request from 
this author for more information on its selection of survey participants. 
 502. See ZOGBY POLL, supra note 491, at 2. Zogby’s polling sample is somewhat questionable, but 
“internal” data in the poll reveals interesting insights on the question of whether opinions among 
younger people might make it more acceptable to accommodate gays in the military. The Zogby poll 
seems to indicate that opinions on this issue have more to do with military occupation than they do 
with age. Active duty people in the younger and older ranks are more favorable to the idea, but the 
ones in the middle age and experience group, who are more likely to be involved in close combat 
situations, are more strongly opposed. It is possible that an objective poll of identified military 
personnel similar to the official survey done by the Roper Organization for the 1992 Presidential 
Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces would show similar results. See 
ZOGBY POLL, supra note 491, at 14–15; see also supra note 492. 
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greater comfort of younger people with homosexuals is evidence enough to 
justify changing the law; however, if that were the case, all referenda banning 
same-sex marriage would have been soundly defeated. On the contrary, the 
voters of several states have approved twenty-six of twenty-seven such 
referenda, often with comfortable majorities.503 
e. The National Security Argument: Too Many Discharges of Homosexuals 
Supporters of legislation to repeal the 1993 homosexual conduct law have 
tried to reframe their argument in terms of military necessity, rather than equal 
opportunity. The “national security” argument for gays in the military usually 
centers on the number of discharges of homosexual servicemen and women that 
have occurred and suggests that recruiting problems and shortages could be 
solved if only the military were open to professed homosexuals.504 
A report done by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) early in 
2005 provided statistical data on the number of “unprogrammed separations.”505 
The GAO report essentially estimated the “replacement costs” of discharging 
and replacing homosexual service members from FY 1994 through FY 2003 to be 
approximately $190.5 million.506 
Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
responded to the GAO report with a two-page memorandum.507 Figures cited by 
Dr. Chu indicated that discharges due to the homosexual exclusion policy 
between 1994 and 2003 amounted to only 0.37% of discharges for all reasons 
(about five percent of unplanned separations) during that period.508 There were, 
for example, 26,446 discharges for pregnancy; 36,513 for violations of weight 
standards; 38,178 for “serious offenses;” 20,527 for parenthood, 59,098 for “drug 
offenses/use”; and 9501 for homosexuality.509 
The Berkeley based Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the 
Military (CSSMM) was not satisfied with the $190 million dollar estimate. 
 
 503. See Human Rights Campaign, State Prohibitions on Marriage for Same Sex Couples 1 (Nov. 
2006), http://www.hrc.org/TemplateRedirect.cfm?Template=/ContentManagement/Content 
Display.cfm&ContentID=28225 (listing twenty-six states that have a voter-approved constitutional 
amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage and nineteen states that have a law prohibiting same-sex 
marriage). To date, Arizona is the only state in which voters have repudiated an attempt to amend a 
state constitution to ban same-sex civil marriage. See CNN.com, America Votes 2006, Key Ballot 
Measures, http://www.cnn.com/ ELECTION/2006/pages/results/ballot.measures/ (reporting on 
the failure of Arizona Proposition 107 on November 7, 2006). 
 504. John Henren, Ban on Gays in Military Assailed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, at A24; Josh White, 
“Don’t Ask” Costs More Than Expected, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at A04; John Files, Military’s 
Discharges for Being Gay Rose in ’05, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at A17. 
 505. See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: FINANCIAL COSTS AND 
LOSS OF CRITICAL SKILLS DUE TO DOD’S HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY CANNOT BE COMPLETELY 
ESTIMATED (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter GAO, FINANCIAL COSTS CANNOT BE ESTIMATED], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05299.pdf. 
 506. Id. at 3. 
 507. Memorandum from Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness, 
to Derek Stewart, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management at the GAO (Feb. 7, 2005), 
reprinted in GAO, FINANCIAL COSTS CANNOT BE ESTIMATED, supra note 505, at 42–43. 
 508. Chu, supra note 507. 
 509. GAO, FINANCIAL COSTS CANNOT BE ESTIMATED, supra note 505, at 42. 
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CSSMM Executive Director Aaron Belkin organized a “Blue Ribbon 
Commission,” which he chairs.510 This non-governmental “Blue Ribbon 
Commission” claimed in a February 2006 report that the GAO estimate of 
“replacement costs” was too low.511 The CSSMM argued that a more accurate 
estimate of the costs of discharges for homosexuality would be $363 
million approximately $173.3 million, or ninety-one percent higher, than the 
GAO estimate.512 
The Comptroller General responded by addressing a letter to Sen. Edward 
Kennedy (D-Mass.) on July 13, 2006, which “stood by” the original GAO 
estimate.513 The entire debate about numbers generated publicity, but it missed 
the point. The cost of personnel losses related to the homosexual conduct law, 
whatever it is, could be reduced to near-zero if all potential recruits were fully 
and accurately notified that the 1993 law means that homosexuals are not 
eligible to serve. It is bad policy to enforce a regulatory policy such as “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell,” which misinforms potential recruits about the conditions of 
eligibility and encourages people to be less than honest about their 
homosexuality—only to be subject to discharge later. 
The GAO document provided useful information, but you do not get the 
right answers if you do not ask the right questions. The issue is not 
“replacement cost.” It is the cost of recruiting and training individuals who are 
not eligible to serve in the military because they are homosexual. 
f. Contradiction: Too Few Discharges Due to the War 
Many of the same people who claim that the military is losing too many 
homosexual personnel simultaneously make a contradictory claim: Dismissals 
have declined because gays are needed to fight in the war.514 A Congressional 
Research Service Report to Congress discussed this argument: 
Some have claimed that discharges decline during time of war, suggesting that 
the military ignores homosexuality when soldiers are most needed, only to “kick 
them out” once the crisis has passed. It is notable that during wartime, the 
military services can, and have, instituted actions “to suspend certain laws 
relating to . . . separation” that can limit administrative discharges. These 
actions, know [sic] as “stop-loss,” allow the services to minimize the disruptive 
effects of personnel turnover during a crisis. However, administrative 
discharges for homosexual conduct are not affected by stop-loss. It can be 
 
 510. FRANK J. BARRETT ET AL., THE PALM CENTER, FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T 
TELL”: HOW MUCH DOES THE GAY BAN COST?, at 1, 3 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.palmcenter. 
org/files/active/0/2006-FebBlueRibbonFinalRpt.pdf. In addition to Prof. Belkin, this non-
governmentally authorized, private group includes Lawrence Korb, Adm. John D. Hutson, USN 
(Ret.), and other activists supporting repeal of the law regarding homosexual conduct in the 
military. The report also acknowledges receiving help from the offices of Rep. Marty Meehan (D-
Mass.) and Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.), sponsors of legislation to repeal the 1993 law. 
 511. Id. at 2. 
 512. Id. at 3. 
 513. Letter from David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, to Sen. Edward 
Kennedy (July 13, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/htext/d06909r.html. 
 514. Associated Press, “Don’t Ask” Dismissals Drop in Wartime, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2004, at A22; 
Evelyn Nieves & Ann Scott Tyson, Fewer Gays Being Discharged Since 9/11, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2005, 
at A01. 
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speculated that a claim of homosexuality during a crisis may be viewed 
skeptically and under the policy would require an investigation. . . . [but if] such 
a claim were found to be in violation of the law on homosexual conduct, the 
services could not use “stop-loss” to delay an administrative discharge.515 
Two news releases from the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the 
Military in September 2005 claimed to have evidence that homosexual service 
members were being retained to serve the needs of war, despite the homosexual 
conduct law.516 But a spokesman at the Forces Command Army base at Fort 
McPherson, Georgia, where this evidence allegedly was found, has countered 
that argument with a clarification. According to the spokesman, if a soldier 
declares himself to be homosexual just prior to a deployment, an investigation 
ensues, lasting eight to ten weeks, which may not be completed prior to 
deployment. If the investigation does find that a person is homosexual and 
therefore not eligible to serve, an honorable discharge is ordered, even if the 
person is deployed.517 
Anecdotes about homosexuals being allowed to remain in the military 
demonstrate the need for accurate information on what the “Military Personnel 
Eligibility Act” actually says. Commanders who do not understand or enforce 
the law should be given accurate information and support when taking steps to 
comply with it. Officials who choose to disregard this law should be held 
accountable in the same way that they would be for other failures to comply 
with duly enacted law. 
g. Linguists and the Defense Language Institute 
The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy/regulations have caused widespread 
confusion and costly errors, such as the admittance of twelve homosexual 
language trainees to the Army’s Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, 
 
 515. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HOMOSEXUALS AND U.S. MILITARY POLICY: CURRENT 
ISSUES 9–10 (May 27, 2005) (citations omitted; alteration added), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/natsec/RL30113.pdf. 
 516. The Michael D. Palm Center, Researchers Locate Army Document Ordering Commanders 
Not to Fire Gays (Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/ 
researchers_locate_army_document_ordering_commanders_not_to_fire_gays; The Michael D. Palm 
Center, Pentagon Acknowledges Sending Openly Gay Service Members to War (Sept. 23, 2005), 
available at http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/pentagon_acknowledges_sending_ 
openly_gay_service_members_to_war_acknowledgement_follows_discovery_of_regulat. 
 517. E-mail correspondence from Major Nate Flegler, Chief, Media Division, FORSCOM Public 
Affairs, to author (Nov. 15, 2005) (on file with author). 
When a Guard or Reserve unit is mobilized to active duty, Forces Command Regulation 
500-3-3 . . . identifies 35 different criteria that may prevent a Soldier from deploying with 
his or her unit. Examples include being overweight, facing criminal prosecution, or 
medical problems. . . . Should a Soldier declare him or herself homosexual, a process 
defined not by FORMDEPS but by other regulations is begun to determine the veracity of 
the assertion and whether the assertion constitutes grounds to discharge the Soldier from 
military service. This process can last eight to ten weeks. . . . While our spokesman may 
have been accurately quoted as saying, “they still have to go to war and the homosexual 
issue is postponed until they return to the U.S. and the unit is demobilized,” we wish to 
clarify that the Soldier’s case is not postponed until the unit returns. The review process 
continues while the unit is deployed and there is no delay in resolving the matter or 
discharging the Soldier if that is the resolution. 
Id. 
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California. Two of the students were found in bed together, and the others 
voluntarily admitted their homosexuality.518 
All were honorably discharged.519 Gay activist groups decried the 
dismissals as a loss for national security. The true loss occurred, however, when 
twelve students who were not eligible to serve occupied the spaces of other 
language trainees who could be participating in the current war. This wasted 
time and money was a direct result of President Clinton’s calculated action to 
accommodate homosexuals in the military, despite prohibitions in the law. 
Military specialty schools such as the DLI should not be misusing scarce 
resources to train linguists who are not eligible to serve in the military. The 
problem here is not the 1993 homosexual conduct law, but “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell,” a set of inconsistent enforcement regulations that ought to be 
administratively eliminated.520 
h. Alleged Shortages in Critical Specialties 
In July 1994, the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military 
(CSSMM) claimed the military was discharging valuable personnel in important 
military specialties. These included, for example, “49 nuclear, biological, and 
chemical warfare specialists; 212 medical-care workers; 90 nuclear power 
engineers; 52 missile guidance and control operators; 10 rocket, missile and 
other artillery specialists; 340 infantrymen; 88 linguists; and 163 law-
enforcement specialists.”521 The story was based on data that the CSSMM 
obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) by means of a 
Freedom of Information Request.522 
A closer look at the same data, obtained from the DMDC, reveals several 
disparities with those quoted in the “study” released by the CSSMM. For 
example, according to the official who provided the same DMDC data to this 
author, the category of persons in the “nuclear power” field does not necessarily 
mean that all the people in question were “nuclear power engineers.”523 As for 
 
 518. See Nathaniel Frank, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” v. the War on Terrorism, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 18, 
2002, at 18; Op-Ed, Alistair Gamble, A Military at War Needs Its Gay Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 
2002. 
 519. See Frank, supra note 518. 
 520. On December 11, 2002, the Center for Military Readiness filed a formal Request for 
Assistance with the Army Inspector General, asking for an investigation of this waste of educational 
resources by authorities at DLI. No response was received. A subsequent Freedom of Information 
(FOIA) request, which did not ask for individual information, was addressed in a letter to the DoD 
Inspector General on November 17, 2003. The FOIA request was initially denied and later 
“answered” with largely blank pages marked with FOIA exemption code “(b)(7)(c).” That code is 
used when government officials refuse to confirm or deny that disciplinary proceedings have taken 
place. 
 521. Vince Crawley, Hundreds of Discharged Gays Served in Critical Specialties, AIR FORCE TIMES, 
June 12, 2004, available at http://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/ 
iw.newsbank.com:AFNB:AFTB&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=103F530765572C3
E&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggregated4&req_dat=0F56A02D68496F45 See also Kim Curtis, Report: Number 
of Gay Linguists Discharged Higher than Thought, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 13, 2005. 
 522. Defense Manpower Data Center, tables titled “Separations Due to Homosexual Conduct, FY 
1998–2003,” and “Duty Base Facility Identifier, (FY 1998–2003)” (on file with author). 
 523. See id. 
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the eighty-eight discharged linguists, the list of “Primary DoD Occupation 
Code” titles includes, at number 241, “Language interrogation,” an occupation 
from which a total of fifteen persons were separated due to homosexuality. But 
that is seventy-three persons short of the number of discharged “linguists” cited. 
How to account for the discrepancy? A Duty Base Facility Identifier Table, also 
provided by the DMDC, indicates that a total of seventy-three persons were 
separated from the Presidio of Monterey, where the Defense Language Institute 
is located.524 It is not clear how the CSSMM came up with the the claim that 
“eighty-eight linguists” were discharged due to the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
policy. Fifteen plus seventy-three, coincidentally, equals eighty-eight. There is 
no “linguist” category listed among the DMDC categories of occupations.525 
Another round of news reports and hand-wringing commentaries centered 
on the loss of “fifty-four Arabic linguists” trained for military service.526 This 
number is in a column of personnel losses noted by the General Accountability 
Office (GAO) in 2005.527 The referenced number is broken down, however, by 
type and level of proficiency of the language trainees, which varied 
considerably. Again, the number of language trainees lost after any time in 
training could be reduced to near zero if the “Military Personnel Eligibility Act” 
were accurately explained and enforced by the Department of Defense. 
i. The Urban Institute 
In September 2004, the Urban Institute, a nonpartisan social policy and 
research organization, issued a report estimating that approximately 65,000 gay 
personnel are now serving in the U.S. military, and another one million gays 
and lesbians are veterans.528 Activists frequently cite this report when advocating 
repeal of the 1993 homosexual conduct law529—sometimes touting the data as if 
it is brand new and “solid.”530 
The document, however, reveals questionable methodology, based on 
presumptions about the percentage of homosexuals in the general population 
 
 524. See id. 
 525. Id. 
 526. See, e.g., Mackubin Thomas Owens, Ask, Tell, Whatever?: Gays-in-the-Military Comes Up Again, 
NAT’L REV., Apr. 16, 2007; Debra Saunders, Don’t Ask,Don’t Tell for the Devout, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2007, at A13. 
 527. GAO, FINANCIAL COSTS CANNOT BE ESTIMATED, supra note 505, at 21. 
 528. GARY J. GATES, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, GAY MEN AND LESBIANS IN THE U.S. MILITARY: 
ESTIMATES FROM CENSUS 2000, at iii (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 
411069_GayLesbianMilitary.pdf. 
 529. See Joanne Kimberlin, Study Finds 65,000 Gay Men, Women in the Military, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 
Oct. 21, 2004, at A10; Denise M. Bonilla, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: A Policy Under Fire, NEWSDAY, Aug. 6, 
2006, at G05. 
 530. See Deb Price, UCLA Researcher Mines Data to Make Gays Visible, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 2, 2007, 
at 13A. In this article, self-identified gay columnist Deb Price praises Gary J. Gates, now affiliated 
with the progressive Williams Institute at the University of California at Los Angeles, for producing 
“solid numbers” that will help persuade Congress to lift the ban on homosexuals in the military. The 
public relations strategy at work here may be a reflection of what is known about surveys of public 
opinion. People are more likely to favor a policy if they think it is already in place. See supra note 493. 
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and about the sexuality of persons interviewed by the census.531 The speculative 
claim that three percent of women and four percent of men are homosexual was 
applied to 2000 census data on the number of persons of the same sex living in 
the same household—one of whom is a “veteran.”532 Citing mathematical 
computations, the study speculated that household-mates of the same sex are 
homosexual.533 Next came the leaping conclusion that sixty-five thousand gay 
men and lesbians are serving or used to be in the military. This number is 
frequently trumpeted by gay activists and like-minded journalists, who 
overlook or fail to mention the fact that the census does not ask questions about 
sexual orientation or behavior. All estimates are based on sheer speculation, 
dressed up with a public relations spin. 
The Urban Institute report, which was prepared in consultation with the 
activist Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military and the 
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, is more like an urban legend than a 
serious piece of scholarship. 
j. Harassment of Homosexuals 
Contrary to exaggerated claims by activist groups, more than eighty 
percent of homosexual service members discharged since the law was enacted 
left the service not because of witch hunts rooting them out but because of 
voluntary statements admitting homosexuality. According to a 1998 DoD Task 
Force report, there were only four cases of anti-homosexual harassment reported 
since 1994.534 Two of those cases involved anonymous letters that could not be 
traced.535 
In 1999, homosexual activists crafted a polemic campaign that focused on 
the brutal murder of Army Pfc. Barry Winchell, an alleged homosexual, at Fort 
Campbell, Kentucky, in July of that year.536 The savage killing of Pfc. Barry 
Winchell has been cited as evidence that more must be done to end “hate 
crimes” and harassment of homosexuals.537 
 
 531. GAO, FINANCIAL COSTS CANNOT BE ESTIMATED, supra note 505, at 1–4. The report, which 
includes many caveats, concedes that “the census does not ask any questions about sexual 
orientation, sexual behavior, or sexual attraction (three common ways used to identify gay men and 
lesbians in surveys).” Id. at 1. 
 532. Id. at 3. 
 533. Id. at 1–4. 
 534. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS, REPORT TO 
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE DEPARTMENT’S POLICY ON HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT IN THE MILITARY 6 (Apr. 1998) [hereinafter 
DOD TASK FORCE REPORT 1998, available at http://dont.stanford.edu/casestudy/appendixG_ 
short.pdf; Dep’t of Defense News Release, No. 158-98 (Apr. 7, 1998). 
 535. DOD TASK FORCE REPORT 1998, supra note 534. 
 536. Jane McHugh, Murder in the Barracks, ARMY TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at 12; Jane McHugh, 
Second Soldier Implicated in Possible Hate Crime, ARMY TIMES, Aug. 2, 1999, at 8. 
 537. See Dep’t of Defense News Release No. 432-00, Department of Defense Issues Anti-
Harassment Guidelines (July 21, 2000); Tom Ricks, Pentagon Vows to Enforce “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 
WASH. POST, July 22, 2000, at 1A (quoting Carol Battiste, head of a Pentagon panel set up to review 
the seven year-old “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy in 2000). Battiste said that military leaders face a 
“dilemma” when they try to counter discrimination against homosexuals, who cannot identify 
themselves. Id. Ricks added, “One reason the military establishment continues to be uncomfortable 
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The confessed killer, Pvt. Calvin Glover, assaulted Winchell in the barracks 
with a baseball bat on July 4, 1999, several hours after Winchell had beaten him 
in a drunken brawl.538 Evidence of Glover’s hostile attitude toward Winchell, 
who was involved with a transgender male nightclub entertainer who appeared 
to be a woman, was a factor in his trial and sentencing to life in prison.539 An 
Army Inspector General investigation cleared Fort Campbell commanders, but 
noted poor morale and a tolerance of underage drinking and anti-gay language 
by the senior sergeant in the battalion. The report also noted the reluctance of 
battalion commanders to ask questions about matters involving alleged 
homosexuality.540 Military discipline requires constant awareness of what is 
happening in military units, throughout the chain of command. A policy such as 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” that discourages the asking of legitimate questions 
interferes with sound leadership. In this tragic case, a failure to ask questions 
apparently was a factor in the creation of a volatile situation that exploded with 
violence. Perpetrators of this crime have been rightly punished, but there is no 
need for additional legislation to stop harassment or murderous assaults—of 
anyone—in the barracks. 
Some recent cases of harassment involving persons of the same sex deserve 
closer scrutiny and objective analysis of whether the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
policy created conditions conducive to abuse. For example, the Associated Press 
reported that a drill sergeant at Fort Eustis, Virginia, faced molestation charges 
for forcing a trainee to dress as Superman and submit to sexual acts. A Fort 
Eustis spokeswoman, Karla Gonzalez, confirmed that Army Staff Sgt. Edmundo 
F. Estrada, thirty-five-years-old, was accused of indecent assault, having an 
inappropriate relationship with a trainee, and cruelty and maltreatment of 
subordinates.541 
 
with ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ is that it is a policy that is purposely ambiguous, while military culture 
tends to value clarity.” Id. Actually, a policy that encourages deception is not workable in any 
institution. This is one of the reasons why members of Congress did not vote for the proposal known 
as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Instead of wringing their hands about “ambiguity” and “dilemmas,” 
Pentagon officials should scrap the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” regulations and issue informational 
materials that reflect the clarity of the law. 
 538. Id. 
 539. See David France, An Inconvenient Woman, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 28, 2000, available at 
http://www1.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/index.html; Brian Dunn, Private Confessed to 
“Gay Bash” Slaying, Inmate Says, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 13, 1999, at 16. 
 540. Jane McHugh, 1st Sgt. Faulted in report on Gay Beating Death, ARMY TIMES, July 31, 2000, at 8. 
This article reported on the Army Inspector General’s Investigation of the July 1999 beating death of 
Army Pfc. Barry Winchell. The report found that the command environment at Fort Campbell, 
Kentucky, was generally positive, but the unit in which the killing occurred suffered from poor 
morale and a tolerance for underage drinking—a major factor in the case. According to The Army 
Times, the report also found that commanders were frustrated and confused by the “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” policy. Id. 
[Some were] afraid to violate military law by retaining soldiers who admit homosexuality. 
But they are also afraid that some of these soldiers might be saying they are gay just to get 
out of the Army. Either way, commanders are reluctant to investigate. They fear that 
looking into the matter would only hurt unit and soldier morale. 
Id. (alteration added). 
 541. Fort Eustis Drill Sergeant Faces Charges of Molesting Trainees, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 4, 2007. 
Sgt. Estrada pleaded guilty to the charges at his court-martial on April 23, 2007, to three counts of 
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Air Force Captain Devery L. Taylor was convicted and sentenced to 
twenty-eight to fifty years in prison for raping four men, allegedly with date-
rape drugs. According to a report in Air Force Times, an investigator 
interrogating Taylor, now a convicted serial rapist, said that he would not ask 
any questions about the man’s sexual practices because such questions are not 
allowed. This statement demonstrated how misunderstandings about the 1993 
homosexual conduct law help to create volatile conditions that undermine good 
order and discipline.542 Sexual assault of any kind is wrong and especially 
demoralizing in a military setting, where people live in conditions of “forced 
intimacy” and are not free to change jobs if someone threatens them. Such 
misconduct should not be considered “off limits” to questioning just because it 
happens to occur between persons of the same sex. 
k. Foreign Militaries 
The Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military and other 
activist groups frequently point to the experiences of other countries, such as 
Great Britain, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and Israel, which have no 
restrictions on professed homosexuals in their militaries.543 
The United Kingdom was ordered by the European Court of Human Rights 
to open its ranks to homosexuals in September 1999.544 There was some 
controversy in the Parliament, but instead of appealing or challenging the 
ruling, ultimately the nation complied—something the United States would be 
unlikely to do. Contrary to the notion that all has gone well, European 
newspapers have reported recruiting and disciplinary problems in the British 
military.545 
 
mistreating soldiers, as well as to violating regulations not to develop relationships with 
subordinates. Associated Press, Sgt. Pleads Guilty to Sexually Harassing Trainees, ARMY TIMES, May 7, 
2007, at 45. He faces six months in prison, a bad-conduct discharge and reduction in rank. Id. 
 542. See Captain Sentenced to 50 Years for Raping 4 Men, AIR FORCE TIMES, Mar. 12, 2007, at 15; 
Officer Accused of Rape Says He Rejected Alleged Victim, AIR FORCE TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, available at 
http://buzztracker.org/2005//01/19/cache/441692.html. The March 5 article, reported from Eglin 
Air Force Base, Florida, reported that in a video of an interview with Taylor, shown during his 
February 22 court-martial, an Air Force Office of Special Investigations investigator told Taylor, “[It] 
doesn’t concern me if it (the sexual encounter) was consensual . . . I’m not allowed to talk about your 
preferences. That has nothing to do with your military career as far as the people who do my job are 
concerned.” Id. (alteration added). This was an astonishing statement for the investigator to have 
made, particularly in view of Capt. Taylor’s convictions for raping four men. 
 543. See Aaron Belkin, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Necessity?, 
PARAMETERS (U.S. Army War Coll. Q.), Summer 2003, at 108–19. 
 544. See Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Euro. Ct. H.R. 548, 587 (1999); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH: UNIFORM DISCRIMINATION, supra note 472, at 38; Delight and Despair at Gay Ban 
Ruling, BBC NEWS, Sept. 27, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/458842.stm (reporting that 
the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights was “not binding on the UK Government”). 
 545. See, e.g., BBC News, Deepcut Army Sex Attacker Jailed, Oct. 22, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/england/southern_counties/3634474.stm; Nicholas Hellen, Navy Signals for Help to Recruit Gay 
Sailors, TIMESONLINE (London), Feb. 20, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/ 
article516647.ece; Tony Czuczka, Associated Press, British Soldier Admits to Assault on Captive, WASH. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, available at http://www.buzztracker.org/2005//01/19/cache/441692.html; 
Michael Evans, War Blamed as 6,000 Quit Territorial Army, TIMES (London), Oct. 30, 2005, at 2; Michael 
Evans, Iraq Factor Takes Toll on the TA, TIMES (London), Oct. 31, 2005, at 8. The reported abuse of male 
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Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands have cultures quite different from 
the United States546 and live under the protection of the American military. Prof. 
Charles Moskos has noted that nations without official restrictions on gays in 
the military are also very restrictive in actual practice. Germany, for example, 
dropped criminal sanctions against homosexual activities in 1969, but also 
imposed many restrictions on open homosexual behavior and imposed career 
penalties such as denial of promotions and access to classified information.547 
Israel’s situation differs from the United States because all able-bodied citizens, 
including women, are compelled to serve in the military. Israeli soldiers usually 
do not reveal their homosexuality and are barred from elite combat positions if 
they do.548 
The CSSMM frequently claims that no problems have been experienced in 
all of the countries listed above and is critical of those who support the ban, 
demanding that opponents provide “empirical” evidence to support their case. 
The irony is that the CSSMM and other activist groups base most of their 
arguments on anecdotal information and opinion, largely gathered from like-
minded sources. 
In a letter to Parameters responding to a Summer 2003 article by Aaron 
Belkin, Maj. Joseph A. Craft, USMC, pointed out that the CSSMM Executive 
Director had based his case on interviews with only 104 “experts” in four 
countries—all of whom were advocates of gays in the military.549 Wrote Craft, 
One of Belkin’s key arguments is that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) is based on 
anecdotes and misleading surveys instead of quantitative evidence. . . . Yet 
Belkin’s article is entirely anecdotal. It is nothing more than selected quotes from 
supposed experts who claim that homosexual integration has had no impact on 
unit cohesion or military readiness. A quick review of the author’s endnotes, 
cross-checked with an internet search, reveals the questionable credentials and 
political leanings of most of these experts. At one point, Belkin refers to a 1995 
Canadian government report, which supposedly indicates that lifting the ban on 
gays in the military had “no effect.” However, his endnote does not cite the 
report but a “personal communication with Karol Wenek.”550 
The issue of homosexuals in the military is a major political question that 
has been dealt with through the political system, as established by the U.S. 
Constitution. Major decisions such as this should not be decided by 
 
Iraqi soldiers with a forklift involved forced sexual acts, but details are not known because of court-
ordered gag orders. 
 546. See, e.g., Kate Monaghan, Dutch Political Party Wants to Normalize Pedophilia, CNSNEWS.COM, 
July 26, 2006, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewSpecialReports.asp?Page=/SpecialReports/archive/ 
200607/SPE20060726a.html. 
 547. See, e.g., Otto Kreisher, Few Armies Accept Homosexuals, SACRAMENTO UNION, June 7, 1993, at 
A5. 
 548. See Tom Philpott, In Israel: The Hard Reality—Gays Are Allowed to Serve in the Military but They 
Are Not Fully Accepted, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at 11; Tom Philpott, Gay Israelis Avoid Ridicule, Get 
Ahead by Staying in Closet, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at 13; Charles Moskos, Services Will Suffer If 
Used for Social Experiments, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 1993, at F1. 
 549. Joseph A. Craft, Letter to the Editor, Legitimate Debate or Gay Propaganda?, PARAMETERS (U.S. 
Army War Coll. Q.), June 22, 2004, at 132. 
 550. Id. 
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international courts, federal courts in the United States, or by politicians who are 
misinformed about the nature of the 1993 law and the rationale behind it. 
l. Religious Bias 
Finally, advocates of gays in the military have attempted to fire up their 
cause by criticizing Marine Gen. Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, who expressed his personal views regarding gays in the military and 
personal morality during an interview on March 11, 2007.551 A wave of name 
calling and demands for an apology ensued, but Gen. Pace had no reason to 
apologize for a law duly enacted by Congress. The statute reflects the views of 
people who see the issue in moral terms, but it uses secular language 
emphasizing military discipline. Duly enacted laws—including prohibitions 
against lying, stealing, and murder—should not be repealed just because they 
coincide with religious principles and moral codes such as the Ten 
Commandments. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A. The Military/Civilian Connection 
Today’s military is not a conservative institution. It is on the cutting edge of 
liberal cultural change. Many times in our history the military has advanced 
positive social change, especially in the area of civil rights. The armed forces 
were very much ahead of the civilian world in overcoming prejudice against 
minorities and promoting women to leadership positions at rates equal to or 
faster than men.552 
Since 9/11, cultural change in the all-volunteer force has accelerated. We 
are accustomed to seeing female soldiers in fatigues, boots, and helmets, piloting 
aircraft, navigating ships, carrying weapons, and driving humvees in support of 
combat operations. We always knew that women were courageous, but never in 
our history have we seen so much evidence of bravery among servicewomen 
who are choosing to live—and in unprecedented numbers, die in a man’s very 
dangerous world. Women are in our military to stay, and no one is seriously 
suggesting otherwise. 
Given the prominence of gender issues in today’s military, it is wise to 
consider the cultural implications of the current course. Pentagon officials, 
feminist activists, politicians, media, and bureaucratic forces are uniting to push 
for elimination of all of women’s exemptions from direct ground combat. Many 
of the same people expect officially mandated acceptance of professed 
 
 551. See, e.g., Aamer Madhani, Top General Calls Homosexuality “Immoral,” CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 
2007, at 1; Group Wants Gen. Pace Apology for Calling Gays “Immoral,” ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 13, 
2007; Editorial, Old Prejudice Dishonors New Military Generation, USA TODAY, Mar. 14, 2007, at 10A; 
Elaine Donnelly, Gen. Pace vs. PC Police, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, at B3. 
 552. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-131 (Finding 4.24); Army, Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Air Force Responses to DACOWITS (Spring 2001) (on file with author). See also 
Defense Data Manpower Center and Service’s Human Resource Staffs and Commands, Annual 
Report on Status of Female Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, FY 2002–2005, 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/docs/feb2006/statusofwomenfinal_05.doc (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2007). 
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homosexuals in the armed forces, with career penalties for anyone who dares to 
object or show resistance. 
Some advocates attempt to wrap their agenda in the flag of military 
necessity, but the two social movements share the same hierarchy of values. 
Both movements assign higher priority to “equal opportunity” considerations 
than they do to the needs of the military. The advocates of these movements are 
asking the armed forces to pay any price, and carry any burden, in order to 
advance acceptance of their viewpoints and the career opportunities of a few. 
If this paramount standard of review is adopted and applied consistently, 
the consequences inevitably will be felt not only in the military, but in the 
civilian world as well. In the matter of gays in the military, that is the 
underlying objective. It is reasonable to ask, where is this powerful and 
respected institution taking us now? 
1. What Our Military Says About Cultural Values 
a. Respect for Women 
One of the biggest human interest news stories in recent years was the 
mysterious disappearance of eighteen-year-old Natalie Holloway, in 2005, 
during a high school graduation trip to Aruba. After months of controversy, in 
March 2006, Fox News correspondent Greta van Susteren—who “owned” the 
story—interviewed the prime suspect, eighteen-year-old Joran van der Sloot.553 
Experts who watched the three-part interview thought that the young man came 
across as surprisingly credible and that he probably did not kill Natalie. Yet no 
one analyzed the broader implications and message conveyed by the young 
man’s defense. Joran van der Sloot claimed he was innocent because he left the 
intoxicated Natalie Holloway alone, late at night, on a beach in Aruba. His 
indifference and self-centered neglect that night did not violate any law. But it 
did say something about respect for women and the eroding values of Western 
Civilization. The parents of Joran, apparently, did not teach him a fundamental 
lesson: Good men protect and defend women. It is a concept that we purge from 
our culture at great risk. 
In the summer of 1995, near downtown Detroit, Michigan, a 260-pound 
man, Martell Welch, brutally assaulted a 115-pound woman, Deletha Word, on 
the Belle Isle Bridge. Approximately forty people reportedly watched but did 
not intervene when Welch chased Word with a tire iron. The desperate woman 
fled and leaped off the bridge to her death.554 At the conclusion of Welch’s trial 
in April 1996, foreman William Brown announced the jury’s maximum verdict: 
second degree murder. Brown also made front-page news by reaffirming 
civilized cultural values. Repeating a simple maxim that he had learned at his 
mother’s knee, Brown conveyed a message that the jury intended to be heard by 
the young men of the city of Detroit: “Never hit a woman. You can’t go around 
battering young ladies. The people aren’t going to take it anymore.”555 With that 
 
 553. On the Record (Fox News Broadcast Mar. 1–3, 2006). 
 554. Melinda Wilson, Belle Isle Bridge Death Was Murder, Jury Says, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 30, 1996, 
at 1A. 
 555. Id. 
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unequivocal statement, the thirty-two-year-old security guard demonstrated 
civilized cultural values. If mothers everywhere taught the same lesson to their 
sons, violent crime rates would drop significantly. 
In contrast to the two stories above, the campaign to force young women 
into or near the violence of close combat depends on psychological acceptance of 
the idea that men can and should place women in physical or mortal danger.556 
Even in some forms of military training, men have to learn to “hit” female 
trainees and not think twice about it.557 Kate O’Beirne, as a member of the 
Presidential Commission and now an author, forcefully defended Western 
cultural values and civilization on the issue of violence against women. Feminist 
advocates had difficulty answering Commissioner O’Beirne’s compelling 
argument, which she restated in 2006: 
Good men protect and defend women in the face of a physical threat. If men in 
uniform are going to be expected to be sex blind when it comes to protecting 
their comrades, American mothers will have to get to work instructing their 
sons that it’s okay to hit girls. Women have no “right” to serve in combat if their 
presence puts the men they serve with in jeopardy because these decent men are 
determined to protect the weaker sex. Instructors at the military’s [Survival, 
Evasion, Resistance & Escape (SERE)] school for pilots saw that male students 
reacted more negatively to the simulated torture of female trainees and 
concluded that the men would have to be trained to inure themselves to the 
plight of women in pain.558 
Feminists recognize the vulnerability of women when they are concerned with 
the plight of women who are victims of domestic abuse. . . . Their position on 
integrating combat ranks puts them in the position of saying that violence 
against women is a terrible thing unless it is at the hands of the enemy, in which 
case it’s a welcome tribute to women’s equality.559 
b. Cultural Amnesia and the “New Chivalry” 
Do we as a nation still believe that good men protect and defend women? 
The answer is unclear. In the military, traditional chivalry has been replaced 
with a peculiar form of “new chivalry.”560 The new concept promotes 
 
 556. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-127 (Finding 4.13). The commission 
established that different assignment policies allowing women the option of volunteering for close 
combat but not the burden of being involuntarily assigned would have a deleterious effect on 
morale. 
 557. Pamela Martineau & Steve Weigand, A Dad Soldiers On, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 9, 2005, 
available at http://dwb.sacbee.com/content/news/projects/women_at_war/story/12533035p-
13388315c.html. An accompanying photo by Renee C. Byer shows 2nd Lt. Emily Morris in training at 
Fort Lewis, Washington. Lt. Morris is trying to break away from her instructor, Sgt. Keith Chesser, 
who has her pinned to a mat with his large hand throttling her neck. Id. 
 558. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-45–46 (Findings 1.48–1.50) (referencing 
SERE trainers’ testimony before the Commission on June 8, 1992) (alteration added). 
 559. KATE O’BEIRNE, WOMEN WHO MAKE THE WORLD WORSE AND HOW THEIR RADICAL FEMINIST 
ASSAULT IS RUINING OUR SCHOOLS, FAMILIES, MILITARY, AND SPORTS 119–20 (2006) (alteration added). 
Mrs. O’Beirne is the Washington Editor of National Review. 
 560. Duke Selwyn, The New Chivalry, AMERICANTHINKER.COM, Jan. 5, 2006, http://www. 
americanthinker.com/2006/01/the_new_chivalry.html. 
So, the great white knight of chivalry is supposed to be dead, slain by the feminist dragon 
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professional paternalism, as defined and provided by “victim advocates” who 
get paid to help women who encounter problems in the brave, new, gender-free 
world.561 
The military service academies have become a prime market for 
professionally paternalistic Department of Women’s Studies graduates who are 
seeking to become a growth service industry in the DoD and military bases 
everywhere.562 Many officials in Congress, the Pentagon, and the service 
academies are eager to establish ubiquitous “victim advocate” offices, staffed by 
professionals who vow to protect military women from the slightest form of 
harassment, real or imagined. 
The same officials simultaneously promote the deliberate exposure of 
military women to extreme abuse and violence in close, lethal combat, where 
females do not have an equal opportunity to survive or to help fellow soldiers 
survive. Some observers think this is acceptable because the women volunteered 
for military service and knew what they were getting into. Indications are, 
however, that many female recruits are not being informed, prior to enlistment, 
that regulations no longer exempt women from assignments known to involve a 
“substantial risk of capture.”563 Nor are the female recruits being told that their 
“job description” might involve involuntary placement in ground combat-
collocated units, despite regulations requiring those units to be coded for men 
only.564 Army officials have been misleading members of Congress and female 
 
of androgyny. . . . You see, while [the] old chivalry’s habitat has been denuded, relegating 
it to a few pristine bastions of traditionalism, it has not left a void. It has been replaced. 
Replaced by a new chivalry . . . . Like the old chivalry, the new version involves social 
codes and social pressure to enforce them, but also much, much more. The new chivalry 
has also been written into law; it is embodied by affirmative-action and set aside programs 
that favor women, and by legislation such as the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 
which now serves as a vehicle through which to empower and fund feminist groups. 
Id. (alteration added). 
 561. While misogyny or women hating is politically incorrect, misandry or men hating is socially 
acceptable. American Enterprise Institute scholar Christina Hoff Sommers notes that “gender 
feminists” relentlessly portray women as “victims” by frequently concocting evidence that cannot 
stand up to scrutiny. See CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, WHO STOLE FEMINISM? 11–25 (1994). 
 562. See DEFENSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 11–19, 27. The Task Force Report recited a 
long list of officials and institutions that are available for the support of (alleged) victims of sexual 
harassment or assault. At all three military service academies, these include chaplains, psycho-
therapists, medical staff and family support counselors, military and civilian “victim advocates,” 
volunteer crisis support organizations and offices with various names, judge advocates who provide 
counsel and prosecutors on campus, associated civilian hospitals and law enforcement agencies, 
academy boards of visitors and superintendents, plus numerous Defense Department officials 
charged to enforce DoD directives guaranteeing numerous rights to persons deciding to pursue legal 
remedies. 
 563. See Thomas, supra note 58; Kris Axtman, Guard Recruiters Try Realism and Succeed, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 12, 2006, at 1 (reporting on a seventeen-year girl who tells a recruiter: “‘I don’t 
want to do the military thing. I don’t want to be trained or none of that.’ . . . ‘I just want to go to 
college.’” When the recruiter assured her that she “won’t be on the front lines because women are 
not allowed in combat positions,” the girl said, “‘OK, I want to go. I’m ready.’”). 
 564. See also E-mail and telephone correspondence from Pfc. Stephanie Filus and her father to 
author (Jan. 2005–June 2006) (on file with author). Spec. Filus had served as an Army light wheeled 
vehicle mechanic for twelve years, but she had no desire to be placed in or near direct ground 
combat. Recruiters had assured her that that would never happen. But in December 2004, officers of 
the 101st Airborne at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, told Filus and several other female soldiers that their 
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recruits about the possibility of involuntary placement in ground-combat-
collocated units since 2004, primarily by playing word games in order to justify 
the illicit “employment” of women in certain support units that collocate, or 
embed, with all-male infantry battalions.565 
The general public is confused and conflicted. Allegations of sexual abuse 
in the military inspire outrage, but news stories about unprecedented numbers 
of women killed and injured in the war are met with stoic and resigned 
acceptance. This reaction was presaged in 1992 by prisoner of war survival 
(SERE) instructors, who favored repeal of all exemption rules. The SERE trainers 
told the Presidential Commission that the culture would have to change before 
great numbers of women could be sent into combat.566 A type of “de-
sensitization,” similar to coping mechanisms that are taught to men in training 
scenarios simulating abuse of female captives, would have to occur in the 
nation.567 
 
next deployment would involve placement in a forward support company (FSC), with an infantry 
company headed to Iraq. The local officers assured the female soldiers that they would be 
“assigned” to a support unit at the brigade level, so nothing would change. Filus was aware, 
however, that the FSC would be physically attached and collocated with an infantry maneuver 
battalion, despite the collocation rule. Her attempts to obtain a discharge prior to that deployment 
were denied, and she was sent to Fort Polk, Lousiana, for pre-deployment training. Filus finally 
obtained her discharge from the Army in May 2005, but only after she took the desperate and 
dangerous step of attempting suicide with pills in front of the commanding officer at Fort Polk. 
 565. See Cathy Booth Thomas, Taken by Surprise: This Single Mom Joined the Army to be a Cook. How 
Did She Become a POW?, TIME, Apr. 7, 2003, at 64; Axtman, supra note 563. 
 566. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-45 (Finding 1.50 (referencing June 8, 
1992, testimony of SERE trainers regarding heightened sensitivity of men when women are 
subjected to simulated abuse)); id. at C-46 (Finding 1.51 (also referencing testimony of SERE trainers, 
who said that there was no sexual abuse of male U.S. POWs substantiated from the Vietnam conflict 
forward)). 
 567. Id. at C-45–C-46 (Findings 1.50–1.51); id. at 103 (Trip Report Summary of Commissioner 
Elaine Donnelly). During her two-day trip to Fairchild AFB, Washington, August 9–11, 1992, 
Donnelly talked to instructors about their realistic “rape scenario,” in which male trainees are taught 
to manage more intense feelings when a female colleague is threatened with sexual assault or worse, 
so that enemy captors cannot exploit those emotions. Donnelly described parts of the SERE training 
that she saw at Fairchild Air Force Base during her visit: 
Without knowing what to expect, I found myself locked in a cramped black box that was 
both physically and psychologically uncomfortable. I also participated in and witnessed 
interrogation exercises designed to suggest but not duplicate the physical and emotional 
stress of being a POW. As the night wore on, a sense of cultural dissonance began to 
overcome the camp’s logic of equality in the simulation of brutality. 
A woman I watched being interrogated was very capable, but she was totally in the power 
of a man much stronger than she. What I saw was an unmistakable element of inequality 
that—in the opinion of many Commission witnesses—cannot be overcome by peacetime 
training programs or psychological techniques. As the interrogation continued, it was easy 
to visualize the possibility of sexual abuse as well as physical harm at the hands of a 
menacing enemy. For reasons of survival, the SERE training for aircrew members makes 
sense. . . . However, the politically-correct unisex nature of the resistance training is very 
seductive; it is easy to become “desensitized,” meaning accustomed, to the idea that men 
and women are interchangeable equals in a world of torture and abuse. The SERE trainers 
asserted that the entire nation must prepare itself for this very real possibility if women 
are assigned to combat positions. 
Id. See also id. at C-46 (Finding 1.51 (finding that there was no sexual abuse substantiated of male U.S. 
POWs from the Vietnam conflict to the time of the panel’s inquiry)). 
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Are we already there? An insightful New Yorker cartoon, showing a group 
of bureaucrats discussing disturbing news while seated around a conference 
table, may be close to the truth. In the caption one of the men says to the others, 
“Let’s just sit tight till the cultural amnesia sets in.”568 
There are several reasons, including cultural amnesia, that explain why the 
public reaction to the numbers of women killed in the current war has been 
somewhat muted. One is that people understand the power of international 
media and the Internet. We are reluctant to react in a way that encourages 
murderous anarchists in Iraq to deliberately target more of our women for 
capture, brutality, and death.569 Another reason is that many Americans find it 
hard to believe that a Republican administration would ignore or contradict the 
president’s stated position that women should not be in land combat. And we 
respect the sacrifices of our female soldiers. No one wants to say anything that 
might add to the grief of the families. Reaction is also diffuse because news 
stories about the deaths and injuries being suffered by our women usually 
appear only in the soldiers’ hometown newspapers, with little information 
provided. Rarely do we hear heartbreaking details, such as circumstances 
surrounding the death of Staff Sgt. Kimberley Voelz, who lost her life during a 
courageous attempt to defuse a bomb in Iraq.570 
A news report from Britain reflects a kind of concern about combat 
violence against women that has been muted in the United States.571 Two 
women, a nurse and an interpreter, were among four soldiers killed in a bomb 
attack near the southern Iraq city of Basra.572 Col. Bob Stewart, who was the first 
British commander of UN forces in Bosnia, said that he was against women 
being close to combat as their deaths or injuries had a debilitating effect on male 
soldiers.573 “It’s disquieting for a lot of people in this country when women are 
put into the front line because when they are wounded or killed, the men 
around them find it very difficult to operate.”574 Col. Stewart added that he had 
 
 568. P.C. Vey, Let’s just sit tight till the cultural amnesia sets in., NEW YORKER, Oct. 14, 2002 
(cartoon), available at http://www.cartoonbank.com/product_details.asp?sitetype=1&sid=52827. 
 569. In the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, there were reports that Iraqi insurgents, enraged by photos 
from Abu Ghraib, wanted to kidnap and kill an American woman for purposes of revenge. Rowan 
Scarborough, Zarqawi Targets Female Soldiers, WASH. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at A01. 
 570. Chris A. Courogen, She “Died in His Arms,” PATRIOT NEWS (Harrisburg, Penn.), Dec. 16, 
2003, at A01; David Zucchino, Equal Right to Fight, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2004, at A1. On December 13, 
2003, a male soldier escorted Staff Sgt. Voelz, an explosive ordnance disposal expert, to disarm a 
device taped to an electrical tower. When the bomb exploded, shrapnel ripped her body, nearly 
severing her left arm and lower leg. Her husband, a soldier also on duty nearby in Iraq, rushed to 
her side, and she died in his arms. As of May 2007, more than seventy-five American military 
women have been killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait. See Center for Military Readiness, Grim 
Toll of Military Women Lost in War (Feb. 27, 2007), http://www.cmrlink.org/printfriendly.asp? 
docID=288. 
 571. Thomas Harding, Outrage as Two Female Soldiers Die in Basra, TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 6, 
2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/04/06/wireaq 
06.xml. 
 572. Id. 
 573. Id. 
 574. Id. 
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twice been present when women soldiers died.575 “One was in my arms after a 
bomb in Northern Ireland and I was inconsolable afterwards. I could not 
operate. If you put women in the front line because they are equal then you have 
to expect that there will be operational casualties.”576 
In the New Gender Order, we are not supposed to care about female 
soldiers any more than we do about male soldiers, who die in far greater 
numbers. Some men who resent feminists take it a step further, expressing 
eagerness to see more female soldiers injured and killed in combat. “You 
wanted equal rights,” they argue. “Why shouldn’t you be expected to lose limbs, 
bleed, and die in combat along with the men?” This attitude represents a small 
but significant cohort of men, which was detected in a survey of Army men and 
women done for the Presidential Commission by one of its members, noted 
sociologist Charles C. Moskos, Ph.D.577 Prof. Moskos and his Northwestern 
University colleague, doctoral candidate Laura Miller, identified a group of 
survey respondents that they called “egalitarian sexists” or “hostile 
proponents.”578 These were men who advocated forced combat for women for 
vindictive reasons.579 
A West Point graduate challenged that attitude: “Ninety years ago, the 
Titanic men gave their lives for the women and children ‘because it was the 
civilized thing to do;’ now women are masculinized to serve in wars for 
American males [who are] relaxing at golf and tennis clubs declaring it 
‘progress.’”580 
Syndicated columnist Kathleen Parker has expressed similar concerns: 
 
 575. Id. 
 576. Id. 
 577. Charles C. Moskos & Laura Miller, 1992 Survey on Gender in the Military, Aug. 28, 1992, 
presented to the Presidential Commission by Moskos and Miller on Sept. 10, 1992 (transcript on file 
with author). See also Kathleen Parker, Separate the Genders During War?, JEWISH WORLD REV., Mar. 
28, 2007, available at http://www.jewishworldreview.com/kathleen/parker032807.php3? 
printer_friendly (describing the simmering resentment of women among some men in the military, 
which results when they are forced to pretend that women are or should be “equals” in combat). Cf. 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-114 (Findings 3.31, 3.32). 
 578. See Moskos & Miller, supra note 577. 
 579. Id. Ms. (now Dr.) Miller commented that some men said, “Well, yeah, I’m for women in 
combat. Let them fall on their faces.” Id. When asked to explain further she added, 
[The egalitarian sexists] said those comments directly. Let them go out there and see how 
hard it is and then they won’t want to be in combat; that it’s just a principle, they are just 
complaining on the principle. They don’t really want to do it, so if you just open it up then 
we won’t have to deal with the issue. They’ll get themselves killed and we won’t have to 
hear from those women anymore. . . . It’s also a sort of treatment of like a third gender of 
Army women. I mean, they say, “Oh, those aren’t real women,” and they talk about them 
in different terms, so it’s not like they’re really sacrificing women in that case. They still 
have, you know, this sense of traditional women elsewhere and that those are women to 
be gotten rid of. 
Id. (alteration added). Prof. Moskos estimated, subjectively, that about one-third to one-half of male 
respondents favoring women in combat shared this view. Id. 
 580. Letter from W. Edward Chynoweth to author (July 14, 2005) (on file with author) (alteration 
added). Mr. Chynoweth graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1946 
and earned graduate degrees from the University of California at Berkeley and Stanford University. 
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[O]ur military is gradually weaning men of their intuitive inclination to protect 
women—which by extrapolation, means ignoring the screams of women being 
assaulted. At the point when our men can stand by unfazed while American 
servicewomen are raped and tortured, thewe will have no cause to fight any 
war. We will have already lost.581 
c. Untold Consequences of Family Separation 
This “progress” has affected not only women, but thousands of young 
children left behind while their sole parent, one parent, or both are deployed to 
the war zone—sometimes for a year or more. The military does regular 
assessments of the impact of military operations on wild animals, birds, and 
whales.582 In contrast, thousands of children are being conscripted for an 
unprecedented social experiment, but there have been few studies done or 
revealed that have examined the psychological effects of prolonged wartime 
separation on children and their parents.583 
The last time the subject was officially researched at all was in 1992, when 
several experts in the fields of child psychology, psychiatry, and human 
development presented testimony to the Presidential Commission.584 Some 
witnesses focused on the impact of long-term wartime separation on children. 
Others described the coping mechanisms of deployed mothers—including 
deliberately setting aside their maternal feelings while abroad—and the 
 
 581. Kathleen Parker, The Mother of All Blunders, WASH. POST, April 7, 2007, at A13 (alteration 
added). 
 582. See Kenneth R. Weiss, Navy Gets 2-Year Exemption to Sonar Limits, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2007, at 
A21; Editorial, Degrading Our Military, FORBES, Sept. 15, 2003, at 25; Marc Kaufman, Sonar Used Before 
Whales Hit Shore, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2004; Marc Kaufman, Whale Stranding in N.C. Followed Navy 
Sonar Use, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2005, at A03. 
 583. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-117 (Finding 3.39). The smaller 
Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), established with a new 
charter in 2002, has produced several reports that deal with family issues, but has not followed up 
on research available. In its 2004 Report, for example, DACOWITS made reference to “studies [that] 
have found a significant negative relationship between deployment-related parental absence and 
one or more aspects of children’s well-being.” See REPORT OF THE DACOWITS 32–33 (2004) 
[hereinafter DACOWITS 2004 REPORT] (referencing Michelle L. Kelly, The Effects of Deployment on 
Traditional and Nontraditional Military Families: Navy Mothers and Their Children, in MILITARY BRATS 
AND OTHER GLOBAL NOMADS: GROWING UP IN ORGANIZATIONAL FAMILIES (M.G. Ender ed., 2002) 
(finding that “[a]bout 12 percent of children of deployed mothers exhibited internalizing behavior 
scores in the clinical range, compared to 1 percent of children of non-deployed mothers.” (alteration 
added))) (alteration added). The DACOWITS made several recommendations for reducing the 
impact of long-term separation on children, but the committee apparently has not pursued those 
proposals. See DACOWITS 2004 REPORT, supra, at 76–77. 
 584. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-118 (Finding 3.43). 
Child development experts agree that the psychological and emotional effects of parental 
separation on young children is [sic] greatly increased when there is a risk of death in war. 
Their research demonstrated that separation from the primary caregiver (mother or father, 
mother in particular) greatly reduces a child’s feelings of security. An infant/toddler who 
does not have a secure attachment is less likely to explore his/her surroundings and relate 
to others. The mother is most often cited by experts as the preferred and most critical 
parent for childcare. After prolonged and/or repeated separations, attachment theory 
research showed that children tended to be more depressed and anxious, and less willing 
to re-attach to the parent upon reunion. 
Id. 
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difficulty of reestablishing those feelings upon their return, especially when the 
child emotionally withdraws.585 
There have been many recent reports of emotional scars in military 
families, indicating that this subject ought to be studied in more depth.586 
Instead, the DoD continues to subsidize and encourage the recruitment and 
deployment of single mothers and moms with large families, buying into the 
politically correct notion that it makes no difference who does the soldiering and 
who does the mothering. 
2. Rumpelstiltskin Recruiting 
In addition to personal patriotism, fathers and mothers join or stay in the 
military for the same reasons they work in any occupation. But in the military, 
generous education, housing, and medical benefits serve as an almost irresistible 
magnet for single parents with custody, the greater proportion of which are 
mothers.587 Gender-based recruiting quotas increase numbers of deployable 
mothers even more, especially in the National Guard, which allows single 
parents with custody to sign up for deployable positions.588 
In this and many other situations involving single- or dual-service parents, 
family subsidies that are needed to support stable families have had the 
 
 585. Testimony of Dr. Jay Belsky, Penn State University, Before the Presidential Commission 
(June 9, 1992) (“[W]e have this new emergency language of child development. All we hear about is 
their resilience. Lost is a language of vulnerability. And I contend to you, every time you hear 
resilience spoken, you will hear simultaneously, really, a driving motivation, which is an adult’s 
career development.”) (on file with author). See also PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, 
at 55–56 (Issue H: Parental and Family Policies, Alternative Views). 
 586. See, e.g., Donna St. George, Yearning to be Whole Again, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2006, at A01 
(describing the effects of war on a single mother soldier and her family); Pamela Martineau & Steve 
Wiegand, Scarred Survivors, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 8, 2005, available at http://www.truthout.org/ 
docs_docs_2006/112406X.shtml. Pamela Martineau & Steve Weigand, A Dad Soldiers On, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 9, 2005 (describing what happened when Lt. Emily Morris’s soldier husband 
was called up for duty at the same time that she was—their six-year-old son, Julian, threw all of his 
toys out of his bedroom, and hung a sign on the door reading “No dog, no toys, no aunt, no mom, 
no dad.”), available at http://www.sacbee.com/content/news/pprojectrs/women_at_war/v-print/ 
story/12528269p-13383679c.html; Shia Kapos, Internal Wars: Family Separation Adds Another Layer of 
Stress for Women Serving in the Military, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 2004, at C1. 
 587. Quarterly Data Collection on Non-Deployables, DAPE-MPE (Dec. 15, 2002) (quoting Dr. 
Betty D. Maxfield, Chief, Army Demographics Office, G-1, Q.6) (“In FY 02, 36,531 Soldiers are single 
with children. Of that number, 26,495 are male (or 72.5% of total) and 10,036 are female (or 27.5% of 
total). The latter figure is disproportionate to the number of women in the Army.”) (on file with 
author). See also Sandy Davis, Single Mom Has Right Stuff for U.S. Army, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, 
June 23, 2001, at 1A; PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-116 (Finding 3.35). 
 588. National Guard units used to serve primarily within the borders of individual states, but in 
the early 1990s, Guard missions were expanded to include overseas deployments in combat zones. 
The Army’s liberal policy of inducting single parents drew national attention in 2003, when Spec. 
Simone Holcomb, an Army National Guard medic and mother of seven children in a “blended” 
family, was called to duty in Iraq at the same time as her Army husband. See, e.g., Associated Press, 
Army Medic, Mom Faces Punishment: Carson Soldier Refuses to Leave 7 Kids, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE, 
Nov. 6, 2003, at 1. The problem actually began years earlier when the Guard recruited Holcomb as a 
single mother of three or possibly five children—the exact number is not known due to military 
privacy rules. For the same reason, the ages of the children could not be revealed. 
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unintended effect of creating more unstable families. As in the civilian world, 
when you subsidize something you get more of it. 
Due to pressures from feminists inside and outside of the Pentagon, the 
military seems incapable of striking a more reasonable balance between the 
needs of three parties at interest: (1) the mother, who wants a good job and 
career advancement; (2) field commanders, who rely upon the readiness of 
deployable personnel; and (3) the children, whose needs for mother-care have 
not changed to conform with feminist theories. 
The military’s answer to this monumental problem is to throw money at it. 
Millions of defense dollars are spent on expensive, heavily subsidized 
childcare—the largest system in the nation. Family support is a necessity in the 
all-volunteer force, sixty percent of which is composed of married people.589 
Funds spent to sustain stable families have also attracted thousands of young 
custodial single parents. Many of these young families live beneath the poverty 
line, and depend on food stamps as well as financial support and benefits from 
the DoD.590 
The job of recruiters is tough enough, without having to spend more time 
and money recruiting female trainees, who drop out at higher rates.591 Pressures 
from the Pentagon, however, have forced recruiters to become like the fairy tale 
character Rumpelstiltskin—offering help to young women in need, with painful 
separations from their children being the ultimate tradeoff later on.592 
This does not mean that mothers should not serve in the military, but some 
situations are less workable and acceptable than others, especially where the 
needs of the child are concerned.593 
Pentagon leaders need to acknowledge this reality. It is not sound policy to 
perpetuate false assurances and illusions about the psychological resiliency of 
children, while assigning lower priority to the most important needs of the 
military. 
 
 589. Allan Carlson, The Howard Center for Family, Religion & Society, Families and War: Two 
Cautionary Tales, 16 FAMILY AM. 2 (Oct. 2002). 
 590. Id. at 3. According to Dr. Carlson, direct and indirect military expenditures for child care 
tripled in the decade prior to 2002. Id. He added, “Although military people are more likely to be 
married than others in their age group, young service couples are 64% more likely to be divorced by 
age 24 than comparable civilian couples.” Id. 
 591. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-96 (Finding 2.6.3C). 
 592. For a summary of the tale of Rumpelstiltskin, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Rumpelstiltskin (last visited Apr. 21, 2007). 
 593. During the first Persian Gulf War, many dependent care plans fell apart, forcing many 
soldiers to leave their children behind in makeshift care arrangements. Sen. John Heinz (D-Penn.) 
and other members of Congress sponsored “Gulf Orphan” bills, which would have allowed one 
parent in military couples and single parents to exempt themselves from combat voluntarily. See, 
e.g., S. 325, 102d Cong. (1991). The Senate voted against the bill and instead passed a non-binding 
resolution sponsored by Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) calling for the Pentagon to develop consistent 
regulations regarding military couples, single parents and newborn children. S. amend. 7 to S. 320, 
102d Cong. (1991); see also Helen Dewar, Senate, Yielding to Pentagon, Rejects Parent Exemption Plan, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1991, at A27. The Presidential Commission recognized, however, that changes 
in family policies should be implemented long before a major war begins. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 5, at C-134–C-135 (Findings 10–13); id. at 15–18 (Issue H: Parental and Family 
Policies, Recommendations); id. at 54–56 (Issue H: Parental and Family Policies, Alternative Views). 
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B. Constructing a Stronger Military 
1. Recommendations for the Secretary of Defense 
When former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld gave his farewell 
address at the Pentagon in December 2006, he said that the single worst day of 
his time in office occurred when he learned of the Abu Ghraib prisoner scandal 
in Iraq.594 This was not a military defeat, but it put the American forces on the 
defensive and diverted untold thousands of man-hours for intense damage 
control. 
An internationally scandalous breakdown in discipline as serious as Abu 
Ghraib is likely to happen again. One way to guarantee that result is to allow 
social engineers to continue volatile social experiments with servicemen and 
women, conducted without accountability or objective evaluation. Unlike the 
mechanical engineers of NASA, social engineers do not even try to learn from 
their mistakes. And when something bad happens, they blame men (not 
women) who “don’t get it,” instead of accepting responsibility for their own 
policies. 
The social engineering blueprint for an ungendered military incorporates 
elitist assumptions, Amazon myths, double standards, social fiction, high-level 
dissembling, and arrogance held together with a fragile web of carefully spun 
public relations. It is a shaky structure, not stable enough for what must be the 
strongest military in the world. 
To reinforce the social infrastructure of our military, the Secretary of 
Defense should: 
• Be vigilant. 
• Take these issues seriously. 
• Set forth sound priorities, putting the needs of the military first. 
• Mandate complete candor about the consequences of cultural change in 
the military, forbidding retribution or career penalties for anyone 
expressing inconvenient truth. 
a. End Illusions in Military Basic and Advanced Training 
In a 1997 article published by The Weekly Standard, former Secretary of the 
Navy James Webb, now the junior Senator from Virginia, wrote about the 
importance of getting candid, firsthand information from military commanders 
who have to deal with the consequences of sexual misconduct in the military: 
Consider the commander who knows that the culprit in such situations is not 
one or a half-dozen individuals, but a system that throws healthy young men 
and women together inside a volatile, isolated crucible of emotions—a ship at 
sea or basic training, to take two notable examples. 
Whom does this commander tell if he believes that the experiment itself has not 
worked, that the compressed and emotional environment in which these young 
men and women have been thrust together by unknowing or uncaring 
policymakers actually encourages disruptive sexual activity? 
 
 594. Robert Burns, Rumsfeld Bids Farewell to Pentagon, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 8, 2006. 
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Present-day generals and admirals, constantly under political pressure, 
sometimes unsure of where to draw the line between military and civilian 
control, often constrained by legal edicts, and wishing to be fair to those females 
who do perform well, have issued unenforceable orders rather than confront the 
politicians who dreamed them up. They have muddled about for years from 
incident to incident while many junior leaders have been forced to deal directly 
with impossible, ethically compromising positions.595 
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan summarily ended a five-year experiment 
with co-ed basic training in the Army. Women were suffering too many injuries, 
and men were not being challenged enough.596 The Marines retained separate-
gender training, which continues to be superior for teaching discipline to both 
men and women during and after basic training. 
In 1993, Army officials reinstated co-ed basic training and introduced 
various types of gender-norming techniques to disguise physical differences. An 
editorial cartoonist illustrated the illogic of this by portraying ten beribboned 
Army generals sitting around a conference table: “It’s agreed then,” says the 
presiding general. “We will reduce the physical requirements of warfare so that 
women may participate.”597 
A Marine officer serving in Fallujah addressed that illusion directly: 
Please think about this: when things really go wrong, that is not the time to 
remember why the military has upper body strength requirements. When there 
are casualties, no soldier or Marine should die because his buddy couldn’t get 
him to safety because she wasn’t strong enough.598 
The Secretary of Defense should: 
• Take this matter out of the hands of social engineers and restore 
separate-gender basic training without apology or further delay. 
Mixed-gender training occurs at advanced levels, but new recruits 
need to concentrate on learning the basics first. 
• Require the various services to maintain height, weight, and physical 
capability standards that are commensurate with occupational 
demands in time of war and are not obscured by evaluations of entire 
groups in training. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1994 mandated “Gender-Neutral Occupational Performance 
Standards,” but none have yet been established.599 
 
 595. James Webb, The War on Military Culture, WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 20, 1997, at 17. 
 596. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-71, C-78 (Findings 2.1.5, 2.4.1A). 
 597. Peter Steiner, It’s agreed then. We will reduce the physical requirements of warfare so that women 
may participate., WASH. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996. During the 2000 presidential campaign, the American 
Legion magazine asked then-Texas Gov. George W. Bush about his views on co-ed basic training. 
Candidate Bush replied, “The experts tell me, such as Condoleezza Rice, [formerly a member of the 
Kassebaum-Baker Commission] that we ought to have separate basic training facilities.” Bill Gertz & 
Rowan Scarborough, Inside the Ring, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A7 (alteration added). 
 598. E-mail from senior Marine officer serving in Iraq to author (July 20, 2005) (on file with 
author). 
 599. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No 103-160, 
§ 543(a)(1),(3), 107 Stat. 1547, 1660 (1993). 
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• Direct all military officials responsible for physical training that, if it is 
necessary to have different, gender-normed grading systems for men 
and women in order to avoid disproportionate injuries among female 
trainees, they must avoid describing the standards as “the same” or 
“identical,” because “equal effort” is not the same as “equal results.” 
• Instruct advanced training commands that special concessions and 
double standards involving women (DSIW) are not acceptable, 
particularly in aviation and other forms of training for hazardous 
positions on land, sea, and in the air. 
b. Restore Compliance with Policy and Law 
The issue of women in combat should not be treated as a “women’s issue.” 
It is condescending, if not sexist, to treat these issues as less important than other 
matters of Defense policy. DoD regulations regarding women in combat were 
set forth in 1994, and the services are obligated to comply. Army officials do not 
have the right to rewrite, redefine, bend, break, or contrive rules on their own. 
Nor should Pentagon bureaucrats expect junior officers to resolve contradictions 
and confusion caused by high level officials who are trying to shift their own 
responsibilities elsewhere. 
“Fem fear”600 is an emotion that grips the hearts of men who are terrified 
that feminists—including women on the Armed Services Committees—might 
get angry at them. The Defense Secretary has to be prepared to take some heat, 
but ultimately it is much easier to defend coherent policies that are based on 
sound principles than it is to satisfy implacable ideologues. Solid information 
can be produced to support constructive directives, but only if the Secretary asks 
the right questions and insists on complete, candid answers. 
“Fatherly favoritism” is another emotion that seems to be influencing some 
policies in the military. A number of Pentagon policymakers have daughters in 
uniform—some of them graduates of the military academies who want to follow 
their dads’ footsteps into flag rank.601 Paternal feelings are understandable, but 
they are the last reason why a policymaker should take a position either for or 
against women in ground combat. 
Even if direct combat experience were required for promotions (it is not), 
fatherly favoritism is not a good enough reason to send other women into 
combat. Nor should these policies be influenced primarily by the opinions of 
wives or female officers seeking promotions. 
Absent intervention by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army’s 
assignment system has become needlessly confused and chaotic. Field 
commanders are expected to accommodate female soldiers in formerly all-male 
units, coping with personnel losses that are common in gender-mixed support 
units.602 At the same time, junior female officers are being allowed to assign 
 
 600. This term was first used by Marine Staff Sgt. Charlotte Crouch. See Charlotte Crouch, “Fem 
Fear” Widening the Corps’ Gender Gap, NAVY TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996, at 29. 
 601. Confidential personal conversations between individuals at the Pentagon and author 
(Summer 2004). 
 602. E-mail from ground-combat soldier to author (Dec. 11, 2006) (on file with author). The 
soldier wrote that a forward support company (FSC) associated with his former unit was “totally 
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female soldiers almost anywhere they please.603 Male officers rarely are asked 
what they think about all this, but if they are, their answers appear to be 
influenced by career considerations.604 
It is a demoralizing situation, unguided by policy or law, and another 
example of DSIW. If (when) another explosive international incident involving 
our military occurs, people will wonder why the Pentagon officials did not see 
the “perfect storm” coming.605 
Some observers insist that regulations do not matter anymore because there 
is no “front line” in the current war. But in the last major mobilization of 
American ground forces, the Persian Gulf War, there was a violent “front line” 
attack to liberate Kuwait. It is impossible to predict what the requirements of the 
next war will be, but even in the current war the missions of direct ground 
combat troops, such as the infantry, Special Operations Forces, and Marine 
 
[gender-]integrated,” resulting in two pregnancies for the first time in the history of the battalion. Id. 
(alteration added). See also E-mail from ground combat solider to author (Dec. 9, 2006) (on file with 
author). 
On another note, the line between the FSC and our battalion has completely broken down. 
Females from the FSC’s are being attached to all male infantry and armor companies with 
no regard whatsoever. Interestingly, this same FSC is now having its [rank omitted] and 
one of its senior NCO’s fired over sexual misconduct. This is a pretty tremendous shock 
for a company and it will definitely shake, if not ruin, the confidence in the company’s 
chain of command for the foreseeable future. . . . Those of us who are combat arms officers 
are not envious of the FSC commander’s job who has to hold his company together after 
his [rank omitted] has been taken down. 
Id. (alterations added). 
 603. Jontz & Dougherty, supra note 143; Tyson, For Female GIs, Combat Is a Fact, supra note 122 
(describing the actions of Lt. Col. Cheri Provancha, who decided to “bend” (actually break) Army 
rules by allowing a female soldier, Spec. Jennifer Guay, to serve as a medic for an infantry company 
of the 82nd Airborne). 
 604. E-mail from combat-experienced officer in Iraq to author (Oct. 26, 2006) (explaining that 
some male officers enhance their careers by enthusiastically embracing feminism in the military) (on 
file with author). 
I guess something I have not really mentioned is the NCO responsibility for implementing 
bad policy. Senior officers come up with bad ideas and as much as the good NCO’s know 
it will not work, they feel professionally obligated to implement it because that is what 
they do. They are just as, or even more reluctant to fight bad policies for the sake of their 
careers and many feel that at a certain time, it is not worth fighting the system. 
Id. 
 605. E-mail from deployed infantryman in Iraq to the author (Dec. 11, 2006) (explaining the risks 
of gender integrating Military Training Teams) (on file with author). 
The Iraqis, as you know, are not prepared to deal with women in a professional capacity. 
They have no EO or sensitivity training. Women to them are almost cattle and they will 
see no problem in making aggressive sexual advances, particularly since American 
women are seen as petite and exotic. The tough girl attitude loses its charm when a 300 
man battalion of Iraqis have no problem groping, leering and raping a gung ho female 
American. The CA [Civil Affairs] team . . . replaced a team with a female captain. What 
happened to the previous team illustrates the very worst that could happen to an 
integrated MTT team. The female CA captain was sleeping with all of the powerful local 
Iraqi contacts. She compromised her mission and her team. She was removed and her 
disgraced team replaced. Who knows how much classified information she could have 
given away. At the very least, her team was unable to do its job. 
Id. (alteration added). 
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infantry, have not changed. “Tip of the spear” ground-combat troops should not 
be managed as if they are the “tip of the spoon.” 
DoD regulations are clear, but Army officials keep arrogating to themselves 
the power to order young female soldiers into units that are required to be all-
male. Because responsible decisions on this issue are long overdue—and are too 
important to be decided without accountability—the Secretary of Defense 
should: 
• Direct Army officials to comply with current DoD regulations 
regarding female soldiers, including the collocation rule. 
• Ensure compliance in new units requiring close combat experience and 
readiness, such as small combat Military Transition Teams (MTTs), 
which train male Iraqi troops in combat skills. 
• Order a reevaluation of some positions, such as the military police, to 
determine areas that resemble direct ground combat. To ensure 
compliance with regulations, it may be necessary to divide the 
occupational title to reflect current realities. 
• Direct female search team (FST) leaders to begin the process of training 
Iraqi women to assist their own forces in doing searches of female Iraqi 
civilians. 
• Instruct Army officials that if they want to change or repeal the 1994 
Aspin regulations, including the collocation rule, they first must obtain 
the written approval of the Secretary of Defense. (This responsibility is 
too important to be delegated to a subordinate.) 
• Provide formal notice of proposed regulation changes to Congress well 
in advance, as mandated by law, together with the legally required 
analysis of the consequences for Selective Service obligations. 
• Provide long-overdue information to Congress on how many female 
soldiers have been physically placed in ground-combat-collocated 
units—and explain why this has been permitted. 
• Dismiss or demote civilian and military officials who are responsible 
for any shortages of male soldiers for the combat arms, and those who 
have ordered the placement of female soldiers in units that are 
required to be all male. 
• If the Army is allowed to continue status-quo placements of women in 
or near formerly all-male units, the Secretary should issue a formal 
news release announcing that female soldiers can and will be assigned 
involuntarily in or near direct-ground-combat units, such as the 
infantry. This information should be posted in all recruiting offices. 
• Officials who are reluctant to provide this information publicly should 
honestly assess why they are reluctant. 
c. Recruit to Meet Requirements 
If there is a greater need of men for the combat arms, the President should 
speak directly to young men and ask them to consider serving in uniform. In the 
years since 9/11, the President has yet to issue such a call, but it is likely that 
sufficient numbers of young men would respond affirmatively if he were to do 
so. 
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The various branches of the services are required to recruit people to fill 
anticipated needs. The military service academies have the responsibility to 
tailor the makeup of each incoming class, and the service departments make 
assignments of graduates to meet current and future requirements. The 
Secretary of Defense should: 
• Instruct leaders of the various services to adjust recruiting goals and 
drop gender-based quotas, in order to provide the proper “inventory” 
of soldiers for commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, including those 
responsible for combat training Military Transition Teams (MTTs).606 
• Protect the volunteer force by defending, without apology, the right of 
access for recruiters and ROTC units at high schools and colleges.607 
• Instruct all military service academy superintendents to increase the 
number of cadets and midshipmen who are eligible for the combat 
communities that are needed most: Combined infantry/armor 
battalions, Special Operations Forces, Marine Infantry, Navy SEALS, 
and submarines. 
• Instruct all recruiters that they should provide accurate information 
about the risks involved in military service—i.e., that there are no laws 
exempting women from “combat” and regulations regarding women 
do not exempt them from being “In Harm’s Way.” 
• Encourage recruiters to spend primary time and effort with the cohort 
of people who are most likely to sign up and finish basic training—i.e., 
young men, who are also needed in greater numbers for the combat 
arms. 
d. Encourage Discipline, not Indiscipline 
Both civilian and military policy makers have the responsibility to set 
conditions so that troops in the field can succeed. Given the many social 
disruptions that have occurred in recent years, Pentagon policy makers have a 
responsibility to deter similar incidents in the future. A senior Marine officer 
wrote, 
As for the unit cohesion argument is concerned, you cite studies. I can tell you, 
first hand, that females and males in forward deployed units do not mix well. 
Flirtations and relationships on ships and remotely deployed units do have an 
adverse effect on morale and unit cohesiveness. We deal with it every day here 
in Iraq.608 
Behavioral perfection is beyond the human condition; personnel policies 
should encourage discipline rather than indiscipline. The Indiana National 
 
 606. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 mandated an end to gender 
quotas, goals, and ceilings. See Pub. L. No 103-160, § 543(a)(2), 107 Stat. 1547, 1660 (1993). 
 607. The “Solomon Amendment,” legislation passed in 1996 to protect access for recruiters, was 
upheld by the Supreme Court on March 6, 2006. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. 
(FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). See also Guy Taylor, Colleges’ Military Bans Rejected, WASH. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at A1. 
 608. E-mail from senior Marine officer in Fallujah, Iraq, to author (July 20, 2005) (on file with 
author). 
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Guard has provided a small but significant demonstration of how sound policies 
can work to reduce incidents of misconduct. 
In 2005, the Indiana National Guard was dealing with serious allegations of 
rape and sexual misconduct between military recruiters and teenagers. The 
GAO reported 629 confirmed cases of sexual misconduct in FYs 2004 and 2005. 
The Associated Press reported that the highly inappropriate incidents involved 
trusting girls—and some boys—who were offered alcohol and sexual attention 
in the recruiting stations after hours.609 
The GAO also reported that only ten percent of the allegations of sexual 
misconduct were substantiated or corroborated (629 of 6602).610 Even if the 
remaining ninety percent of cases were discounted by half, a large portion of the 
recruiters were being falsely accused. 
Instead of panicking and sacking any recruiter accused of misconduct, the 
Indiana Guard adopted a policy, called “No One Alone,” which addressed both 
problems: sexual misconduct and false allegations of the same. This policy 
simply states that adult recruiters may not be alone with teenage prospects in 
offices, cars, or anywhere else. If they are, or if they fail to report another 
recruiter’s misconduct, they risk immediate disciplinary action. Wallet-sized 
“Guard Cards” advise parents and students of the rules and a telephone number 
to call if they experience anything improper. 
As a result of this sensible program, which deters inappropriate conduct 
and discourages false accusations, morale is more secure, community trust is up, 
and misconduct reports are down.611 The Congress included language in the 
report accompanying the 2007 Defense Authorization Act, encouraging the 
Defense Department to adopt the Indiana National Guard’s “No One Alone” 
policy as a DoD standard.612 
Policies to deter sexual misconduct between adults are more complicated 
but have a better chance of succeeding if they acknowledge human failings, 
instead of operating on the assumption that men and women are 
interchangeable beings who can be perfected with a few “sensitivity training” 
sessions run by “victim advocate” professionals. The Secretary of Defense, the 
service chiefs, academy superintendents and all military installations should: 
• Adopt social policies that are rooted in reality, not social fiction. 
• Enforce “No One Alone” policies for all recruiters who work with 
teenagers and potential recruits for all the services. 
 
 609. Martha Mendoza, Preying on Recruits, NAVY TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at 14–16; James Gillaspy & 
Dan McFeely, Military Recruiter Accused of Sex Assaults, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.notinourname.net/youth/recruiter-sex-assault-1mar05.htm. 
 610. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY RECRUITING, DOD AND SERVICES NEED BETTER DATA 
TO ENHANCE VISIBILITY OVER RECRUITER IRREGULARITIES 19 (Aug. 2006), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06846.pdf. 
 611. See Elaine Donnelly, Remedies for Recruiter Abuse, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at B3. 
 612. Rick Maze, Lawmakers Want Tougher Recruiting Rules, AIR FORCE TIMES, Oct. 4, 2006, available 
at http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-2150102.php; H.R. REP. NO. 109-702 (2006) 
(Conf. Rep.). See also Bryan Bender, Pentagon Acts to Crack Down on Recruiter Misconduct, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 19, 2007, at A1. 
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• End or discourage gender-mixed housing arrangements and other 
situations that encourage unprofessional relationships, including the 
use of alcohol. 
• Decline requests for funding of an “office of victim advocate” in the 
Pentagon, and avoid mandates to needlessly increase such services, 
which are readily available at the local installations. 
• Investigate all reports of sexual misconduct or abuse, having respect 
for the privacy of a person alleging abuse prior to the filing of a 
complaint, but also providing full protection for the rights of the 
accused after a complaint is filed. 
e. Respect for Family and Cultural Values 
At times in history our leaders have had no choice but to send young men 
to fight. We do have a choice, however, about sending women and single 
mothers. America is a large and patriotic country; there is no demographic or 
military reason why we must send so many young women and mothers to fight 
our wars. 
Since the September 11, 2001, attacks on America, some individuals, 
including single and dual-service parents, have been rotated in and out of the 
war zone several times, on deployments lengthened by several months. It is long 
past time for policymakers to implement policies that alleviate the psychological 
damage done to emotionally vulnerable children. There are several things that 
the Secretary of Defense should do to address these problems: 
• Review and revise all family policies that do not provide a reasonable 
balance between the interests of the parent, field commanders, and 
vulnerable children.613 
• Order appropriate DoD offices to consider or act upon the various 
recommendations regarding family issues that were made by the 
Presidential Commission in 1992, but not implemented.614 
• Order the National Guard and Reserves to revise recruitment policies 
and benefit subsidies, which have the effect of increasing the number 
of single parents with custody, and the number of dependent children 
separated from their parents during lengthy deployments. 
• Issue guidelines for disciplining military personnel who fail to make 
secure arrangements for the care of their children. 
• Conduct and release studies of military post-traumatic stress disorder, 
which monitor and report on gender differences, plus additional 
 
 613. Single parents who want to join the active duty force frequently surrender custody of their 
children to others in order to sign up. 
 614. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 54 (Issue H: Parental and Family 
Policies, Alternative Views). 
In order to reduce the number of children subjected to prolonged separation or the risk of 
becoming orphans during deployment, long-term DoD policies regarding the recruitment, 
deployment and retention of single and dual-service parents should be revised on a 
phased-in basis. Such policies should allow for voluntary or involuntary discharges at the 
discretion of local commanders, or reasonable incentives for separation. They may also 
include waivers by local commanders in certain circumstances. 
Id. 
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studies providing information on the impact of long separations on 
military parents and children. 
f. Enforce the 1993 Homosexual Conduct Law 
Activists who want to repeal the law banning homosexuals from the 
military are determined to impose their agenda on the military. This would 
include the full range of benefits and “sensitivity training” programs designed 
to promote acceptance of the homosexual lifestyle and conduct.615 For the sake of 
civilian institutions as well as the military, they should not be allowed to 
succeed.616 
President George W. Bush is obligated by the U.S. Constitution to enforce 
all laws, but he is not required to retain administrative regulations written by his 
predecessor, including the policy known by the catch phrase “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell.” Whether intended or not, inconsistencies between Clinton’s policy and the 
1993 homosexual conduct law create an advantage for activists who want to 
repeal both. 
In doing this, the Department of Defense should not apologize or be 
intimidated by civil rights analogies and pejorative accusations. Gen. Colin 
Powell, who was Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff early in the Clinton 
Administration, wrote a classic letter addressing the subject to then-Rep. Patricia 
Schroeder (D-Colo.) in 1993. Dismissing Schroeder’s argument that his position 
reminded her of arguments used in the 1950s against desegregating the military, 
Gen. Powell replied: 
I know you are a history major but I can assure you I need no reminders 
concerning the history of African-Americans in the defense of their nation and 
the tribulations they faced. I am part of that history. . . . Skin color is a benign, 
non-behavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is perhaps the most profound 
of human behavioral characteristics. Comparison of the two is a convenient but 
invalid argument.617 
Columnist Charles Krauthammer agreed: 
Powell’s case does not just rest on tradition or fear. It rests on the distinction 
between behavioral and non-behavioral characteristics. Skin color is a non-
behavioral trait. Homosexuality, like gender, is not. Consider the behavioral 
implications of gender differences: Men and women are sexually attracted to 
each other and sexual attraction engenders feelings not just of desire but shame 
and a wish for privacy. . . . 
That is why if a white person refuses association with blacks, the military tells 
him that the refusal is irrational and will not be respected. But the military does 
 
 615. See supra note 411. 
 616. Closing scenes in the 1947 film Miracle on 34th Street suggest a strategy for the movement to 
gain legitimacy. The classic Christmas film ends happily when a kindly gentleman named Kris 
Kringle is recognized as Santa Claus by the U.S. Postal Service, which forwards thousands of 
children’s letters to him. If another respected government agency, the U.S. military, bestows 
legitimacy on the campaign for homosexual rights, recognition would soon be extended to other 
federal, state, and local agencies, and even private institutions that receive public support. 
 617. Elmo R. Zumwalt & J.G. Zumwalt, Schroeder Ignores Wise Advice from Powell, HUM. EVENTS, 
June 1, 1992. 
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respect the difference between men and women. Because the cramped and 
intimate quarters of the military afford no privacy, the military sensibly and 
non-controversially does not force man and women to share barracks.618 
In recent years, advocates of gays in the military have been promoting the 
idea that sexual modesty does not matter, since modern military facilities 
provide more privacy than older ones. Even if people are exposed to others in 
the field, they say, younger people are used to it, and this is not a big deal.619 This 
is an elitist argument, which is contradicted in numerous ways that usually 
escape notice. 
A midwestern family-oriented recreation center, for example, has separate 
locker rooms for men and women, next to the community pool. Inside the 
entrance of the women’s locker room is a sign clearly stating that boys of any 
age are not permitted. A similar sign, regarding girls, is posted in the men’s 
locker room. The signs are there not as an affront to young boys (or girls). They 
are there because the community respects the desire for sexual modesty in 
conditions of forced intimacy. This is the case even though people who use the 
recreation center do not live and sleep there for months at a time. 
Servicemen and women in the military deserve the same consideration, and 
much more. As columnist Thomas Sowell wrote, “Military morale is an 
intangible, but it is one of those intangibles without which the tangibles do not 
work.”620 Military people depend on policymakers to remember basic realities 
and to guard their best interests. Considerations such as this strengthen vertical 
cohesion—the indispensable bond of trust between military leaders and the 
troops they lead. 
To ensure that the intent of Congress is carried out with regard to 
homosexuals in the military, the Secretary of Defense should: 
• Improve understanding and enforcement of the law by eliminating the 
Clinton Administration’s enforcement regulations, known as “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell,” which are inconsistent with the 1993 law that 
Congress actually passed, and (better yet) restore “the question” about 
homosexuality that used to be on induction forms prior to January 
1993. 
• Oppose any legislative attempt to repeal the 1993 homosexual conduct 
law in Congress. 
• Ensure that the 1993 statute is vigorously defended every time it is 
challenged in the federal courts. 
• Prepare and distribute accurate instructional materials for potential 
recruits, recruiters, and all military personnel that include the text and 
legislative history of the 1993 law. 
• Remind the media that everyone can serve their country in some way, 
but not everyone is eligible to be in the military. 
 
 618. Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed, Powell Needs No Lectures, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1993, at A23. 
 619. Aaron Belkin & Melissa Sheridan Embser-Herbert, A Modest Proposal, 27 INT’L SEC. 178 (Fall 
2002). 
 620. Thomas Sowell, The Anointed and Those Who Aren’t, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1993, at E3. 
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2. The Only Military We Have 
Many institutions in civilian life have been affected negatively by 
unsuccessful social experimentation. The baby boomer and “Gen-X” 
generations, for example, have been subjected to “look-say” reading, “new 
math,” and “civics” courses that fail to teach students fundamentals about 
history and the U.S. Constitution. In matters of urban policy, whole cities have 
been threatened by unrestrained crime, ruinous taxes, and crumbling 
neighborhoods. 
Parents who are dissatisfied with the public schools can choose private 
ones or teach their children at home. If residents do not like the way their city is 
being managed, they can run for local office or move to another city. Some states 
gain population while others lose. Consumers constantly choose favored 
products over less desirable ones. This is a free country, and limitless choices are 
always available. 
When it comes to national defense, however, there are no options from 
which to choose. Today’s volunteer force is the only military we have. All of our 
freedoms are guaranteed by a strong national defense, which cannot be taken 
for granted in a dangerous world. 
Our national security depends on the men and women of the military. For 
our own sake as well as theirs, the co-ed military must be constructed on 
foundations that are sound. We have to get this right; it is the only military we 
have. Ours is the strongest military in the world, and we have an obligation to 
keep it that way. 
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APPENDIX A 
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994, PUB. L. NO. 
103-160, § 571, 107 STAT. 1547, 1670 (1993) (CODIFIED AT 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000)) 
(a) Codification.—(1) Chapter 37 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following new section: 
§ 654. Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces 
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States commits 
exclusively to the Congress the powers to raise and support armies, provide 
and maintain a Navy, and make rules for the government and regulation of 
the land and naval forces. 
(2) There is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces. 
(3) Pursuant to the powers conferred by section 8 of article I of the 
Constitution of the United States, it lies within the discretion of the 
Congress to establish qualifications for and conditions of service in the 
armed forces. 
(4) The primary purpose of the armed forces is to prepare for and to prevail 
in combat should the need arise. 
(5) The conduct of military operations requires members of the armed 
forces to make extraordinary sacrifices, including the ultimate sacrifice, in 
order to provide for the common defense. 
(6) Success in combat requires military units that are characterized by high 
morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion. 
(7) One of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit cohesion, 
that is, the bonds of trust among individual service members that make the 
combat effectiveness of a military unit greater than the sum of the combat 
effectiveness of the individual unit members. 
(8) Military life is fundamentally different from civilian life in that— 
(A) the extraordinary responsibilities of the armed forces, the unique 
conditions of military service, and the critical role of unit cohesion, 
require that the military community, while subject to civilian control, 
exist as a specialized society; and 
(B) the military society is characterized by its own laws, rules, customs, 
and traditions, including numerous restrictions on personal behavior, 
that would not be acceptable in civilian society. 
(9) The standards of conduct for members of the armed forces regulate a 
member’s life for 24 hours each day beginning at the moment the member 
enters military status and not ending until that person is discharged or 
otherwise separated from the armed forces. 
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(10) Those standards of conduct, including the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, apply to a member of the armed forces at all times that the member 
has a military status, whether the member is on base or off base, and 
whether the member is on duty or off duty. 
(11) The pervasive application of the standards of conduct is necessary 
because members of the armed forces must be ready at all times for 
worldwide deployment to a combat environment. 
(12) The worldwide deployment of United States military forces, the 
international responsibilities of the United States, and the potential for 
involvement of the armed forces in actual combat routinely make it 
necessary for members of the armed forces involuntarily to accept living 
conditions and working conditions that are often spartan, primitive, and 
characterized by forced intimacy with little or no privacy. 
(13) The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding element 
of military law that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances 
of military service. 
(14) The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude 
persons whose presence in the armed forces would create an unacceptable 
risk to the armed forces’ high standards of morale, good order and 
discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability. 
(15) The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a 
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an 
unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and 
discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability. 
(b) Policy.—A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed 
forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more of 
the following findings is made and approved in accordance with procedures set 
forth in such regulations: 
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited 
another to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are further 
findings, made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in 
such regulations, that the member has demonstrated that— 
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member’s usual and 
customary behavior; 
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur; 
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or 
intimidation; 
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member’s 
continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests 
of the armed forces in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and 
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in 
homosexual acts. 
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, 
or words to that effect, unless there is a further finding, made and approved 
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in accordance with procedures set forth in the regulations, that the member 
has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to 
engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in 
homosexual acts. 
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to 
be of the same biological sex. 
(c) Entry standards and documents.— 
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the standards for enlistment 
and appointment of members of the armed forces reflect the policies set 
forth in subsection (b). 
(2) The documents used to effectuate the enlistment or appointment of a 
person as a member of the armed forces shall set forth the provisions of 
subsection (b). 
(d) Required briefings.—The briefings that members of the armed forces receive 
upon entry into the armed forces and periodically thereafter under section 937 
of this title [10 U.S.C. § 937] (article 137 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) 
shall include a detailed explanation of the applicable laws and regulations 
governing sexual conduct by members of the armed forces, including the 
policies prescribed under subsection (b). 
(e) Rule of construction.—Nothing in subsection (b) shall be construed to require 
that a member of the armed forces be processed for separation from the armed 
forces when a determination is made in accordance with regulations prescribed 
by the Secretary of Defense that— 
(1) the member engaged in conduct or made statements for the purpose of 
avoiding or terminating military service; and 
(2) separation of the member would not be in the best interest of the armed 
forces. 
(f) Definitions.—In this section: 
(1) The term “homosexual” means a person, regardless of sex, who engages 
in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to 
engage in homosexual acts, and includes the terms “gay” and “lesbian”. 
(2) The term “bisexual” means a person who engages in, attempts to engage 
in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual and 
heterosexual acts. 
(3) The term “homosexual act” means— 
(A) any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, 
between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual 
desires; and 
(B) any bodily contact which a reasonable person would understand to 
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act described in 
subparagraph (A). 
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(b) Regulations.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act 
[Nov. 30, 1993], the Secretary of Defense shall revise Department of Defense 
regulations, and issue such new regulations as may be necessary, to implement 
section 654 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a). 
(c) Savings Provision.—Nothing in this section or section 654 of title 10, United 
States Code, as added by subsection (a), may be construed to invalidate any 
inquiry, investigation, administrative action or proceeding, court-martial, or 
judicial proceeding conducted before the effective date of regulations issued by 
the Secretary of Defense to implement such section 654. 
(d) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the suspension of questioning concerning homosexuality as part of the 
processing of individuals for accession into the Armed Forces under the interim 
policy of January 29, 1993, should be continued, but the Secretary of Defense 
may reinstate that questioning with such questions or such revised questions as 
he considers appropriate if the Secretary determines that it is necessary to do so 
in order to effectuate the policy set forth in section 654 of title 10, United States 
Code, as added by subsection (a); and 
(2) the Secretary of Defense should consider issuing guidance governing the 
circumstances under which members of the Armed Forces questioned about 
homosexuality for administrative purposes should be afforded warnings similar 
to the warnings under section 831(b) of title 10, United States Code (article 31(b) 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice). 
